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Chapter I: Introduction
Imagine a world without sexual craving. Katie Roiphe talks of such a place, as
invented by the feminist writer Charlotte Perkins Gilman in her book Her land. In this
make-believe utopia, "everything runs smoothly and rationally...[and] none of the
women harbors any sexual feelings, towards men or towards each other" (86). The
concept of sexual desire is nonexistent in this world of fiction. But the real world is not
Herland. The real world is a place where people can be, and are, sexually harassed.
So it is somewhat surprising that sexual harassment, as an area of research and
analysis, has only been studied for approximately twenty years. As such, many questions
still exist. This thesis is a continuance of this relatively new area of research and a search
for answers via the method of rhetorical analysis. Specifically, this thesis is seeking to
make a determination as to the effectiveness of sexual harassment codes on college and
university campuses. "Effectiveness" is meant in this instance to indicate the degree to
which these codes function as persuasive means of explaining and responding to sexual
harassment.
Crucial to such an issue of function is an initial preview of the definition of sexual
harassment that will be the focal point of our critical inquiry: the one created by Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in 1980 [EEOC]. This definition, as this thesis will
demonstrate, is the basis of sexual harassment codes on campuses across the nation. But,
1 Portions of this thesis have been presented at conferences under the titles: "Rethinking the Constraints:
Examination, Application, and Revision of 'The Rhetorical Situation" (Northwest Communication
Association Conference, April 1997) and "The Ethical Implications of the Rhetorical Situation: An
Analysis of College and University Sexual Harassment Codes" (Speech Communication Association
Conference, November 1996).2
as will also become clear, the EEOC definition is complicated by the nature of the
situation in which it resides. What follows is the EEOC definition and the liabilities that
extend from it:
Section 1604.11 Sexual Harassment
a.) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of
Sec. 703 of Title VII. Unwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's
employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
an individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect
of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment.
b.) In determining whether alleged conduct
constitutes sexual harassment, the Commission will look at
the records as a whole and the totality of the circumstances,
such as the alleged nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred. The
determination of the legality of a particular action will be
made from the facts on a case by case basis.
c.) Applying general Title VII principles, an
employer, employment agency, joint apprenticeship
committee or labor org nization (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and
those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect
to sexual harassment regardless of whether the specific acts
complained of were authorized or even forbidden by the
employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence. The Commission
will examine the circumstances of the particular employment
relationship and the job functions of the particular
employment relationship and the job functions performed by
the individual in determining whether an individual acts in
either a supervisory or agency capacity.
d.) With respect to conduct between fellow
employees, an employer is responsible for acts of sexual
harassment in the work place where the employer (or its
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have3
known of the conduct, unless it can be shown that it took
immediate and appropriate corrective action.
e.) An employer may also be responsible for the
acts of non-employees, with respect to sexual harassment of
employees in the workplace, where the employer (or its
agents or supervisory employees) knows or should have
known of the conduct and fails to take immediate and
appropriate corrective action. In reviewing these cases, the
Commission will consider the extent of the employer's
control and any other legal responsibility which the
employer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-
employees.
f.) Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of
sexual harassment. An employer should take all steps
necessary to prevent sexual harassment from occurring,
such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressing strong
disapproval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing
employees of their right to raise and how to raise the issue
of harassment under Title VII. and developing methods to
sensitize all concerned.
g.) Other Related Principles: Where employment
opportunities or benefits are granted because of an
individual's submission to the employer's sexual advances or
requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable
for unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who
were qualified for but denied that employment opportunity
or benefit. (Crusius and Channel 374-375)
From this foundation my rhetorical analysis develops along a distinct path. That is
to say, the research that currently exists in relation to sexual harassment is predominately
quantitative rather than qualitative. Present research focuses in large part on how people
react to hypothetical scenarios, material is coded and compiled so as to provide
information as to cases of future fact. But this rhetorical analysis is more present-situated
in that the functions of codes are being studied as historical facts brought to bear in the
current academic situation. As such, a review of literature related to sexual harassment
would be redundant in that specific quantitative materials will be covered extensively in
later chapters. This quantitative material is used to supplement the rhetorical analysis and
to help flesh out distinctions, but is not to be considered the focus of this thesis.4
More generally, there exists an extensive body of research related to the
connections between human interaction and the influences of sex and gender.2 Carol
Gilligan notes that "women's and men's voices [are heard] differently" and, historically,
men have been given primarily placement and women have largely been relegated to a
secondary status in matters of relationship ("Letter" xiv). Given this divide, Gilligan
develops a more thorough treatment of women's perceptions--of relationships, of
interdependence, of conflict - -in the ground breaking In a Different Voice. And works
since then have furthered this discussion by examining the ways in which men and women
differ, the ways in which they are similar, the ways in which they react -- socially,
interpersonally, and so on--to these relatively new discussions of sex and gender.
This ongoing discussion about the effects of sex and gender is important. But, as
much as this information textures my research focus, it also does little to get at the
problem I am seeking to examine: sexual harassment codes as a matter of persuasive
discourse. While male and female, masculine and feminine, differences and similarities are
an obvious component of any discussion of sexual harassment, too extensive a treatment
thereof would only serve to muddle the direction and clarity of my thesis. The purpose of
my research is not to study the gender and/or sex implications of the codes per se. Rather,
I am looking at the codes as a distinctive rhetorical response to sexual harassment. As
such, sex and gender theory will be used in much the same way as the quantitative
2 For a discussion of socialized gender roles and their effect on the sexes in specific communication
contexts, refer to Scudder, Joseph N., and Patricia Hayes Andrews. "A Comparison of Two Alternative
Models of Powerful Speech: The Impact of Power and Gender Upon the Use of Threats." Communication
Research Reports 12 (1995): 25-33. For information related to sex biases in the promotion of specific
communicative frameworks, see Shepherd, Gregory J. "Communication as Influence: Definitional
Exclusion." Communication Studies 43 (1992): 204-217; and Foss, Sonja, and Cindy Griffin. "Beyond
Persuasion: A Proposal for An Invitational Rhetoric." Communication Monographs 62 (1995): 2-17.
Finally, for general overviews of sex and gender differences, refer to Stewart, Lea P., et al.
Communication Between the Sexes: Sex Differences and Sex-role Stereotypes. 2nd ed. Scottsdale:
Gorsuch Scarisbrick, 1990; and Bate, Barbara, and Judith Bowker. Communication and The Sexes.
Prospect Heights, Ill: Waveland Press, Inc., 1996.5
materials. At those points where such material is pertinent to the ongoing rhetorical
discussion, it will be included to help expand the understanding of sexual harassment.
Moreover, the structure of this thesis is dictated in large part on the basis of the
theoretical model I have chosen and will expand upon in the following chapters. Initially,
we must set the situational stage. Chapter Two will provide us with a philosophical
explanation of codes as ethical sanctions on conduct and will serve to demonstrate the
situational nature of the codes as a response to sexual harassment. More so, this chapter
will help us to determine the dual function of the codes--as explanations of and sanctions
against sexual harassment--as previewed at the start of the introduction. The next chapter
will then introduce the method to be used in studying the codes. Therein we will examine
the situational approach to rhetoric as articulated by Dr. Lloyd F. Bitzer. This framework
is based in the assumption that there are three primary components that determine a
situation: exigence (an imperfection), constraints (which mediate changes within the
situation), and audience (those who respond to the rhetor's discourse by changing the
exigence). All things being equal, a rhetor will craft a response to the situation that is in
line with these components; such a response would be considered "fitting" in that the sum
result would be the audience responding to the rhetor in such a way as to positively
modify the exigence. Pause will then be given to critiques, such as those provided by
Richard E. Vatz and K.E. Wilkerson, that have come about in response to Bitzer's
situational perspective. We will finally examine one application of this model so as to
more thoroughly understand the previous criticisms and the possible limitations of the
situational approach that these criticisms suggest.
Chapter Four will examine the development of the exigence of sexual harassment
as a historical, societal fact and a situational component on campuses. This analysis will
clarify how the exigence, in a parallel to the dual functions of the codes, is observable as a
factual and perceptual entity. The focus of Chapter Five will be the persons who stand as
possible mediators of the exigence. These persons, as will become clear, create both6
general publics and a specific rhetorical audience capable of modifying the exigence of
sexual harassment. But these persons are also subject to forces, to constraints, that limit
and restrain their ability to respond both to the exigence and to the discourse of the codes.
Additionally, the creators of the codes are subject to and, in turn, create situational
restrictions. As such, Chapter Six will explore both the inartistic and artistic constraints
within the campus situation.
With the above components of the situation thus set forth, we finally turn our
attention to determining the degree to which sexual harassment codes function as fitting
response to the campus situation. Crucial to this analysis within Chapter Seven is the
extent to which the dual functions of the codes respond to the realities of sexual
harassment. As will become clear, it is my estimation that the codes as currently
articulated are not "fitting" in so far as they fail to accurately reflect the factual and
perceptual conditions of the exigence. Given this determination, we must turn our
attention to possible revisions which might provide a response that is more "fitting" than
the one currently in existence. These suggestions, while initially radical in their departure
from the standard means of creating codes, are nonetheless based in: 1) the analysis thus
conducted, and 2) a pragmatic belief that present realities must be integrated into the
codes if future benefits are to be had.
The goal of this thesis is to promote a more thorough understanding of sexual
harassment--as a social factor, a historical development, and an academic problem. On a
more personal level, I hope that this thesis would lead to a reassessment of how we
formulate sexual harassment codes. To my mind, progress in prevention of sexual
harassment must be sparked by reflection-based revisions that seek not absolute standards,
but flexible guidelines. Sexual harassment cannot be forced into a template, and to
continue with such an assumption is to disgrace those falsely accused and demean those
that suffer unduly from its real and unethical harms.7
Chapter H:
Codes as Ethical Constructs
Moral communities [are] founded on a blend of consensus
on general norms for important roles and tolerance for how
people play the roles....it remains an unrealized ideal for
entire societies but still a viable target for aspiration....
true community may not be possible in any society until it is
achieved throughout the world. (Kultgen 51)
The statement above is generalizable to the nature of the problem regarding sexual
harassment codes on college and university campuses: we would ideally wish that persons
did not harass others, but such a wish is affected by the diversity of factors such as the
perceptions of the persons involved, the nature of the situation, and the types of
constraints within a given environment. While we will defer a more extensive discussion
of these factors until later chapters, we can at least make the following claims: college and
university codes are a complex mixture of ethical components; the makeup of the ethical
components are as complicated as the mixture they create.
On the one hand, it is obvious that these codes are teleological in that they "hold
that the moral value of an action or practice is a function of the consequences" (Callahan
19). We, as members of the campus community, subject harassers to a variety of
punishments, to consequences, based in their act(s) of harassment. These judgments are
matters of community formulation in that we make determinations as to what acts "would
survive the appeal for justification from reasonable persons" (Bok 93).The ethical codes
that determine such judgments are based in the assumption that "action involves character,
which involves choice; and the form of choice attains its perfection in the distinction
between Yes and No" (Crable 25). These original italics highlight an important feature of
the topic under discussion: choice that takes the form of harassment-as-action
demonstrates that the consequential "No" is based on the quality of character as shown in
the given act.8
At the same time, sexual harassment codes embody an ethical absolute: no one
should harass another person sexually. Given this interpretation, these codes are also
deontological in that "once [the] moral rule is established, it is exceptionless" (19). In
other words, we seek via the condemnation of sexual harassment to codify the inherent
value of an individual to carry on their business free from unwanted sexual acts. Or, as
Martin Buber states in "Elements of the Interhuman," we make judgments against certain
acts so as to engage other persons as an inherently valuable person, deserving of respect,
and capable of thought and choice (31-41). Thus, sexual harassment codes are based in
the category of actions which deny consent and choice as components of participating in a
given sexual act.
Hence, we arrive at a quandary: what purpose do the codes serve as responses to
the exigence? This chapter is an attempt to begin the process of answering that
complicated question. More so, the analysis herein serves to demonstrate that the codes
as ethical constructs is inherently situational in nature; that is to say, the codes herein are a
result of historical factors generally and campus/academic factors specifically. As such,
the discussion will develop in several parts. Initially, we will survey the philosophical
foundations of ethical codes. An analysis of the structure of the sexual harassment codes
will then be undertaken to demonstrate their relation to two basic matters of ethics:
autonomy and sanction. Additionally, these codes will be compared with other ethical
codes of conduct that are found in a variety of professional settings. This comparative
analysis will serve to demonstrate the general connection of the codes to other constructs
that deal with ethical concerns but, more so, the necessary distinctions which render them
unique artifacts suited to individual critical treatment. Finally, by studying the foundations
upon which compliance to codes of conduct are based, we will put forth some concluding
comments relating to the discussion that has occurred. As a result of these observations, it
should become apparent that sexual harassment codes, as much as other codes of conduct,
are: 1) sufficiently complex to warrant the analysis that will occur in the preceding9
chapters, and 2) forms of discourse suitable for scrutiny given the rhetorical framework
that will be endorsed in the very next chapter.
The Foundation of Ethical Codes
As was alluded to in the introduction, ethics deals with questions of morality. The
word ethics, "meaning character or custom," is focused on two general types of concern:
1) individual character and how such is determined, and 2) the social rules which constrain
that conduct by virtue of delineating what is positive and negative in given instances
(Shaw 3). The sum effect of these concerns is evident when we begin to discuss ethical
codes: social rules are provided, codified, so as to regulate the individual's character.
Perhaps the most important component of these codes is the matter of autonomy,
the ability for the individual to govern their actions. But that governance is a tricky
movement between the freedom to make choices and the ability to make those choices
without coercive pressure exercised on our ability to do so (Appelbaum and Lawton 32).
More so, a person must be capable of obtaining all information related to a choice for that
choice to truly operate without coercion; that is, the constraint of information by another
person is coercive in that such constraint factors out details necessary for making a choice
(33).
The autonomous individual is also connected to a larger framework of social
conduct. Worded simply, these social rules of conduct take the form of one of several
principles: paternalism, harm, offense, welfare, or legal moralism. The principle of
paternalism asserts that "a person's self-determination may be justifiably restricted in order
to benefit the person" (35). We would not let a person with a mental disorder, given this
principle, to inflict injury on themselves even though they were capable of doing so. The
harm principle operates in contrast to the first, in that it restricts persons so that they do
not impose harm on other persons (36). Although a rapist can rape a person, it goes10
against the harm principle to allow them to do so. The offense principle contends that it is
just to regulate self-determination if it causes offense to others; a flasher would bean
example of a person in violation of this principle in that their need to expose themselves
conflicts with other person's right to avoid such displays. The fourth type of principle,
welfare, functions in opposition to the harm principle in that the benefit of others is a
justifiable reason to regulate the individual (37). Hypothetically, the person with all of the
food on a desert island would be required, via the welfare principle, to distribute that food
to the other people on the island. The final principle, legal moralism, restricts the
individual "in order to prevent immoral action" (37). Sodomy laws operate asan example
of constraints that restrict sexual activities that certain persons have determined to be
immoral. The second and last principles are the most applicable to sexual harassment
codes. Although shades of all of the principles can be noted in sexual harassment codes,
legal moralism and the harm principle seem the most directly related in that the harm that
is caused is sanctioned against via a legal mechanism that determines harassing behaviors
to be unethical.
Care must be taken at this juncture to note the problems inherent in these types of
principles. While they all favor some type of benefit--to the individual, to others
specifically, to society in general--they also necessarily reduce the function of autonomy.
As such, the questions surrounding ethical codes double back to the very definition of
ethics. That is, how do we deal with the tension between the individual's rights
(autonomy) and the rules of social conduct (codes)? Answers to this question are often as
problematic as they are simple. On one hand, it would be easy to say that total autonomy
is granted if the individual operates outside of the realm of socially constructed rules. But
there are few, if any, cases where a person is capable of such unrestricted freedom; in
other words, there are no hermits in the world today. In an attempt to overcome these
problems, certain theorists have proposed the interesting notion of a subjective, yet
universal code.11
Such is the case in an essay by Paul Allen. He argues that "according to [R.M.]
Hare's thesis of universalizability, logic requires us to decide to do to others only what we
are willing to have done to ourselves--under relevantly similar circumstances" (50). The
obvious problem is that such a formulation leads to some uncomfortable implications: a
murderer, willing to be murdered in a "relevantly similar circumstance," is thus allowed to
murder. Allen, however, believes that the fault in Hare's original theory can be overcome
if we are to look at the idea of immediate freedom: the ability to do what one is currently
choosing to do free from sanction (52).
This form of autonomy that Allen endorses in further channeled into a universal
application: since we would not want another person to take away our immediate
freedom, "every agent is required by logic not to decide to thwart the immediate freedom
of others" (53). More so, this principle is constrained by the "relevant clause" of Hare's
original theory in that any feature that is found in our formulation of immediate freedom is
extended to our consideration of others (54). By this logic, we cannot murder because we
would not allow ourselves to be murdered. The reason is that the immediate freedom we
have is based on our autonomy and the person to be murdered has the exact same
autonomy--the inclination to murder is thus rendered secondary to our ability to operate
autonomously. Allen's revision is thus: 1) subjective by being based on our own
preference for autonomy; and 2) universal in that it would be held by all logical thinking
people in any situation (56-57).
This type of construction of moral conduct is faulty in at least two regards, both of
which are demonstrated sufficiently when taking into consideration sexual harassment. If
"logic" is a requirement for the proper functioning of Allen's theory, then many instances
subject to ethical consideration fall outside its reach. When we recall the harm and legal
moralism principles, we notice that they hinge on stopping actions that fall outside of
ethical conduct as prescribed by social rules. Actions of this type can be labeled illogical
in so far as the rules of social conduct define right and wrong. Secondly, Allen keeps12
Hare's notion of "relevance" as a component of his formulation. But, judgments of what is
relevant are significantly hampered when actions are illogically autonomous; the need to
fondle another person for sexual pleasure is an irrelevant factor in judging how we
ethically treat another person, insofar as that other person does not want to be fondled. In
sum, Allen's formulation seems to be idealistic at best and utopian at worst when making
ethical and moral judgments about codes of conduct generally or sexual harassment codes
in particular.
Now that we have looked at the general reasons for the formulation of ethical
codes, and at the problems inherent in one attempt to deal with their complex nature, we
must turn our attention to the nature of sexual harassment codes on college and university
campuses. By looking at the specifics of these codes, we will be able to understand better
their relationship to other types of ethical codes that are operative in society today.
Additionally, later questions of compliance will become easier to address with the
structure of the codes already laid out.
Sexual Harassment Codes
As was mentioned in the introductory chapter, the definition of "sexual
harassment" created by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC] in 1980
is the primary explanation of the problem used in a wide variety of legal, employment, and
educational settings. This definition includes two manners of harassment, quid pro quo
and "hostile environment," and also the liabilities that extend from either type of
harassment (Crusius & Channell 374-375).
Each campus code is based on the above factors offered by the EEOC. In addition
many of the codes make a direct reference to the ethical implications of sexual harassment.
Oregon State University, the first of the artifacts in the rhetorical analysis, includes the
comment in its 1995 Purpose Statement that OSU realizes there are "moral and legal13
obligations to ensure" that the campus is free from sexual harassment - -a rather direct
explication of OSU's belief that constraints must be placed on the social conduct of those
persons within the campus community (1).
Slight modifications are also made to the codes so as to focus the definitions on
the academic arena. To illustrate this point, note the similarity of the following three
definitions of sexual harassment:
1."Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature" (Oregon State University, "1994" 1).
2."Sexual harassment may involve the behavior of a person of either sex against a person
of the opposite or same sex, and occurs when such behavior constitutes unwelcome
sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors, and other unwelcome verbal
or physical behavior of a sexual nature" (Rice University, "1992" 1).
3."Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment" (Crusius and Channel 374).
In the first two definitions, the influence of the third -- EEOC -- definition is more
than just passing. The former modifies the EEOC definition with the movement of a few
words; the latter makes the definition more inclusive with a direct reference to same-sex
sexual harassment. Other codes are illustrative of the same point. Western Washington
University's 1986 definition uses the exact EEOC definition (1); Middlebury College in
Vermont offers a brief statement of purpose that then refers to the "violations of the civil
rights laws" (1); Howard University in Washington, DC, simply refers the readers to Titles
VII and EX in its 1993 policy (1); and The University of Maryland College Park code is
once again a subtle modification of the EEOC definition (3-4).
When the focus shifts to what makes sexual harassment illegal, the definitions
again turn directly to the EEOC: as an implicit or explicit condition of employment or
"education," as a basis for employment or "educational decisions," or when it
unreasonably affects the "academic conditions" so as to create an intimidating, hostile, or14
offensive environment. Cornell University substitutes the word "conditions" for the term
"performance" (1). But law student Jollee Faber mentions one area that is not covered in
these codes: student-to-student harassment (86). Although court cases have established
the connection of employer/employee and student/teacher harassment claims filed under
Title IX and VII, they have not outlined how legal recourse is to be addressed in peer
harassment cases (86-90).3
The result is that academic institutions have phrased codes in such a way as to
imply all types of harassment, yet ignore specific cases. The conclusion that Barbara Bate
and Judith Bowker reach in regards to secondary institutions easily applies to colleges and
universities as well: "policies continue to be written primarily with the teacher/student
relationship in mind, giving only passing notice to harassment among students" (252). The
absence of recourse in the codes for this type of harassment serves to demonstrate that
sexual harassment codes are comparably similar in not only what they include, but what
they leave out.
The changes in the organizational structure of the codes are relatively minor
These changes are, for the most part, expansions of the procedural sections or, in other
cases, the inclusion of the EEOC guidelines where they had only been referenced
previously. The former types of change are the result of legal changes that affect issues,
such as the length of time to file a complaint; the latter modifications occurred in the years
directly after the creation of the 1980 definition and liabilities, representing a move to
bring the then-current sexual harassment policies in line with the new federal regulations.4
In sum, colleges and universities vary the word choice, placement, and content with few
3 Faber's argument is complicated by a troubling fact: although the codes may not deal explicitly with
peer-to-peer harassment, supplemental materials do. The Rice University artifact is contradicted in that a
pamphlet that is given to all new staff, and available to students, makes the claim that "peer harassment is
one of the most common forms of sexual harassment"(2). But this statement does not mention that such
action is not considered in a legal sense.
4 The two artifacts that are the focus of this thesis contain representative examples of these historical
modifications and they will be expanded upon in the fitting response section, Chapter Seven.15
exceptions to the pattern described above. But, from this starting point, the codes develop
along one of two paths. So as to simplify matters, we will henceforth label these basic and
extended codes.
The first type, basic, contains the above definitions and provisions (modified as
described above to suit the academic setting) and the procedural process through which a
person can use the code. A representative example of this type is the previously
mentioned sexual harassment policy offered at Oregon State University. The introductory
section contains statements of purpose, policy, and definition, followed by the more
general statements related to consensual relationships and the ways in which to create a
harassment free environment (1-3). The code then goes into an extended amount of detail
in describing complaint procedures of both a formal and informal nature. The former is
"the process of gathering information to either establish a suspicion of sexual harassment
or to attempt to resolve a disagreement without following a formal procedure"; whereas
the latter is "the process of investigating a case of alleged sexual harassment and making a
determination as to whether or not sexual harassment occurred and, where appropriate,
providing a resolution to the complaint" (4).
While both types of complaints include additional sections related to persons who
may file charges and the procedures available in each instance, formal complaints are
extended to include a discussion of board rules, collective bargaining agreements,
initiation of formal grievance, appeal to faculty grievance committee, decision by the
committee and appeal to the president, appeal to state board, effect of time limits, non-
retaliation standards, and two-year review process (5-10). The final sections of the basic
code detail sanctions that can be imposed on members of the campus community as
determined by their respective position (employee, student, etc.).5
5 These components of the basic code (and the distinctions to be made when compared to an extended
code) will be examined in detail in the Fitting Response chapter.16
The second type, extended, follows the same format as the basic type code but
includes an element not offered in the basic type: prohibited behaviors. These behaviors
range from explicit gestures to subtle innuendoes. By offering a list of behaviors that are
subject to sanctions, extended codes expand the area of constraints offered. This
expansion changes the dynamics of the given sexual harassment code as a response to the
situation in that it has "the power to constrain decision and action needed to modify the
exigence" in a way that is far greater than basic type codes (Bitzer, "Rhetorical" 21).
Going beyond a general discourse about the sexual harassment situation, an extended code
such as the one offered by Rice University, the second artifact in the rhetorical analysis,
specifies those actions within the situation that are subject to constraint.6 What follows
are two examples of the more explicitly-stated types of prohibited behaviors found in
college and university codes:
1.Unwelcome types of touching, pinching, gesturing (Rice University, "1995" 2).
2."Risque" jokes, insulting sounds, continuous idle chatter of a sexual nature
(University of Maryland College Park 5).
These elements of the sexual harassment codes on college and university
campuses--the EEOC definition and provisions, and the basic and extended types thereof--
serve as the standard throughout the academic community in the U.S. Now, we shall
provide a brief comparative sketch of sexual harassment codes and other ethical codes of
conduct that are found within the professional spectrum. The results of this cursory
analysis will demonstrate that sexual harassment codes, while obviously distinct in their
location within the sexual harassment situation in general and on campuses specifically, are
connected to other codes of conduct is many practical ways.'
6 An issue that will be addressed in the actual analysis of the codes-as-responses is the extent to which an
Extended code, by stating prohibited actions, necessarily ignores actions that fall outside of the code but
could still be construed as violations.
7 A matter of analogy helps to clarify how these components of sexual harassment codes operate in a
rhetorical fashion. Bitzer notes that the Declaration of Independence is rhetorical in that it is17
That these sexual harassment codes differ from other ethical codes of conduct is
obvious. Codes such as the American Medical Association's [AMA] Principles of Medical
Ethics and the Association for Computing Machinery's [ACM] Bylaw 19, Code of
Professional Conduct, are directed towards differing contexts (Appelbaum, Appendix 422;
425). But those differences illustrate that the "context" is, in all practical senses, a
substitution for the word "situation." As such, we must briefly examine the similarity of
ethical codes of conduct for, while distinctions yield little practical benefit, they are indeed
comparable in many ways. This examination is of import because it provides an
illustrative parallel to the development of sexual harassment codes; that is, codes are
generally similar but are also individually distinct in much the same way as the codes are
historically developed yet campus specific. In the similarities we note features which
connect the sexual harassment codes to other ethical forms of sanctions. In the differences
we note the specifics which make them a situational factor.
First, the use of the term "professional" designates a certain groups relationship
based on their shared occupational pursuit. In a very real sense, sexual harassment codes
on college and university campuses operate in the exact same manner; that is, colleges and
universities are professional centers of education. Campuses form a "plurality of publics"
where participants operate within a realm of shared interest in much the same way that the
AMA's or the ACM's members do. While it may be true that we are not oft-inclined to
label students and professors comparable "professionals," such a designation fits if we are
to view it from a situational perspective. As Bitzer suggests, these groups comprise
distinct publics that are recognizable in their contrast with other such groupings of persons
in that they form "a community of persons who share conceptions, principles, interests,
enthymematic ("Public" 86). Sexual harassment codes follow a similar structure: major premises (sexual
harassment as federal and educational violation, statement of intent) followed by minor premises ("hostile
environment" and quid pro quo) and, in the case of the extended codes, particular instances that support
the major and minor premises.18
and values, and who are significantly interdependent. This community may be
characterized further by institutions such as offices, schools, laws, tribunals" ("Public" 68).
Hierarchically, there is no doubt that students and professors differ inasmuch as
administrators and contractual employees differ from them as well. Yet they rely on the
educational center for those distinctions and are interdependent to the degree that the
situation defines the shared locale in which they operate.
The point to be stressed is that situations demonstrate a relative degree of
similarity in their organization even if that structure is directed to different tasks, such as
medical or educational pursuits. And the parallels in the codes that we have examined are
based in the similarity of the ethical constraints that are placed on their differing members.
As such, the terms "professional" or "context" apply not only to occupations, but to
groups that are significantly interdependent and distinguished by institutional structures.
Sexual harassment codes are, in short, connected to a range of differing codes of conduct
in that they all place sanctions on the autonomy of the individuals within the respective
situations.
Questions of Compliance
The initial tendency in looking at compliance, "self-regulation," also deals with the
issue of autonomy. Given that people operate, to varying degrees, as individuals within
specific realms of social constraint, there is a belief that they can also regulate their actions
within those realms. The first type of self-regulation is admission: by entering into a
professional group we agree to operate in line with that group's rules of conduct (Bayles
126-127). Colleges and universities provide this type of regulatory mechanism in that
students agree to abide by the rules of the institution. The second type of self-regulation
is discipline: the group's ability to punish those who have been admitted but disregard rules
of conduct (129-130). Again, colleges and universities operate in this fashion in that19
boards are set up to deal with infractions related to issues such as general conduct,
substance abuse, and sexual harassment.
Both of these internal types of compliance operate on the assumption that the
individual and the group are capable of regulating themselves, out of the scope of the
larger society. But such idealism often bears tainted results: self-regulation can mutate
into a "private matter" (what is done and why it is done is ambiguous to outsiders) and at
worst the perpetuation of unethical behavior (the Tailhook scandal offers the example of
people self - regulating- -not ethical behavior--the flow of information about behavior into
the general public).
The next compliance-gaining type is an expansion of the previous ones, again
relating back to autonomy. The difference is that "professional autonomy" extends
beyond the interaction of self/profession (the person and their relation to the group) to the
more comprehensive relationship of profession/societal (the group and the contact with
the larger society). The first type is centered on expertise: those involved in the profession
know how to deal with that profession's conduct problems (Bayles 133). As we have
seen, colleges and universities frame the nature of sexual harassment so as to focus on the
fact that it occurs in an educational context. The next type is based on the concept of
independence: the inclusion of those outside the profession in matters of conduct intrudes
on that profession's autonomy (135). In regards to this type, campus sexual harassment
codes differ in that they are tied to the EEOC, a government committee, for the definition
which frames the exigence and are held to liabilities that extend from that definition. The
third and final type is related to confidentiality: allowing outsiders to scrutinize the
profession's rules of conduct destroys the professional/client- -and, we can add by
extension, educator /student -- relationship (136). In this instance, campus codes diverge
from this compliance type in that the only area in which confidentiality is an issue is in
relation to complaints filed and persons named in such complaints. In regards to other
aspects of sexual harassment codes, confidentiality is not a factor as persons found guilty20
of harassment are subject to penalties which makes the person known to those within the
campus community.
All of these professional compliance techniques can run into similar flaws, if on a
larger scale, as the self-regulation concepts. The assumption that internal matters are
removed from the concerns of a larger public ignores the relationship of the profession to
the larger society, the overlap of societal issues of conduct into the professional realm, and
the need for outside scrutiny that is independent from those directly involved in the
profession. As a result of the flaws in the aforementioned areas, suggestions have been
made to adopt new strategies for compliance. The use of laypersons is one alternative, but
there is often the problem of deciding the scope and nature of their activity in formulating
and regulating conduct (Bayles 138-139). Indeed, the situational perspective operates on
the assumption that only those audiences capable of authorizing and mediating change can
provide the means by which to modify the exigence; yet, at the same time, the codes are
built on the materials provide by persons from outside of the campus situation--again, the
EEOC. Another possible compliance technique is the revision of codes so that they are
more explicit, increase the chances for the reporting of violations, expand investigative
devices, and streamline the process by which professional membership can be revoked
(140-142). But, as was noted in looking at extended codes, those explicit inclusions
necessarily limit those actions which can be designated as a breach of the code. A final
alternative places emphasis on the idea of stopping violations, not merely punishing those
that occur. Central to this plan is the use of educational materials that infuse all
professional activities with some degree of ethical implication (144). But, as was noted
earlier, if the materials are not standardized in the description and explanation of the
conduct subject to sanction, more problems than benefits may be accrued.
These matters of compliance have import on all of the codes that have been
discussed, but our attention must finally return to a discussion of sexual harassment codes.21
Specifically, we must now address the question of "function" that was raised at the outset
of this paper and note how that question factors into the rhetorical analysis.
Consequence and Condemnation
The basis for and the regulations within ethical codes of conduct are a complicated
mixture of what ideally to do and what realistically happens. The autonomous individual
is located in a complex matrix of differing rules of social conduct. They must abide by
these ethical rules set forth by the different publics to which they claim membership if they
are to avoid the consequences of actions determined to be negative: condemnation via
sanction. As such, sexual harassment codes serve two primary purposes. First, they are
educational in that they provide definitions of, explanations about, sexual harassment.
Secondly, they provide a sanctioning mechanism in that they explain the options open to
the harassed and the punishments incurred by the harasser. Together, these dual purposes
create the overall function of the code: an explication of and a reaction to sexual
harassment.
That the educational and sanctioning purposes of the codes are disregarded should
not surprise anyone. As with malpractice and other unethical professional practices, there
will always be those that throw into conflict the optimism of Kultgen's "moral
community " But what is important is that for all the similarities that sexual harassment
codes share with other types of codes, they still stand as a distinct form of response with
distinct problems. Thus we return to my introductory comment that sexual harassment
codes provide a problematic form of discourse which are in need of critique. In their
connection to other codes of conduct we are able to note the ethical foundations and
philosophical underpinnings that render them rhetorical; in their individuality, sexual
harassment codes offer a distinct mode of ethical and rhetorical discourse warranting an
equally philosophical, and situational, critical treatment.22
For these reasons, the next chapter turns to the methodological framework best
suited to guide the work to be done in the preceding chapters. The situational perspective
seeks to make a determination as to the nature of social constraints, of discourse that
changes the actions of the public. But, more than that, the end goal of this rhetorical
format is the articulation of a response that might be more pragmatic, more fitting, than
the one originally constructed. Just as we determine that acts such as sexual harassment
have (negative) consequences, we must assess the means by which we define and react to
those negative actions. Such assessments might provide us with a clearer explanation of
how the response that explains and sanctions against sexual harassment operates and if
that response "fits."23
Chapter III: The Rhetorical Situation
In 1968, Lloyd F. Bitzer published "The Rhetorical Situation" which introduced a
method of rhetorical inquiry promoting an understanding of discourse as a situational
creation. In 1980, he expanded and clarified the initial critical construction, introducing a
more thorough treatment of audience and speaker response to situational components.
The result of these two articles is the creation of a philosophical framework that goes
beyond traditional Neo-Aristotelian critical constructs by positioning "rhetoric-as-
essentially-related-to-situation" (18). More so, this situational perspective challenges the
conventional, modernist modes of rhetorical inquiry by seeing the rhetor as part of the
impetus for, not sole creator of the persuasive discourse that arises in a given situation.
With these perceptual components in mind, this chapter will develop in four stages:
an analysis of "The Rhetorical Situation" and "Functional Communication: A Situational
Perspective," scrutiny of the criticisms that have come about in response to Bitzer's
framework, an examination of the ways in which the situational perspective has been
utilized and suggestions as to reasons for such usage and, finally, a discussion of the
problems and benefits inherent in the use of this critical framework.
The Situational Perspective
There are many theoretical frameworks by which to approach the understanding of
rhetorical discourse. Some methods emphasize the viewpoint of the rhetor, or the
audience, or even the genre from which the artifacts draw their commonalties. The
situational approach to rhetorical criticism is grounded in the search for an understanding
of "the nature of those contexts in which speakers or writers create rhetorical discourse"
("Situation" 17). Those contexts, using Bitzer's terminology, become the situations in
which the persuasive discourse is found. And these situations can be of differing designs24
dependent on the factors found therein. On the one hand, a situation may be the
interaction of many component parts (complex) or it may be relatively simple in its
organization; on the other, it may be highly or loosely structured depending on how many
of "its elements are located and readied for the task to be performed" (23). In sum, a
rhetorical situation is a combination of both of these factors (simple/complex organization
and loose/highly structured).
More specifically, a rhetorical situation is:
A complex of persons, events, objects, and relations
presenting an actual or potential exigence which can
completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into
the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as
to bring about significant modification of the exigence. (20)
Thus, three factors are necessary to create a rhetorical situation: exigence, audience, and
constraints. The exigence, "an imperfection marked by urgency," is rhetorical in so far as
it can be modified by discourse. In contrast, the singular acts of urgency to which we are
treated everyday--a car crash, the death of a friend, the birth of a baby--are not capable of
modification as they present themselves in the context of their situation and, therefore, are
not rhetorical exigencies (20). The second element, audience, is no less important to the
understanding of the rhetorical situation. The audience acts as the body that is influenced
by the discourse and is capable of "being mediators of change" (21).That modification is
affected and influenced by the force of constraints. Constraints are those "persons, events,
objects, and relations which are parts of the situation because they have the power to
constrain decision and action needed to modify the exigence" (21). In regards to
constraints, there are two types: those which are the creation of the rhetor (artistic) and
those which are found in and active within the situation (inartistic).
This blending of exigence, audience, and constraints forms the situation which
provides the rhetor with "an invitation to create and present discourse" ("Situation" 21).
But not all of the rhetorical responses to the situation are successful. The situation, given25
that it is affected and controlled by the unique characteristics found therein, calls forth a
particular "fitting response." But what makes for a response that fits the situation? Bitzer
answers this crucial situational question in the essay "Functional Communication: A
Situational Perspective." Therein he argues that two types of responses are possible in a
situational account of rhetoric. The first type of response is complementary and is best
thought of as an obvious reaction--a call to war by a president in the wake of an
aggressive attack by another country. The corrective response, however, is the more
"essential" of the two in that this response seeks to promote a change demonstrated as
necessary within the situation ("Functional" 36-37). The distinction to be made between
these two types of responses is that the former operates as a natural, rhetorical outgrowth
of the situation whereas the latter promotes a change in the status quo.
Corrective rhetorical responses are further divided by Bitzer into two subgroups.
The first is a response that is called forth as a result of real or potential exigences
perceived by the speaker. When a school board takes measures to boost security after a
recent rise in drug activity, or in response to suspicions that there has been an increase,
they are attempting to modify the potential or actual increase in drug activity. The second
subgroup of responses promotes "continued and successful situational activity"
("Functional" 37). In this case, the lack of the rhetorical response would create difficulties
within the situation, would create other exigences. This subgroup is often recognized
when it is absent, such as when we are asked to do a simple task for a friend and fail to
respond or respond in the negative. The distinction to be made between these two types
of responses is that the former is an attempt to reduce or remove the exigence, as in the
case of sexual harassment codes, whereas the latter is an attempt to perpetuate the current
situation via rhetoric.
Regardless of the type and/or subgroup of the response that is called for by the
situation, many obstacles lie in the path of the "fitting response." An audience may choose
to ignore a speaker's rhetoric, a rhetor may miscalculate the type of response that is26
necessary or may misidentify the controlling exigence in a given situation. As such, the
responses to the exigence by the speaker, as creator of the response, and the audience, as
possible mediators of the exigence, are paramount. If the speaker is unsuccessful, then the
audience will not mediate the change called for. The result will be the perpetuation of the
exigence or the alteration of the exigence that is not "fitting." To help determine the
fitting nature of the speaker's response, Bitzer offers up six factors that influence the
responsiveness of the speaker and audience to the exigence. If these factors are not
adequately taken into consideration by the speaker, they are less likely to be understood by
the audience that the speaker addresses. Thus, how a speaker responds determines how
and if an audience does the same.
The first factor, degree of interest, involves six principles of motivation for the
speaker and the audience: an exigence that demonstrates a high amount of factual
substance will yield the most interest; direct knowledge of the exigence creates more
interest than merely knowing about the exigence; interest is higher the more closely one is
located to the exigence; an exigence that has a direct impact on people immediately known
to the speaker or audience will arouse more interest than one that involves anonymous
individuals at a distance from them; personal involvement- -some feeling of responsibility--
for the exigence will increase interest; and the amount of specific interest, denoted by
specific emotional responses to the exigence, signals a higher degree of interest than a
general response to the exigence ("Functional" 31-32). The speaker's degree of interest,
as demonstrated by their motivation to respond, will determine the audience's degree of
interest. In essence, the speaker must make the audience aware of the exigence and
persuade them to act on the response provided.
The other five factors that influence responsiveness are: modification capability,
risk, obligations and expectations, familiarity and confidence, and immediacy ("Functional"
32-33). The degree to which all six of these factors are present will help to determine
"accurately that messages of a certain kind will occur" (34). That is to say, the more27
chance one has of modifying the exigence (whether as speaker or as audience) and the less
risk associated with such modifications will necessarily increase the likelihood that such a
response will be initiated.
Rhetorical situations are also capable of, and often require, modification in much
the same way as differing situations call for differing responses. The reason for this
modification is quite simple: each situation is a combination of different features that are
structured in various ways. A speech code and a code of conduct for an organization are
similar in nature but, as the previous chapter demonstrated, they are also structurally
different and unique. In a slightly different fashion, the components within individual
situations shape and determine the nature of the modification required. As a situation
progresses, it will (necessarily) take on new characteristics to fit the modifications and
dispense with those characteristics which have faded from view. In other cases, the
situation will be so radically altered by the infusion of new constraints that it become a
structurally different situation. As an example, a speech related to the war on drugs in the
1980s may be similar to a speech given addressing the exigence of drugs in the 1990s, but
the situation is no longer--in the sense of time, constraints, audience, and information--the
same. A response to a previous form of the situation, or to a related situation, or a new
situation, will not be rhetorically effective in so far as it is responding to a past version or a
different type of situation. This similarity of situations and situational components can, in
turn, provide for a specific situation's continued existence or eventual destruction
("Situation" 23).
Criticisms
"The Rhetorical Situation" has been the focus of significant amounts of criticism,
often for seemingly innocent misunderstandings as to its nature and function as a means of
explaining what gives rise to rhetoric or, in other cases, due to approaching Bitzer's28
position from a theoretically divergent rhetorical framework. Most often, these arguments
focus on Bitzer's use of the situation as the ambiguous creator of the rhetoric (Patton 37).
Those critics of the situational perspective, however, have failed to note a crucial element
in the theory that Bitzer has proposed: one of the most fundamental parts of the situation
is the rhetor who stands within the situation and not, as some of the preceding critics
argue, at a distance from it (Mackin 286).
Richard E. Vatz, in his essay "The Myth of the Rhetorical Situation," provides one
of the most reprinted criticisms of Bitzer's situational perspective. He argues that rhetoric
is not situational; rather, "situations are rhetorical" (159). In addition, Vatz puts forth the
argument that rhetoric, far from creating meaning, is an effect of meaning in that rhetors
create persuasive discourse in response to facts within a situation (160). While these
rationalistic arguments seem at first to be serious blows to the situational perspective of
Bitzer, they operate in most cases as supporting argument for a situational understanding
of rhetoric. In answer to much of what Vatz describes as flaws, a careful reader can find
answers located directly in the text of Bitzer.
One of the earliest claims that Vatz makes is that "no situation can have a nature
independent of the perception of its interpreter or independent of the rhetoric with which
he chooses to characterize it" (154). These "dependent" factors which Vatz is quick to
point out are dealt with in the area of constraints, in the "set of...beliefs, attitudes...
motives and the like" that determine the rhetor's actions (Bitzer, "Situation" 21). The
rhetor has "perceptions" that are in turn affected by the situation in which they find
themselves. This claim of dependency is funnelled through the larger argument that "The
Rhetorical Situation" amounts to a predetermined view of events in "which rhetoric
inexorably follows, or should follow" (Vatz 155). But, as Patton demonstrates, the should
part of the above argument is also key to its undoing (41). By the very fact that not all
situations produce rhetoric, that these situations can and do decay, the deterministic claim
against the situational perspective seems fallacious. Given these observations, rhetoric is29
situational in that the success or failure of persuasion is tied to the situation in which it
Occurs.
The next major argument that Vatz raises against "The Rhetorical Situation" is
twofold: that "there is a choice to communicate" and a choice to translate "information
into meaning" (156-157). Although the above analysis highlighting that not all situations
produce rhetoric answers the question of choice, a more extensive answer is necessary. I
would posit that the choices Vatz refers to are part of 1) what distinguishes different
situations and 2) an extended reference to the effect of constraints on the situation. In no
way is the "act of creativity" necessary to create rhetorical discourse negated by the
situational perspective. As Patton confirms, "in any given situation, a rhetor decides about
the form and content of intended discourse in accordance with operative constraints" (41).
That freedom of movement in creating (or not creating) discourse implies the choice that
Vatz seems to believe is absent from Bitzer's perspective. This choice, in turn, points to
the creation or possibility of creating meaning within the situation. An audience that
responds to the speaker's discourse is responding by extension to an exigence that the
speaker has interpreted persuasively for them; the meaning of the given imperfection is to
be found in the success or failure of the rhetoric.
The final argument of Vatz's that must be addressed is the contention that the
situational perspective "ascribe(s) little responsibility to the rhetor" (158). This claim
ignores the effect of the exigence on the discourse, the rhetoric that is sought in response
to the exigence, and the very basis of Bitzer's theoretical framework. The rhetor
responding to the situation, and the exigence, is answering the "invitation to create and
present discourse" (Bitzer, "Situation" 21). That invitation is no idle call for any type of
discourse that the rhetor chooses. The situation calls for "a fitting response, a response
that fits the situation" (22). Therein lies the responsibility of the rhetor. Although it must
be admitted that rhetors can and do fail to provide a fitting response to the situation, thesearch for said response is the very foundation upon which Bitzer builds "The Rhetorical
Situation":
The world presents imperfections to be modified by means
of discourse--hence the practical need for rhetorical
investigation and discourse...rhetoric as a discipline is
justified philosophically insofar as it provides principles,
concepts, and procedures by which we effect valuable
changes in reality. (24)
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As Mackin notes, this lofty sounding goal of rhetoric is much more practical than Vatz
would lead one to believe; indeed, Bitzer provides a method of inquiry which considers
"rhetoric pragmatically as a moral act that results when interaction between organism and
environment creates a problematic situation" (286).
K. E. Wilkerson also finds problems with the search for "valuable changes in
reality" as proposed by Bitzer. The foremost claim that he levels against "The Rhetorical
Situation" is the ambiguity in the definitions. To highlight this point, Wilkerson offers the
example of a child's hunger and his mother's response as a situation fitting Bitzer's
perspective (85).I would posit that this scenario does involve an exigence, but not a
rhetorical one necessarily. While one may argue that the mother would be persuaded by
the son's calls for food, I would label such an attempt to critique the situational
perspective minimalistic to the point of absurdity. Hunger, as described by Wilkerson,
cannot be considered a rhetorical exigence in that, without food, we die; it does not
require discourse to be satisfied because it is a component of a larger "necessity [that]
cannot be changed" (Bitzer, "Situation" 20). What Wilkerson has done is akin to refuting
the situational perspective by arguing that a naked child, caught in the "situation" of
getting out of a bath, rhetorically modifies the exigence by having his mother hand him a
towel.
The second, and more substantive, argument Wilkerson raises against "The
Rhetorical Situation" is that it fails to "establish natural boundaries for the area of human31
activity it would comprehend...specify a set of phenomena which can be readily
observed...[and] align with a general theory of human communication" (83-85).
Arguments could be made that these standards, created by Wilkerson to advance his own
theoretical principles, are self-serving. But, as a matter of analysis, we can return to
Bitzer for answers to these critiques. The natural boundaries of the situational perspective
are explicit in the very label that describes the perspective: the situation. The diversity of
examples which Bitzer provides--a fishing expedition, a political campaign, eulogies, and
the like--seems sufficient to warrant dismissing the first of Wilkerson's claims ("Situation"
24).
The question of how available a set of phenomena are for observation also seems
to be apparent. By scrutinizing the nature of the exigence, audience, and constraints in a
given situation, the critic is able to observe the characteristics that set one situation apart
from another ("Situation" 21). That the fishing expedition is different from the inaugural
address of a President only serves to highlight that rhetorical situations are 1) readily
observable and 2) unique in their individual makeup. Finally, the alignment of Bitzer's
rhetorical approach with a more general theory of communication is not as unlikely as
Wilkerson would have a reader believe. I would label "The Rhetorical Situation" an
historical perspective and, if further specificity is necessary, an active component in what
has come to be considered genre criticism. But these forms of criticism are all connected
to the more general Neo-Aristotelian critical framework as well. And the Neo-Aristotelian
critical approach, at least as articulated by Bitzer, is easily aligned with a pragmatic
approach to communication: we create messages so as to create specific responses. By
focusing on specifics and treading lightly upon the overall approach that Bitzer endorses,
Wilkerson seems to have missed the comment that "from day to day, year to year,
comparable situations occur, prompting comparable responses" (24).
A brief look at Phillip K Tompkins' response to both Patton and Bitzer in The
Quarterly Journal of Speech's "The Forum" suggests that some criticism of "The32
Rhetorical Situation" is little more than in-house bickering offering little in the way of
constructive revision or commentary. Indeed, his suggestion of "a new formulation of
situational theory" provides the most evidence of questionable critique: "Rhetorical
discourse shapes, and is shaped by, rhetorical situations; by imputing causal status either
to discourse or situation, in whatever degree of force, one may be simply bracketing a
sequence of events in an arbitrary manner" (87).
Initially one wonders what about Tompkins' proposition is theoretical and what, by
extension, his formulation adds to the understanding of a situational approach to rhetoric.
While Tompkins claims this revision merges the ideas of both Bitzer and Vatz, the larger
issue is how this formulation offers up anything in the way of "completeness, wholeness"- -
ingredients he asserts to be lacking from "The Rhetorical Situation" (86). More so, the
initial discussion of the creation of rhetorical discourse seems entirely complementary to
Bitzer's explication of situation. Situations and the rhetoric that is related to them are not
creations removed from past situations and rhetoric; each is influenced by what has come
before.8 Bitzer's own analysis of Tompkins' argument lends credence to my preceding
observations when he states in the very same issue that "there is nothing 'new' in the 'new
formulation' (92). The irony is that Tompkins seems to have underestimated two
situations--the one he spoke of and the one he spoke in--which leads to a result which is
not, given Bitzer's terminology, "fitting."
The most recent critique of "The Rhetorical Situation" and its subsequent
elaboration comes in the 1996 article "Bitzer's Model Reconstructed," by Craig R. Smith
and Scott Lybarger. They preface their examination of the situational perspective by
noting that "as we move through the postmodern era, rhetorical critics face the difficult
task of organizing and integrating various methods as well as assessing more and more
8 A fictional scenario seems to be sufficient proof of this point: a person who sees a child drown, because
they did not wear a life vest that they were told to put on, is influenced by that situation when they tell
another child to do the same.33
fragmented texts" (197). While the claim of textual fragmentation is, in itself worthy of
examination--authorship being one of the first casualties in this supposed postmodernist
era--our attention must turn to the actual reconstruction they propose.
The central issue that the authors raise is that much of Bitzer's articulation of the
situational method is flawed in so far as it is orientated around factors as realities rather
than perceptions. These factors, such as the controlling nature of the exigence as catalyst
for the purpose of the speaker's rhetoric, are suspect in an age when there is an increased
recognition of "multiple audiences, exigencies, constraints, and perceptions surrounding
rhetorical events" (197). Hence, the authors' argue that there is a need to create a more
expansive version of the situational perspective by which to deal with these perceived
challenges.
The problem with the analysis that develops, however, is twofold: the authors
either include (or ignore) in their reconstruction ideas that are already admitted by Bitzer's
original model or they force the false dichotomy--comparable to the questionable divisions
noted by Mackin--between speaker and situation, arguing that the exigence operates "as
the primary locus of critical inquiry because it transcends...speaker's purpose, audience,
perception and scene" (198). In regards to the former, one must admit that the
recognition of various critical tools complementary to the situational perspective is a
healthy result; as to the latter, it must be argued that the situational perspective is useful in
that it acknowledges the interaction between speaker and situation.9
Smith and Lybarger posit that Bitzer's model ignores the "potential of the rhetor to
create an exigence and/or a situation with a rhetorical message" (201). While there is no
explicit textual reference to this problem, one need look only to the fact that "The
Rhetorical Situation" allows for the infusion of new factors into a situation, indeed, allows
9 Smith and Lybarger disparage Bitzer for showing an affinity towards the pragmatic approach of John
Dewey. The irony is that Dewey provides not only a classical treatment of the intimate connection of the
situation (environment) and the individuals therein, but also offers us a continued point of reference in the
following chapters.34
for the creation of new situations out of the decay or maturation of preexisting ones. As a
thoroughly human creation, the issue of exigence arrives at our perceptive feet by no other
than human means. The authors also argue that it is fallacious to claim that situational
components are available for objective scrutiny. But there seems to be an error in arguing
that a situation is not objective in so far as the channel that exists between speaker and
situation sets up a relatively stable spectrum of interaction; that is, speakers operate within
a situation and a situation is continually modified by the speaker's operation therein. Just
as we can note the effects that a declaration of war has on segments of the populace
(given that different audiences would respond in different ways), we can also survey the
possible reasons for a President to issue such a response to an act of aggression. That
such interactions should breed different situations and new factors within preexisting ones
only points to the need to look towards a "controlling" exigence if one is to critically
scrutinize a rhetorical situation in a systematic manner
These aforementioned difficulties are then channelled into a "situational analysis"
of several anti-drug speeches by President George Bush. What is initially striking is that
the authors see multiple exigences as a manifestation of "new rhetoric," not as a fact that
spans the history of rhetoric (205). But, even if one accepts the fragmentation argument,
there runs a constant sense that much of what is being discussed is already allowed for in
the Bitzer construction. When Smith and Lybarger state that "making the exigence a
reality for an audience does not necessarily guarantee that an audience will be motivated
to act," they supplement this by noting that Bitzer was correct in highlighting the need to
persuasively engage constraints if the rhetoric is to be successful (207). On the very next
page, they assert that Bitzer's model can incorporate close textual analysis, which in turn
will provide "a useful reform of Bitzer's model because it allows the critic to achieve more
depth in terms of stylistic analysis while remaining inside a cogent system of critical
theory" (209). But, in any practical sense, are these really reconstructions? I would argue35
that they are merely extensions of Bitzer, complementary supplements that stand
independently of any necessity for insertion of postmodernist theoretical presumption.
Hence, we need to return to the secondary concern previously mentioned: the
wedge that is driven between speaker and situation, with situation arising as predominant,
in this postmodernist reinterpretation of Bitzer's theory. The problem with such a division
is complex in that such a presupposition naturally leads one to assume that a "modernist"
theory cannot deal with "postmodern fragmentation of public discourse and audience"
(209). The real problem becomes a matter of theoretical orientation in that the
postmodernist restructuring comes to be: 1) a needlessly complicated means by which to
achieve similar results as are found using the original Neo-Aristotelian approach, or 2) so
all encompassing as to be of little practical benefit.
These points are made clearer in the authors' concluding section, wherein they
offer the four primary points of revision promoted in their essay. The first is to eliminate
the term "controlling" in regards to an exigence. Even if we suppose such a modification,
the critic is still confronted by the need to focus on one exigence if they are to create a
sufficiently workable critical arena. That other exigencies may exist, may be of import, is
still not discounted in this instance. The second suggestion, to revise the model so as to
account for multiple exigencies, audiences, and a diversity of constraints within a situation,
is more symptomatic of my secondary concern. Part of the power of the situational model
is that it locates certain features within a situation and studies them, acknowledging by
implication that no work of rhetorical criticism can do everything. If we were to revise the
model given the above suggestion, we then face the task of implementing such a critical
directive. Much better to narrow our field of inquiry, in my opinion, than to cut loose the
critical ship from the moorings of practicality. The third revision, to "open the model to
close readings, reconstruction of texts, and ideological critiques," speaks to both of my
concerns (Smith and Lybarger 210). While close reading seems a beneficial inclusion, the
latter two revisions would transform situational analysis into something completely36
different- -which is, perhaps, the point. But the situational model does not reconstruct
texts, it analyzes situational components; it does not focus on ideological critique, though
it may in fact look to ideological factors as crucial factors in a situational criticism.
Thus, when we arrive at the final suggestion that Bitzer's model should be revised
so as to facilitate ideological criticism, it is best to note the obvious: one theory can and
should be complementary to other approaches, but it should not--as a result---become the
other theory. Smith and Lybarger provide, it must be admitted, positive extensions of
Bitzer's situational approach. Yet they sacrifice those extensions to a needlessly nebulous
use of postmodernism, to a prioritization where the situation stands above the persons
located therein.
Application of The Rhetorical Situation
Given the above discussion of the criticisms leveled against the situational
approach, it seems that the use thereof could go one of two ways: an engagement by
critics interested in a philosophical perspective that has raised so many questions, or the
shying away from a theoretical framework that is clearly not in line with the majority of
rhetorical theories. In my opinion, the movement has sadly been towards the former.
While often mentioned in texts that provide overviews of rhetorical theory, "The
Rhetorical Situation" and its subsequent 1980 elaboration, seem to have been relegated for
the most part to the status of a point of contention and not of critical analysis. When it
has been applied, as is the case of the thesis we will examine, the criticism has been vague
and the conclusions sloppy.
Lynn M. Disbrow's analysis of the Reverend Jesse Jackson's speech to the 1984
Democratic National Convention offers a promising start.1° The artifact that is the37
centerpiece of her analysis, the delivered speech, is to be contrasted with an original
manuscript. Her critique looks at how the revisions affected Jackson's "response to the
exigences, constraints and expectations of the rhetorical audience" (i).
The problem that develops, however, is less the path chosen by Disbrow and more
the way that path is analyzed. She traces the rise of the rhetorical situation from the
beginning of Jackson's presidential campaign. Little analysis is made that is related to
Jackson prior to 1984. I would argue that this exclusion of Jackson's historical
progression as a public speaker undermines the rest of Disbrow's analysis. This is partially
due to the treatment she expects to get out of such a short time frame. Questions as to
Jackson's "credibility as a Democratic candidate and as a moral leader" warrant a deeper
historical treatment (7).
Given this time frame, the analysis of the "controlling exigence -- Jackson's
credibility as a legitimate Democratic candidate" is a bit superficial (5). I make this
argument because the critic is left with little ability to develop a sufficient picture of
credibility. More historical treatment would be necessary to investigate Jackson's basis for
entering the presidential race, for determining "the dimensions of judgment brought to the
social situation," dimensions that directly influence perceptions of credibility (Delia 269).
It is not enough to assume Jackson's aspirations; the critic must seek out those past
influences which are brought to bear in the current rhetorical situation. These
considerations are of particular importance if the analysis of the revised speech and the
prior manuscript is to clearly address the situational influences which necessitated such a
"drastic departure" between the two texts (Disbrow 27).
1° The reader is advised to look to: Garret, Mary, and Xiaosui Xiao. "The Rhetorical Situation Revisited."
Rhetoric Society Quarterly 23 (Spring 1993): 30-40. This article provides the reader with an example of
the current critiques of Bitzer's formulation and with a critical application that tries to integrate
postmodernist (i.e., Derrida) and subjectivist (i.e., Vatz) approaches in studying "political discourse from
nineteenth century China...responding to the two Opium wars" (30). For the purposes of this thesis,
however, sufficient treatment has already been given to such critiques and, as in the case of Disbrow's
thesis, the application of the situational perspective.38
Perhaps the most significant problem with the analysis is the lack of information
given concerning the constraints and the audiences in this rhetorical situation. Disbrow
references "Jackson's background as a civil rights leader" without sufficient historical
background to explain this emphasis (60). In essence, she refers to Jackson's past after
already concluding it to be an insignificant factor in the exigence of the current situation.
These weaknesses are then channeled into the final section dealing with the audiences.
Disbrow gives a grocery list of audiences: The Rainbow Coalition, The Democratic Party,
The Black Leadership Family, and The American Public (76-78). Again, we return to the
problem of not providing a sufficiently comprehensive historical background from which
to extend the discussion of the constraints and audience. When we arrive at Disbrow's
concluding statement, that "it is difficult to say if Jackson's speech was a fitting response,"
we have to agree with her (85). That agreement is based not on what she has done in the
previous eighty-four pages of rhetorical analysis, but in what it seems that she has failed to
do.
The problems with Disbrow's thesis should not entirely be leveled at her however.
These 'fault-lines,' if you will, can be traced back to the comments made in the opening of
this section: the relegation of Bitzer's theory to a reference point. The culprits in this
positioning of "The Rhetorical Situation" are, it seems, the very people who should be
interested in the continued relevance of such a challenging rhetorical theory: Bitzer's peers
and, as I shall expand upon shortly, critics trying to use the situational perspective as a
critical methodology.
The current "rhetorical situation" within academia seems compelled to constrain
rhetors who wish to disregard the party line in favor of new theoretical principles or, in an
age of postmodern practice, are cautious in their acceptance of models that are overly
broad. Seeing as how "The Rhetorical Situation" dates back to 1968, current has come to
mean contemporary. What, then, is the reason for such a hostile attitude towards39
alternative constructions of rhetorical theory?11 I believe that the answer lies partially in
the twofold problem of scientization and assumed objectivity in rhetorical theory. The
former emphasis can lead to a weakened ability to promote the pragmatic uses of theory;
the latter denies the inherent need of critics to address rhetoric that appeals to them
personally.
Scientific analysis is an important facet in the study of communication that can
clearly provide an easy companion to rhetorical study. Steven A. McCormack's
Information Manipulation Theory (IMT), as an example, can help to illuminate rhetorical
messages that "covertly violate the principles that govern conversational exchanges" (1).
But when rhetorical theorists become too captivated by the use of science, they give up
their right to claim rhetorical study as a distinct and important area of study in and of
itself. They relegate rhetorical inquiry to a subordinate role, leaving it to cower behind the
supposedly all-powerful methodologies of science (Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland 33).
This is where Bitzer's perspective diverges. "The Rhetorical Situation" is denying the need
to play subordinate by claiming that philosophical methods, not scientific means, can be
employed to study rhetoric.12
This scientization of rhetorical study also infuses critical discussion with an
unhealthy notion of distance, of supposed objectivity (Nothstine, Blair, and Copeland 39).
Such a stance, whether implicit or explicit in the discussion of rhetorical theory,
necessarily casts "The Rhetorical Situation" into the shadows of accepted convention or
11 Other rhetorical perspectives that share a similar divergence from the norm seem to be ripe for
criticism as well. Sonya K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin's 1993 articulation of "Invitational Rhetoric" met
with similar ridicule.
12 This "scientific support system" is not an entirely new construct either. It seems to be a historical and
oft-raised criticism that the canon of philosophical inquiry, to which rhetoricians most certainly add, turns
to schemas that in some way legitimize its work ... asif to say that its endeavors are not valid in and of
themselves. As William James notes in 1886, "ethical treatises may be voluminous and luminous ...but
they can never be final, except in their abstractest and vaguest features; and they must more and more
abandon the old-fashioned, clear-cut, and would-be 'scientific' form" (232).40
into conflict with current fads in theorizing When Bitzer talks of "valuable changes in
reality" being possible, he is promoting a pragmatic and controversial end goal for
rhetoric: a value judgment of what the persuasive discourse says ("Situation" 24). This
stance is not meant to imply an entirely subjective bent either. Bitzer is pushing for critics
to look up from their artifacts and address the audiences (students and lay persons alike, if
such a distinction is really necessary) that such scholarly work should have influence over.
If the current scientization and objectification of rhetorical theory is left unchecked we, to
borrow from Kenneth Burke, will "solve no problems...for ourselves by such solutions"
(219). For, even with all the scholarly emphasis and detail, what use is an analysis that
remains at a distance from the world in which it exists?
Conclusion
"The Rhetorical Situation" is clearly a challenging and controversial piece of
theory. The discussion surrounding Bitzer's approach guarantees that it will continue to
spark discussion and promote debate. Those effects, in my estimation, signal the fact that
the situational perspective offers a valuable alternative to other rhetorical methods.
Otherwise, much less time and paper would have been wasted on glorifying or debunking
the theoretical framework Bitzer has provided.
Clearly, some of the criticisms leveled against "The Rhetorical Situation" are not
frivolous attempts to negate a theoretical model just for the sake of negation. Questions
as to ambiguity raised by Wilkerson and the possible extensions as highlighted by Smith
and Lybarger demonstrate constructive steps in a positive direction. As to the former, the
critic must be attentive to the fact that the philosophical openness of "The Rhetorical
Situation" can create huge gaps in analysis as was demonstrated in the problematic thesis
by Disbrow. But those flaws can be remedied if the critic takes the freedom of the model
to demand comprehensive treatment of the component parts of analysis; the exigence,41
constraints, audience, and fitting response must be sufficiently detailed so as to sustain the
rhetorical criticism that is the result. In relation to the latter issue, one of the primary
extensions Smith and Lybarger argue for--close text reading--helps to compensate for the
deficiencies that result from the ambiguity of key terms. In compliment, this very thesis
uses artifacts that necessitate not only close text criticism but also historical treatment of
the situation being examined. In short, both problems can be overcome if the critic notes
the theoretical gaps and adjusts their criticism to them.
Problems notwithstanding, "The Rhetorical Situation" is a provocative and
beneficial method of rhetorical criticism. Indeed, two of the most important aspects of
"The Rhetorical Situation" are to be found in the overall tone of the model: its sharp
delineation of what is meant by the term "rhetoric" and the inherently ethical
underpinnings of such a perspective. Bitzer makes it clear that some responses are
rhetorical and others, while being discourse of varying kinds, are not. While his
theoretical assumptions encompass a wide variety of instances that could be determined to
be rhetorical, they are also firmly examples of public discourse which pursues some form
of persuasive change. This reining in of the notion of what rhetoric is serves to acquaint
the student and scholar alike with a perceptual field uncluttered by the current trends at
universalization, at a hermeneutical extension of rhetoric into every imaginable nook and
crevice of scholarly and public pursuit. As Bitzer himself argued (in a different, yet
applicable context) in the Van Zelst Lecture at Northwestern University, "it is not
surprising that few people know what the art of rhetoric once was and should be again"
(15). The situational perspective is also inherently ethical in its focus on a fitting response.
Such a rhetorical demand implies the search for good ends and better results than the
initial response to the exigence may provide, the search for "imperfections to be modified
by means of discourse" ("Situation" 24).
Given the discussion above, it seems that the situational perspective is a suitable
complement to the "situation" outline in the previous chapter. "The Rhetorical Situation"42
provides a framework suited to the task of analyzing sexual harassment codes in at least
two ways. Initially, the situational model is clearly philosophical. As such, it is suited to
the critique of codes which are equally philosophical in their focus on education and
sanction of ethical/unethical actions. Secondly, even with all of the criticisms raised, this
method provides for a form of rhetorical criticism that moves beyond mere judgment
towards revision. When evaluating the "fitting" nature of sexual harassment codes, such a
determination offers the possibility of "real world" benefits.
Thus, the following chapters will merge the academic situation with the situational
form of analysis, ultimately leading into a judgment of the response that the codes provide.
In the case of sexual harassment, such a judgment is of vital importance if we are to seek
not only an appropriate manner of interaction with others, but a proper response to
violations of such interaction.43
Chapter IV: Exigence
Bitzer makes it clear that situations are historical in development. As
modifications occur to initial situations, via the infusion of new factors such as constraints,
they can give rise to new situations ("Situation" 21). This modification of the situation is
of import as we look at sexual harassment in that this exigence is a historically developing
fact; it is an example of a persistent imperfection that continues to exist "in spite of
repeated modifications" (20). More so, Bitzer notes that these historically evolving
exigences are of two component parts: "a factual condition plus a relation to some
interest" ("Functional" 28). In the case of sexual harassment, these parts are found in the
actual act and the potential for the act occurring--parallels to the codes' dual functions of
activation based on a concrete occurrences of harassment (procedures both formal and
informal) and the explanation prior to an occurrence (definitions and, in the case of
extended codes, a list of prohibited behaviors).
As a result of sexual harassment's continual development and component parts,
demarcation of the exigence is problematic. There is the chance that, as in the case of
Disbrow's thesis, the critic takes the exigence as a matter of fact, thus ignoring a crucial
point of situational analysis: an exigence evolves and must be tracked as such. Or there is
the chance that scrutiny will be given to only concrete examples of the exigence, casting
into shadow the perceptions of the act prior to its occurrence. Finally, there is the chance
that the exigence and other situational elements might be so thoroughly blended together
that they fold into themselves, creating a circularity of assumptions better left for a
postmodemist form of analysis. Hence we need to supplement Bitzer's notion of historical
development with Roderick Hart's explanation of social forces and cultural boundaries.
The concept of social forces operates from the assumption that "no piece of
discourse can be understood outside of its natural habitat" (Hart 71). That is to say, a
rhetorical situation carries with it elements that can be examined so as to provide the44
boundaries for analysis. An examination of the cultural boundaries takes the "natural
habitat" and seeks to examine "the effect of culture upon human interaction" (73). This
examination is a review of the situational elements "available for scrutiny by an observer
or critic who attends to them," a categorization of the organization and structure of the
situation in which the controlling exigence is located (Bitzer, "Situation" 22-23). Thus a
historical review of the events which spawned the exigence of sexual harassment is
essential in that it clarifies for the critic those forces (matters of habitat) and boundaries
(cultural examples of the situation's existence) which separate the sexual harassment
exigence from comparable exigences--domestic violence as an example--and the more
general societal manifestations of sexual harassment. But this historical examination must
then direct itself towards the specific campus situation and the role that the exigence plays
therein.
As such, this chapter will trace the historical development of the sexual harassment
in both the larger societal sense and then in the more specific campus area. We will begin
the examination of the exigence as a historically observable fact by noting two events
which helped to bring attention to sexual harassment. The next stage of analysis will focus
on individuals' perceptions of sexual harassment and the workplaces in which they are
located. The final historical part of the analysis will review the creation of legal responses
to sexual harassment by noting the development of laws and the subsequent court cases
that have been tried. These two areas--the general and the legal--provide us with the
social and cultural markers which denote the existence of the historical sexual harassment
situation. We will then move to the campus-specific situation. Herein we will initially
note social forces and cultural boundaries which perpetuate sexual harassment. Next we
will examine the exigence as it is demonstrated in the effects that it has on persons within
the campus setting (audience). Finally, we will survey the major academic court cases
related to sexual harassment. As is obvious, the campus situation contains a parallel
system of general and legal markers which will help to clarify the nature of the exigence45
therein. By initially surveying the larger societal context of sexual harassment, we will be
in a better position to then analyze sexual harassment as an academic, and controlling,
rhetorical exigence warranting analysis.
Historical Development
Before we can understand the laws that surround sexual harassment, we must look
at the effects sexual harassment has on society. The reason for this is quite simple: these
effects encompass every area of society and are directly related to how people perceive the
issue--at times, in startlingly different ways. They also help to lay the groundwork for
understanding the historical development of the situation in an important way: legal
responses are responses after the fact, they are reactions to an exigence based in a societal
recognition of an imperfection. This general recognition is then encoded into law. As a
hypothetical example of this pattern of historical development, a call for a drug to be
restricted prior to any knowledge of its detriment to specific persons or groups would be
foolhardy; we must have knowledge of the problems with an exigence before we can call
for a modification thereof. So, before a dissection of the legal responses can be
undertaken, a grounding in the facts that paved that path must be entertained. These facts
will be initially represented by two general catalysts which brought the exigence to the
attention of the general public: the Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill trial and the Tailhook
scandal.
On October 11, 1991, the Senate Judiciary Committee heard charges of sexual
harassment brought against then Supreme Court Nominee Clarence Thomas by his former
employee Anita Hill. Although the charges by Hill did not stop Thomas from being
appointed to a seat on the Supreme Court, the public sat in awe as the events graphically
unfolded before them on television and in the paper. The official 1991 Congressional
Quarterly transcripts detail a pattern of alleged harassment that ranged from references to46
the size of Thomas' penis, to graphic comments related to oral sex, to Hill's hospitalization
for stomach pain that she attributed to the stress of these experiences (2982). Throughout
the hearings, Thomas maintained his innocence and expressed how he was "shocked,
surprised, hurt and enormously saddened" by the allegations (2979). Hill, on the other
hand, answered accusations that she had made a mistake in waiting so long to come
forward. As she stated in regards to her testimony, "when I was asked by a representative
of this committee to report my experience, I felt I had to tell the truth. I could not keep
silent" (2982).
The "truth" that Hill spoke of may not have stopped Thomas from taking his seat
on the Supreme Court, but it did have the effect of demonstrating the complicated and
divisive nature of sexual harassment. That this exigence has come to light as more women
have entered the workforce, after the battles for sexual equality in the 1960s and 1970s, is
not in dispute. But society still contends with the myths and hard realities of this exigence,
as demonstrated in this commentary on the effects of the Hill/Thomas hearings:
"Americans have been taught to think that they had individual, legally protected rights to
equal treatment in the workplace and elsewhere. Yet many women believe they are
discriminated against by a society that is still sexist at heart" (The Economist, "On the
Way" 26). As is obvious, what is thought by both men and women is placed in tension by
sexual harassment.
Occurring only a month before the Thomas hearings, yet coming to light a full year
later, another event sharpened the public awareness of sexual harassment. From
September 5-7, 1991, the 35th Annual Symposium of the Tailhook Association was held
at the Las Vegas Hilton. The convention, a gathering of active and retired military
members, defense contractors, and others, dates back to 1956. But that year, the events
that occurred led to media scrutiny and a shake up in the way that the military deals with
cases of sexual harassment and other instances of misconduct.47
The 1992 Department of Defense's official review of Tailhook makes mention of
the "gauntlet," an event where males lined the walls outside of their rooms fondling
woman as they walked by, and touching that "ranged from consensual pats on the breasts
and buttocks to violent grabbing, groping, and other clearly assaultive behavior" (5). The
following investigation, rife with abuses of power and intentional cover-ups by top
officials, led to the dismissal of several officers and the reprimanding of scores more. One
official from the department of the Navy, in Enclosure Seven of the investigation review,
sums up the causes of the intense attention focused on the Tailhook incident:
We know from reports of victims that a significant number
of naval aviators participated in or witnessed assaults on at
least 25 women, 14 of whom were female naval officers.
However, relatively few naval officers provided information
to the investigators, and those who did generally minimized
their own involvement and/or failed to identify those who
were present.
That the exigence is witnessed in this instance in a military setting only deepens
our understanding of the extent and scope of sexual harassment. And it demonstrates
how the social settings and historical demarcations of sexual harassment have helped to
place sexual harassment on the lips of a public who, only a few decades ago, had never
heard the term before. As such, the events describe above are part of the fabric that has
been woven into the ongoing public debate about sexual harassment, that has been mixed
into the developing historical situation. But that development also has effects in general,
has consequences that extend beyond confirmation hearings and military conventions.
When focus is placed on the individual, however, those effects are often difficult to
gauge. As with any other experience, the description of sexual harassment is complicated
by both the outsider's description and the insider's experience, with different descriptions
and reactions to harassment being the result. Until recently, the analysis of sexual
harassment was scarce, though certain patterns have developed in the still evolving study
of the exigence. Stewart, et al., report that "on a personal level, victims report symptoms48
such as nervousness, irritability, loss of motivation, sleeplessness, and weight loss" (232).
These reactions are only the beginning of what many researchers see as an overall erosion
of the person's self-esteem and self-confidence. One report states that upwards of 20% of
the women surveyed after being sexually harassed demonstrated psychological and
physiological symptoms similar to those found in rape victims (Sandler 7). Research is
also clear that after the initial reaction the majority of sexually harassed persons respond in
informal ways. These actions can run the gamut from ignoring the event to talking with
the harasser in the hopes that they will stop the behavior. As a respondent to the 1988
U.S. Merit Systems Protection Board [MSPB] survey said, "I informed the individual as
to how I felt about his behavior and why I felt he should change his behavior if we were to
remain friends" (17).
The reasons for seeking informal means by which to deal with sexual harassment
and, as a result, avoiding formal actions are diverse: some see the result as not worth the
trouble, others feel they won't be believed or, if they are, will be subjected to further
harassment (Stewart et al. 232). Whatever the reason, those emotions feed into actions
that, in most cases, skirt the formalized mechanisms for dealing with the harassment. This
last result is perhaps the most unfortunate. As the 1993 New York State Governor's Task
Force on Sexual Harassment [GTFSH] concludes about this phenomenon, "victims who
do not make formal complaints suffer as much or more" than the few who choose to
pursue aggressive courses of action (3).
The residue of the harassment, or its continued perpetuation among those who
choose not to speak up, has a direct impact on the workplace. If the harassment is in fact
occurring in the place of employment, those effects can be compounded. People may fear
that their jobs, promotions, and career security will be directly affected by how and if they
respond to the harassment. While the definitions used and the methods for gathering
information about sexual harassment vary in reliability, the following statistics are
indicative of a widespread problem.49
The first study of sexual harassment in the workplace was done in 1976 by
Redbook magazine. Of the 9,000 self-selected respondents, 90% indicated that they had
been the victims of sexual harassment. Cook reports that 59% of the 40 million women in
the United States had been victims of sexual harassment in the work force. In 1988, the
federal figures collected by the MSPB found that 42% of all women and 14% of all men
had been the victims of some form of sexual harassment ("Studies" 1). In the recent
update of the same survey, which used a sample group of 8,000 federal employees, the
numbers for both groups had increased to 44 and 19 respectively, at an estimated cost to
the government of $327 million dollars over a two-year period "in terms of sick leave and
job turnover" (New Media Publishing 1). In both the private and public sectors, surveys
have also hi. hlighted the need for more information on sexual harassment. A respondent
to the MSPB survey pointed out, "general information would be helpful in pointing out the
problems that can arise from thoughtless as well as intended sexual harassment" (6).
But pointing out the problem may not be enough. Cook states that "although most
executives indicated that they favor having a company policy against harassment, few
organizations appear to be addressing the problem" ("Studies" 1). This makes Debra
Haffner's claim that a healthy work environment is "one that promotes and respects all
people who integrate sexuality into their lives in non-exploitative, appropriate ways" seem
optimistic at best when our attention is focused on sexual harassment (11). To be aware
that there is a problem of sexual harassment is quite a different thing from promoting and
following through on policies against sexual harassment.
It must be admitted that sexual harassment within society surely existed prior to
the 1976 Redbook survey. But a specific response to such acts was not legally, nor
rhetorically, enacted until the EEOC drafted their definition and liabilities statement in
1980. As such, the effects of sexual harassment were effects related to sexual
discrimination per se; the responses were reactions to an unnamed action which persons
felt was wrong, but were at a loss to explain in a legal context. Thus, it is best that we50
now note the development of the legal context in which responses to the exigence are
generated. The development of sexual harassment laws follows a fairly simple pattern of
evolution: Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title IX of The Education
Amendments of 1972, and the 1980 EEOC expansion of Title VII Section 1604.11. The
impacts of these laws are incredibly complex. What follows is an explanation of how
these laws came to create what is the most widely accepted definition of sexual
harassment, both in society and on campuses across the nation. These laws, in turn, have
been continuously evaluated and revised by the legal challenges that people have brought
against them.
Before the amendments of 1972 and 1980, the Civil Rights Act did not address
cases of sexual harassment. Rather the act was pointed towards cases of more generalized
discrimination based, predominantly,, on race, color, and religion. But, with the following
inclusions, the act come to be the focal point of current sexual harassment standards.
Title IX. The Education Amendments of 1972 prohibit "discrimination on the
basis of sex in any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance"
(GTFSH, Appendix C 36). This was the first time that both educational and private sector
workplaces had sanctions placed on sexually discriminating conduct. Enforcement of Title
IX was, and is, under the auspices of the Department of Education. It is important to
remember, however, that this amendment did not include the notion of sexual harassment.
Title VII. On November 10, 1980, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was amended to
include section 1604.11 Sexual harassment. This addition is unique in two senses: 1) it
provides a definition of sexual harassment for the first time, and 2) this definition is a
federally enforceable law that provides a comprehensive explanation of employer liability
in sexual harassment cases. As was previously noted, two types of harassment are
referenced in Title VII. The first form of harassment addressed, quid pro quo (or "this for
that": sexual favors must be given for a return in employment benefits), happens when an
agent of the place of employment harasses a person who is under their authority.51
Employers are held liable for this type of harassment even in cases where they had no
direct knowledge that it was occurring. The second form is what has come to be known
as the "hostile environment standard." Susan Bay ly explains that this standard differs from
quid pro quo harassment (where sex affects the future job opportunities and benefits of the
harassed) in that "no discriminatory effects on wages, job assignments, or other tangible
benefits is required" (299). As will later be discussed, this distinction between the two
types of sexual harassment has been the subject of legal scrutiny in recent years.
Legal Revisions of the Civil Rights Act. Much of the change that goes on in the
interpretation of sexual harassment law is the result of court cases, rather than the act
itself. In fact, it wasn't until five years had past that the EEOC guidelines were officially
tested in court. In 1985, the Washington State Supreme court heard Glasglow v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. In the case, two female workers were verbally and physically
harassed by a male coworker. Cook states that the decision in favor of the women
"establishes the standard Washington state courts will follow in deciding hostile work
environment in sexual harassment cases" ("Cases" 1). Expanding directly from the EEOC
guidelines, the Supreme Court's opinion was that:
Casual, isolated, or trivial manifestations of a discriminatory
environment do not affect the terms or conditions of
employment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate the
law. The harassment must be sufficiently pervasive so as to
alter the conditions of employment. (qtd. in Cook, "Cases"
1)
The U.S. Supreme Court first ruled on workplace sexual harassment a year later in
Meritor Saving Bank, FSB v. Vinson. This case involved a woman who alleged that her
male boss had, among other things, exposed himself to her and forcibly raped her. She
argued that these acts created a hostile work environment and violated Title VII. Justin
Weddle states that the ruling in favor of the woman is unique because it "resembled quid
pro quo harassment decisions--the hostile environment was a condition of employment52
applied to one gender and not another" (726-727). Once again, the EEOC guidelines
were cited to further clarify the court's stance on what constitutes a "hostile environment".
More recently, the 1991 U.S. Court of Appeals at San Francisco's ruling in Ellison
v. Brady expanded the definition of "reasonable person" to cases of sexual harassment
specifically. The case focused on a female IRS agent who had been subjected to unwanted
love letters from a male co-worker. After initially being relocated to another office, an
agreement was reached by which the male co-worker could return to his original post in
six months if he promised not to bother the female worker anymore. The female worker
sued for sexual harassment. Initially, the case was rejected by the IRS, the EEOC, and the
federal district court, with the court ruling that the case was "isolated and genuinely
trivial" (qtd. in Bayly 300).
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the case was remanded to the district court. In its
instructions to the district court, the circuit court argued that they should adopt the
victim's perspective in order to avoid "ingrained notions of reasonable behavior fashioned
by the offenders" (qtd. in Cook, "Cases" 1). The court continued:
Congress did not enact Title VII to codify existing sexual
prejudices... wehope that over time both men and women
will learn what conduct offends reasonable members of the
other sex. When employees internalize the standard of
workplace conduct we establish today, the current gap in
perception between the sexes will be bridged. (Bayly 301)
The dissent argued that the need for a female-based perspective was not supported by
evidence and that it contradicted the presupposition within Title VII that the legal test
should "apply to all persons, regardless of gender" (301). The developments within this
case are important in that they demonstrate the disagreements about male-bias in sexual
harassment cases.
In a case heard shortly after Andrews, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.,
the "reasonable woman standard" was upheld. The case centered on a female employee's53
complaints about sexually explicit pictures being posted in a predominantly male
workplace. The ruling in favor of the plaintiff by the Florida district court reversed the
earlier "social context" findings in the 1986 case of Rabidue v. Osceola Refining
Company.In that instance, the Sixth Circuit had argued that laws could not be used to
overturn established social conceptions, only to decide specific cases. But the Florida
court argued that such a context argument perpetuated "pre-existing discriminatory
environments" (Bayly 302).
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court further clarified their stance on the hostile
environment clause of Title VII in the case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. The case
involved a woman who alleged sexual harassment by an employer in the form of verbally
demeaning statements. Lower courts had ruled that the comments were offensive, but did
not constitute psychological abuse. In overturning the lower court decision, the Supreme
Court referred back to section 1604.11 of Title VII in ruling that conditions of
employment can be altered even without proof of psychological suffering on the part of
the person, thereby violating the sexual harassment law. Responding to the court's
decision, Hale and Don's 1994 Labor and Employment Bulletin notes the broad scope of
what can be considered a hostile environment and cautions that "employers should
carefully monitor the workplace to avoid problematic situations" (4-5). The caution
implicit in this warning is of two types: 1) a workplace should be free from harassment,
but 2) harassment is, as stated in the liabilities section of the EEOC guidelines, a liability to
which the employer is held predominantly accountable.
Such liability on the part of the employer becomes confusing when the issue of
sexual harassment is related to cases of consensual relationships. The history of the
people's relationship seems to have as much bearing as the type of behavior that is
engaged in...at times and to differing degrees. In the 1988 case of Koster v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, the court "found no sexual harassment when the defendant had a
previous consensual relationship with the plaintiff' (Bennett-Alexander 138). On the other54
hand, such a prior relationship was of no consequence in the 1988 ruling on Shrout v.
Black Clawson Company. In this instance, the two persons had been involved in a three
year relationship, but for four years afterward the defendant engaged in varying degrees of
sexual harassing behavior that the plaintiff continuously rejected. The court ruled in favor
of the plaintiff because, "even though the relationship had begun on a consensual basis, the
defendant's activity was not welcomed by the plaintiff and the relationship had passed into
the realm of sexual harassment" (138-139). In both instances, though, one thing is
sufficiently clear; the nature of the employee's relationship(s) will be examined in making
determinations as to whether sexual harassment has occurred.
The court cases discussed above must be tempered with a contrasting piece of
evidence many employees have failed in the past to take advantage of formal complaint
procedures which lead to court proceedings and, for those that do, the result is often
negative. The MSPB section on federal employee responses to sexual harassment notes
that "formal remedies are rarely used to deal with sexual harassment. Only 5 percent of
both female and male victims responding in 1987 said they took formal action to deal with
the harassment, and most of these employees viewed the action they took as non-
productive" (17). While the depth of understanding related to sexual harassment has
increased since 1987, the recent court cases indicate that formal complaints still offer an
often conflicting standard of interpretation in regards to the EEOC guidelines. One area
that demonstrates these conflicts succinctly is the nature of psychological and emotional
harm in sexual harassment claims.
As the 1994 case of Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., demonstrated, proof of
psychological injury is not necessary to prove a hostile environment in a sexual harassment
suit. But many plaintiffs are still seeking compensation for psychological injury. James
McDonald and Paul Lees-Haley argue that "junk science"--evidence supplied by witnesses
with no formalized training--in the courtroom is detracting from the real cases of sexual
harassment and setting a dangerous precedent for what constitutes psychological injury.55
They argue from the beginning that psychological injury is difficult to prove and that, in
many cases, expert testimony tries to establish "severe psychological injury as a result of
nominal exposure to objectionable conduct" (51). They state that this type of fraudulent
testimony is based on the faulty notion that sexual harassment causes mental disorders, a
claim to which they say there is no scientific backing (52).
What has led to this problem, McDonald and Lees-Haley continue, is that very
little research has been done on the subject. They cite research which posits that "a review
of outcomes yields a list of possible effects but does not allow conclusions about their
prevalence or the conditions under which any particular effect will occur" (54). The
difficulty in collecting research is based, in large part, on the fact that definitions vary,
study groups are inherently biased towards victims, and that the measurement of
psychopathology varies from study to study in both content and reliability (54-57). The
other problem in sufficiently documenting psychological injury is that the effect an
offensive joke has on one person may not correspond to its effect on another.
The result of these limitations is that a person who presents expert testimony may
actually only be describing an injury based on one case, not a catalog of documented facts,
or they may not "possess any clinical orientation at all" (60). McDonald and Lees-Haley
conclude by arguing that, for a test to be reliable, it must use the proper format (they refer
to the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders), be done by a professional with a clinical background, and be evaluated against
current information and the patient's medical history (62-67).
It may be easy to initially dismiss these arguments. How dare they, we scold, how
could they claim that someone was in this for the money. But the authors, one a lawyer
and the other a clinical psychologist, raise some important issues. As with any area of
serious concern, people will abuse the system. Proper tabulation and reporting of
psychological injuries due to sexual harassment suffer each time a fraudulent case is heard.
What's more, with repeated instances of suspect testimony, a snowball effect can occur:56
sexual harassment cases will begin to be judged by, rather than against, the "junk science"
that McDonald and Lees-Haley talk about. Skepticism in regards to legal cases may seem
an inappropriate goal, but caution is necessary if progress is to be made.
Caution notwithstanding, it is safe to make at least one claim: the shape and scope
of the Civil Rights Act has shifted dramatically over the last 23 years since changes were
adopted that began looking at sexual discrimination generally and then sexual harassment
as a specific imperfection. With those changes came legal challenges that defined the ways
in which the court looks at sexual harassment cases. And, in the midst of this ongoing
process, codes have been adopted on campuses across the country to deal with the
exigence.
Exigence on Campus
As with the discussion of the historical development of sexual harassment, we
must first look to the general rise in comprehension of the exigence by those within the
academic setting. Seeing that the personal perceptions and effects of sexual harassment
on the employment sector have already been covered, we will move directly into the
academic setting. First we will note general biases operative within the situation which
serve to demonstrate the cultural boundaries and social forces which surround the
exigence. We will then analyze the specific legal responses to the exigence within the
academic context.
When one steps figuratively and literally into the campus situation they are treated
to more than just instructional books, comradery, and social networks. They are treated,
in short, to the messages that these educational supplements promote. Research has
pointed to the fact that ingrained sex discrimination exists in the texts, teacher-student
relations, and social organizations found on campuses. This discrimination promotes the
male over female patriarchal hierarchy that increases a tendency to view the sexes as57
different based on biological make-up, rather than individual merit. These attributional
statements are often taken at face value by students and teachers and perpetuated by other
audiences. And these types of discriminatory attitudes infuse the sexual harassment
spectrum with a cluttered barrage of often patently false information; in short, these
attitudes bolster the imperfections of the exigence, lending support to the perpetuation of
sexual harassment.
Jordan Titus surveyed the works of five major publishers of education foundations
textbooks (those books used to train future teachers). In the explicit content of the
material analyzed there were no sexist indicators. However, the implicit messages did
promote a biased review of sex in that they emphasized conventional sex roles for both
males and females and offered no discussion of how deviations from these roles--in gender
orientation, as an example- -are to be addressed (42). More so, Titus noted that these
texts failed to accurately note the differences between sex and gender, creating "the
misleading implication...that both refer to mutually exclusive, dichotomous, and
unambiguous categories" (40). The result of this blended description of the socialized and
biological self is ambiguity. But the result of deferral to traditional, and not always
accurate, sex roles is skewed clarity: the "weaker" person is subject to the demands of the
"stronger" one.
M. Gail Jones noted similar discrepancies in teacher/student classroom
interactions. In the conclusion of her review, she notes that "at all educational levels,
teachers give male students more praise, criticism, and overall attention" (37). Although
the research was focused on education before the post-secondary level, the implication is
that students and the teachers that educate them come into the college and university
systems with a programmed sense of what "sex roles," and the gender ties that stem from
them, mean...and that sense may not be accurate. Once again, cultural boundaries are in
place which perpetuate the exigence of sexual harassment via discriminatory social
interaction methods. Whether correct or not, these patterns of interaction are also58
reinforced outside of the classroom in certain organizational settings sanctioned by
colleges and universities.
Mindy Stombler and Patricia Martin, in a gender-based ethnographic study of little
sister organizations (female groups affiliated with male fraternities), found that they
"encourage women's subordination to, exploitation by, and dependence on, men" (150).
These effects are the result of the women being subjected to terminology ("sweethearts"
and "dream girls") and activities which place then in a subordinate position to their male
peers (153). Indeed, the selection process weeds out those women that do not fit the
fraternity's criteria for attractiveness; one chairman of a little sister organization even went
so far as to admit that a few candidates were "nice," but were not selected because they
were "heavy girls" (157). What's more, these young women often do not note the effects
that this atmosphere has on them:
Our data suggests...that this element of the campus
culture devalues women. Although individual women who
are little sisters cite a litany of benefits, we conclude that the
program fails to enhance, and does much to harm,
undergraduate women's lives when viewed through the
critical lens of a gender perspective. (183)
These subtle and not so subtle endorsements of attitudes that promote a biased
view of one sex, whether in the instructional texts for teachers, the classes we take, or the
groups we belong to, helps to explain the large number of cases of male to female sexual
harassment. If a person is indoctrinated with the sense that men are better than women,
the idea that a man will harass a woman isn't so shocking. On a larger level, all forms of
sexual harassment are reinforced by any stereotype that concludes that one person is better
than another based on their sex or on the gender orientations that they display. But these
problems of gender and sex are filtered out into the general campus setting, a distinct
community with equally distinct characteristics.59
Far from just being another employment area, the academic community has the
distinction of also being a place where students and professors, faculty and graduates, mix
and interrelate in the pursuit of educational goals: to learn, to teach, to exchange ideas.
This mixture of different relational contexts and social settings creates a unique
environment in which harassment can run rampant. More so, this diverse mix denotes the
"plurality of publics" which, as Chapter Five will make clearer, create the rhetorical
audience capable of remedying the exigence of sexual harassment. And, as with the more
general historical effects noted in discussion of personal perceptions in this chapter,
students within this "public" setting face a similar debilitation as a result of sexual
harassment. Expressing an erosion of both her personal and professional self a graduate
student reported the effect of her advisor's sexual harassment: "Some days as I drove to
campus, I began to cry so hard that I had to turn around and go home. I lost all
confidence in my scientific abilities..." (GTFSH 34). Sadly, such personal consequences
have only recently become the focus of study. Dr. Gladys Brown states in the
introduction to the Sexual Harassment Resource Manual for the University of Maryland
College Park, "sexual harassment in higher education is not a new issue, but has until
recently been a hidden silent one" (4).
But, like the research done in the personal and work arenas, a conclusion can be
drawn about sexual harassment in the academic setting within the past two decades: the
problem--as a matter of both perception and documentation--is widespread.13 In a 1982
study of sexual harassment, involving 927 students, faculty, and staff from the University
of Rhode Island, "13% reported personal knowledge of a sexual assault on someone else"
(Rubin and Borgers 402). Of 226 female graduates and undergraduates students surveyed
13 When reviewing these results, it is important to keep in mind a fact that problematizes some of these
findings: there is no standardized means by which to measure incidence of sexual harassment. This
problem is summarized by Barbara Dziech and Linda Wiener in their explanation of a list of surveys they
had studied. They comment on how each "employed different research techniques and slightly different
definitions of sexual harassment. Some used random-sampling; others reported on self-selected
respondents" (qtd. in Crusius and Channell 388).60
at Eastern Carolina University, 33% reported being sexually harassed by male teachers;
the behaviors were broken down into seven types: verbal; leering and ogling; clothing,
body, and sexual attitudes related remarks; unwanted physical contact; pressure for sexual
activity; demands for sexual favor; and physical assault (Rubin and Borgers 403).
A 1984 harassment study found that 30% of undergraduate women experienced
sexual harassment from at least one professor during their undergraduate career. Another
study, conducted in 1985, found that 16% of graduate women students had been
physically assaulted (GTFSH 26). A 1987 study at an East Coast public university found
that of the "356 randomly sampled graduate women," 60% reported "at least one
experience of sexual harassment" (Rubin and Borgers 404). But these numbers may be
deceptively low. As Brown notes, "a study at Harvard showed that only 5 percent of the
students who had an experience they would label sexual harassment reported it to a
college official" (6). Factor in the amount of under reported male and same-sex cases of
harassment and the numbers could be much higher.
A University of California at Berkeley study textures the above explanations when
it reports that "26% of the 235 male faculty members reported sexual involvement with
female students" (Clark 1). Such a factor is not, in and of itself, proof of sexual
harassment. But it is nonetheless an indicator of why schools are adopting consensual
relationship policies. These policies are direct reactions to a variety of problems related to
sexual harassment: an abuse of power, a conflict of interest, or the perception by an
outside party that such relationships are the only way, the quickest way, or the easiest way
by which to secure a grade or position. Hence, the telling statement in OSU's 1995 Sexual
Harassment Policy: "all employees should recognize the possible negative consequences of
sexual or romantic liaisons in the workplace and academic program" (2). That sexual
harassment or claims thereof are one of the primary "possibilities" seems evident.
But how have these reports of sexual harassment been channeled into the legal
arena? What follows is a look at the most important campus cases and the effect they61
have had on shaping sexual harassment law. These cases have had an important impact on
the ways in which campus codes (through the connections drawn under the EEOC
definitions and subsequent clarifications in Titles IX and VII) have been challenged and, as
a result, defined further in recent years:
In the 1977 case of Alexander v. Yale, the first sexual harassment complaint filed
against an educational institution, the Second Circuit Court ruled that "quid pro quo could
be argued even if the harassed student suffered no tangible loss of benefits; and that the
existence of environmental harassment could not be established by rumors and hearsay"
(Clark 8).14 This ruling, while upholding harassment based on request for sexual favors,
implicitly dismissed the hostile environment standard by ruling that arguments based on a
climate of harassment were not compelling (Bayly 303). Two years later, in Cannon v. the
University of Chicago, it was ruled that an individual can sue a state institution on Title IX
grounds, further extending the rights of the harassed beyond claims related to specific
individuals to include those against institutional bodies. The next crucial step in the
development of educational sexual harassment law was in the 1984 case of Grove City
College v. Bell (1984). In this instance, it was "ruled that enforcement of Title IX cannot
apply to colleges that do not receive federal monies" but that students who receive federal
financial aid can argue via Title IX, making practically all schools subject to discrimination
laws (Clark 8).
Four years later, another case tested the hostile environment standard under Title
IX guidelines. In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, a First Circuit court reversed the
pattern set and followed after Alexander v. Yale. According to Bayly, Title VII could be
applied "but only under the specific facts of the case: the harassed person, a female
medical resident, was both a student and employee" (303). This ruling follows from a case
14 For matters of clarity it should be noted that this case was tried under Title IX standards and, as a
result, is based on a claim of discrimination not, as would be possible after the inclusion of Title VII in
1980, sexual harassment.62
heard three years prior, Brown City College v. California State Personnel Board. In this
case, Title VII rulings of sexual harassment were problematized based on the fact that
Title IX does include language that interprets students and faculty as employees within the
academic workplace. As such, it is more difficult to establish "knowledge of harassment
on the part of the institution"--a prerequisite for claims of liability following from the
EEOC guidelines (Clark 9).
But that difficulty is contradicted by the more recent comments of Terry Roach,
Senior Counsel to the President of the University of Maryland at College Park. He posits
that such assumptions about the establishment of prior knowledge can have serious
ramifications for an institution. As such, Roach argues that once a complaint of sexual
harassment is discussed with any person who has authority at the school "it is likely that
the institution will now be judged to have had actual knowledge of the harassment...the
complaint in not 'on hold' until the victim walks through the approved door. Rather,
independent and prompt responsive action by the institution is required" (308).
Finally, Franklin v Gwinnet County Public School (1992), heard by the U.S.
Supreme Court, completely reversed the precedents set by the lower courts in regards to
the hostile environment clause. Clark explains that the ruling "established monetary
damages awarded in sexual harassment cases against educational institutions" (9). This
ruling stands in direct opposition to a federal district court ruling three years earlier, in
Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, which stated that "Title IX does not permit a hostile
environment claim as described for the workplace by [the EEOC regulations]" (qtd. in
Bayly 303). Thus, the hostile environment standard has shifted from being a work force-
specific mechanism to being an avenue of legal recourse within the academic setting.63
Conclusion
The analysis undertaken demonstrates that sexual harassment exists as a
complicated imperfection both historically and academically. But the preceding analysis of
these dual frameworks also serves to clarify the distinctions between the two; for it is not
sufficient to merely say that sexual harassment is societal and also academic. That
simplicity of delineation, though true on its face, leaves the critic no closer to an
understanding of either context. That an exigence exists as a general, evolving, historical
fact does not mean that it exists in the same form in all of the situations in which it is
present. Indeed, sexual harassment-as-exigence is present not only in a given act thereof,
but also in the perceptions prior to the act; it is a factual reality and a perceptual factor.
That both contexts analyzed in this chapter have components in common is also
not a fact to be confused with them being the same. The campus situation is not just a
part of the societal situation, for the perceptions of sexual harassment and the court cases
rendered therein point to a different set of social forces and cultural boundaries; the cases
that have been undertaken involving the campus public are shaped by the nature of the
situation. Simply put, the "natural habitat" is academic and the "cultural interactions" are
necessarily a reflection of the habitat in which administrators, faculty, stet and students
are situated. As a result the exigence in the academic environment can be distinguished
from the more general historical manifestations of sexual harassment.
More so, the previous discussion of the exigence helps us to initially determine the
shape of the academic situation. Framed in the terminology used at the outset of this
chapter, the organization of the sexual harassment situation is complex in that "many
elements [are] made to interact"; the situation is also highly structured in that all of the
components dealt with in this chapter are "ordered to the task to be performed" (Bitzer,
"Situation" 23). These elements and components are "objective and publicly observable"
in so far as this chapter notes the historical development of situation by tracing the64
development of the exigence. These historical factors, in turn, help to frame and define the
academic situation. In short, sexual harassment and the situation(s) in which it is located- -
historically and academically--are observable via our review of specific examples, personal
perceptions, employment contexts, and academic circumstances; the creation and revision
of the Civil Rights Act; the implementation of the EEOC guidelines; and also the legal
interpretation(s) of sexual harassment laws.
Katie Roiphe sums up these elements and the interactions they breed when she
states that the academic setting "with its emphasis on intellectual exchange, on the
passionate pursuit of knowledge, with its strange hours and unworldly citizens, is
theoretically an ideal space for close friendships" (93). Herein we can note that the
direction of goals are different, the ends sought are different, the very means by which
such goals and ends are achieved are distinct from the societal situation. But the
imperfection of sexual harassment forces into flux the "ideal" and "theoretical" nature of
the interactions within the academic setting; it infuses the habitat with a problematic
breach of conduct that codes attempt to remedy. It is for these reasons that the campus
setting warrants a situational analysis. Hence the ongoing task is to further elaborate on
the nature of the campus context by analyzing the other components which make up a
rhetorical situation. The next chapter will thus turn our attention to the next factor within
this situation: the publics that function as the rhetorical audience that will judge the
discourse created in response to the academic exigence.65
Chapter V: The Rhetorical Audience
As was discussed in Chapter Three, the rhetorical audience iscomposed of those
persons capable of meditating change "so as to modify positively exigencies in rhetorical
situations" (Bitzer, "Public" 73). Administrators, faculty, staff andstudents are those
audiences within this situation which have the capabilityto affect change; they are those
persons who can respond to the sexual harassment codes in sucha way so as to decrease
the incidents of sexual harassment. Additionalgroups such as the larger community (and
sub-groups therein) and the alumni may indeed sharean interest in reducing sexual
harassment. Yet they do not function within the situationas has been previously
articulated. They may enter into, pass through, and interact with, thecampus situation,
yet they do not possess the membership that the other audiences do. It is importantto
note that, should an incident of sexual harassment occur toa member of these extraneous
publics, the procedures and processes to which they would appealare related in large part
to the societal situation; that is to say, their appeal is to the courtsystem and not to the
academic review board.
But such delineations warrant a more comprehensive articulation.To that end, we
will begin by noting different audiences--which create publics--withinthe campus
situation. Central to this discussion is the problematicnature of referencing information
related to these audiences, information which often focuseson overly rigid delineations of
male and female, masculine and feminine From that foundation,we must go a few steps
further; we must clarify the relationship between the "plurality ofpublics" and the creators
of the discourse to which they are treated. The establishment ofthis connection is
essential. For, without a clear understandingas to such a relation, we would fail to
sufficiently understand why these audiencesare capable of reacting to the rhetorical
response--the fundamental measure of whetheror not sexual harassment codes are fitting66
or not.15 This section of the chapter will develop following the components of Bitzer's
essay, "Rhetoric and the Public Knowledge." We will note how these publics must: 1) be
connected via shared knowledge, 2) operate as an audience based in their relation to the
historical development of the situation, 3) be defined by the competent representation of
what they know based in how the speaker presents them with such information, 4) be
authorized to act as a rhetorical audience, and 5) be clarified as a rhetorical audience in
relation to the speaker.
The Audiences as Public
Getting at the nature of the audiences involved in the campus sexual harassment
situation is difficult because of how the academic environment operates when confronted
with the issue of sexual harassment. Mary S. Strine explains that in the campus context,
sexual harassment "compromises" the "reasonable expectations" of what education should
do and undermines "the foundational norms of academic life" (392). That those norms
may in fact be merely "ideals" is not the point. Most persons within the campus
community would assume or expect to be treated as equals in so far as sex (gender)
should not be a determinant of one's abilities as a member of the academic public in
whatever position they operate. But, just as sexual harassment undermines such an
optimistic expression, our discussion of sexual harassment uncovers a huge discrepancy in
the information available about each of the publics, about the rhetorical audience capable
of remedying the exigence of sexual harassment.
To wit, the discussion of sexual harassment often focuses on a dichotomy that is
disturbing if an attempt were made to apply it generally: men sexually harass and women
15 As should be apparent, I refer to "publics" as the collection of audiences on each campus. These
campus publics form a "plurality of publics" which then create the collective "rhetorical audience." For
while these publics are distinct in some ways, the subsequent discussion clarifies the fact that their
rhetorical function is the same: the audience judges the discourse of the speaker via their response.67
are harassed. The acceptance of such a delineation would render the discussion of
audience as stereotypical as the skewed perceptions that perpetuate sexual harassment.
Granted, most of the information brought to bear in the previous chapters provides
overwhelming evidence that most cases of sexual harassment are perpetuated by men
towards women. But the extension of that fact to the extent that victims are "women" and
"men" are the criminals is a reductive fallacy; sexual harassment defined solely on the basis
of specific cases is no longer sexual harassment. A most lucid example of this problem is
contained in "Narratives of Sexual Harassment: Organizational Dimensions," by Bryan
Taylor and Charles Conrad:
We chose to exclude the ten narratives...received from
authors identifying themselves as men. These are rich texts
in their own right: they contain descriptions of sexual
"hassle" by women, claims of reverse victimization from
accused harassers, complaints about the awkwardness of the
current sexual harassment climate, and one argument
against affirmative action hiring....Our exclusion of these
narratives was based not on the sex of the authors, but on
the content and range. (407)
The authors were also compelled to make the comment that they "noted an
important (if not surprising) absence in the narratives submitted by men: no male wrote
identifying himself as a sexual harasser" (407). The parenthetical aside is as disruptive of
content as it is illuminating of the "not surprising" problems the critic confronts when they
attempt to gather balanced material related to sexual harassment. While this type of
subjectivity will be addressed more thoroughly in the next chapter, it is important to note
at this point because such information litters our understanding of sexual harassment.
Such a tendency has disastrous ramifications: we perpetuate an understanding of the
interactants in the sexual harassment situation as destructive as the act itself. As a result
of these problems in data, the following discussion of the audiences which create the
publics is based on: 1) general information about each audience, and 2) information
related to procedures which make the distinctions between the audiences apparent.68
Administration. This is an audience which, in many instances, implements policy
as much as it responds to actions that are based in the same. As such, administrative
persons are treated to a fluctuating standard of accountability when dealing with sexual
harassment. Administrative duties thus alternate between "knowing the administrative
channels available to process a complaint of sexual harassment" and serving as a "role
model" for their wards (UMCP 20; 32). And, as Conrad and Taylor note, this component
of the public is often "diffused between loosely coupled bureaucratic units and levels" that
are historically dominated by males (405). The result is that the administrative audience
must be many things at once: authority, reference, role model, and decision-making body
on a variety of issues. At the same time, the uneven historical distribution of the sexes
within this audience exacerbates perceptual, emotional, and managerial inequalities
between its members. Nonetheless they function as a part of the rhetorical audience in
that they--perhaps more than other audiences on campus--maintain some level of
organizational power related to the issue of modifying the exigence of sexual harassment.
Faculty. This audience is one in which males have, in much the same way as in the
administrative body, "traditionally enjoyed higher numbers, status and formal control over
institutional resources and rewards" (Taylor and Conrad 405). In contrast to these
historical realties, the female members of this audience are "traditionally undercapitalized,
underadvised, naively trusting in meritocracy, and underinvolved in important networks"
(406). Additionally, faculty duties bring them into more direct contact with the body of
persons who experience the highest degree of sexual harassment: students. Their actions- -
between peers and as mentors to students--offer as a result of their close proximity the
most intimate examples of behavior to the student population. But, once again, they
operate as a rhetorical body in that they are capable of responding to and mediating sexual
harassment.
Staff. This audience--the secretarial workers within departments and those
employees in subordinate positions within the administrative hierarchy--stands in a slightly69
ambiguous position: they provide channels of communicationbetween the faculty and the
administration, the students and faculty, the administration and thestudents, and vice
versa. The nature of their job is, in other words, dependent on their connectionto the
other audiences which form the publics. And sucha relationship brings them into contact
with perhaps the most diverse patterns of interactionon the campus. In addition, they
operate in contrast to the faculty and the administration in that they have historicallybeen
represented by female members. As a rhetorical audience, theyoperate as the group with
the most diversity of audience interaction; theyserve, in other words, as the go-between
for the other groups listed herein.
Students. The first of the members of this audience thatmust be addressed are the
graduate students. The majority of thesepersons operate in the flux between hired
employee and active student, they are under contractto perform a duty yet they are
continuing their education. And, even for those whoare not under contract with the
institution, their status is unclear in regards to sexual harassment inat least one area: who
are their peers? As has been noted, peer-to-peer harassment is not legally recognized, but
that problem is only compounded ifwe look to this group's alternating role as student and
instructor (or research assistant or work study). The undergraduate student'sposition is
more clearly defined in that their membership in the campus public is for all intensive
purposes based on educational goals, although they too may be employed ina variety of
internship and work study positions.
For both graduate and undergraduate students, sexual harassment loomlarge as an
observable factor with which they must contend. And theirmeans for dealing with sexual
harassment are compounded by their relation to the other audiences: theystand closest to
teachers who perpetuate the most statistical evidence of harassmentagainst them, yet
farthest from the public (administrative) which handles themeans by which to deal with
sexual harassment in both informal and formal modes. Conrad and Taylorsuccinctly
summarize the students' standing:70
Students are commodified (e.g., as enrollment data) and
devalued as transient, needy and 'difficult'. This devaluation
is structural: support systems for harassment victims (e.g.,
Student Services) are typically feminized (sex-segregated)
and marginalized within the institutional power structure.
(405)
While this information further supports the "unnatural" delineation of persons onthe basis
of their sex, it is also applicable to both male and female students in thatstudent
experiences of harassment have the effect of decreasing self-esteem and increasingthe
notion of submission to an admittedly hierarchical system (Striae 394). Givenall of these
complexities within the student "public" sphere, they also demonstrate themselves tobe a
rhetorical body capable of modifying the exigence; they deal with the mostreported cases
of harassment and are in one of the most undervalued institutional positions:they stand in
direct contact with the exigence and stand to gain and/or lose the most shouldthey choose
to mediate change within the sexual harassmentsituation.
While there are other groups that could be discussed as possible audiences
contractual employees, temporary hires, special event staff--they are by and largeabsorbed
into the previously discussed audiences. Their concerns and interests, when related
directly to sexual harassment, are dealt with in the discussion of the audiencesabove. It
suffices to reiterate that each campus' audiences create a "public." Ourattention at this
point must turn to that relationship between these publics, and their collective relation to
the creators of the codes, the EEOC. These connections helps to further clarifythe
campus publics' standing as a collectiverhetorical audience.
The Publics as Audience
As was mentioned in the introduction, the first thing that an audience must possess
is the knowledge of certain situational facts; that is to say, a collective senseof what is
true in a given situation (Bitzer, "Public" 72).The specific knowledge that is in the71
possession of the members of the campus publics is that sexual harassment is wrong.
Even those persons who harass (and we defer discussion of those that do not think their
actions are harassment until the next chapter) can note that what they do is contrary to the
common knowledge of the campus body. Knowledge must be further clarified in that it is
not a mere opinion or belief, but a readily observable fact. Such a position may seem to
be, at first glance, fallacious given that not all persons see sexual harassment as the exact
same thing. But the exigence of sexual harassment does not change insofar as it remains a
constant rift in the knowledge of the publics which must be remedied.This constancy is
not meant to imply that dispute does not exist as to the qualities and shades of the
imperfection. Indeed, disputes as to the designation of such and such an act as "sexual
harassment" further fuse the publics together. These value judgments of the act are part of
the situation, they are indications of "a community exhibiting diversity within unity" (74).
And such value-based disagreements as to specific issues still revolve around a central and
concrete tenet: sexual harassment impedes the smooth running of the campus
environment. '6
How is such a stance possible? First we must be clear that facts are situation-
specific and historically derived. They are, as John Dewey states, "an acquired result of
the workings of natural impulse in connection with environment" (187). We understand
sexual harassment in context of the situation in which it occurs, not in a general sense.
Without some tie to other experiences that confirm, contradict, and complicate, sexual
harassment exists only in abstract. The employee at an aerospace firm has a different
knowledge of sexual harassment than, say, the graduating senior at a Midwest college.
But the campus-specific environment, tied as it is to the historical development of sexual
harassment, necessarily finds verification of such a fact in past situations where persons
have judged sexual harassment to be wrong. Factual judgment, in this situational sense, is
16 Alfred North Whitehead discusses the commonality that is fused through such "value-experience" in his
book Modes of Thought, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1938.72
a process which finds verification by reflection on past instances, and such continued
observation allows us "to arrive at... moreprecise knowledge" (Russell 164).17 Hence
the employee and the senior are connected generally in so far as they note a fact, but are
distinct in the manner in which they arrive--at and interpret--such knowledge.
The second component of verifying the existence of the campus' audiences as
publics is tied to the preceding one in that the campus audiences reference the larger
societal sexual harassment situation. Bitzer argues that in many instances such audiences
"stands in" for apublic ("Public"73). If we were to study the larger societal
manifestations of sexual harassment, we might conclude that the campus audiences stood
in for the more general societalpublicin that they display relatively similar functions
within their respective domain. In other instances, standing in is more a designation of
comparable to and, as Bitzer goes on to note, audiences andpublics"overlap and
coincide" in certain environments (73). Such is the case in this situation. The audiences
that have been noted previously arepublicsin so far as they are capable of fulfilling two
requirements: authorizing and mediating change. That these audiences share a similarity
with the societalpublic --in knowledge at the very least -- merely confirms the historical
development of the campus situation.
The third factor that must be entertained centers on the connection of the
audiences-as-public to the creators of the code, the EEOC. In this instance, the second
factor is clarified due to the fact that the EEOC is apublic,historically verified speaker
now engaged in the implementation of their discourse--the codes--in the campus situation.
As such, the rhetor-as-representative is required to "know what the public knows and
speak as thepublicwould speak were it articulate and aware of its truths and interests"
(Bitzer, "Public" 74). Since the campus publics form the rhetorical audience that will
17 Other scholars have also suggested that Bertrand Russell's philosophical works provide a template for a
"speech communication" examination of rhetoric. As Donald L. Torrence notes, "Russell, like Plato in
the Phaedrus, does present views which form the fundamentals of a sound system of rhetoric" (153).73
judge the speaker's response to sexual harassment, this rule becomes important: if analysis
demonstrates the EEOC to be in tension with the publics' knowledge of sexual harassment
or to be unaware of their interests, the campus publics are less likely to mediate and
activate change. Thus the speaker, the EEOC, is required to demonstrate the reasons that
they are entitled to function as a spokesperson for change, why their response to the
exigence should be seen as fitting within the campus context.
The question of entitlement leads us to the fourth factor of authorization. Bitzer
argues that "authorization is needed when a proposed act or message might seriously
affect the well-being of others" ("Public" 75). That the EEOC operates as a historical
institution initially and a campus-specific organization secondly demonstrates that they
have at the very least established a claim to operate as speaker. Problems have been
addressed in previous chapters, however, that complicate that authority. When looking at
the nature of the codes in Chapter Two it was noted that they had undergone very little
transformation in their transition from societal to campus response, a fact that deserves
more attention in that a situation "prescribes the response that fits" (Bitzer, "Situation"
22).But the true nature of authorization must be deferred until an analysis of the codes is
complete, for the EEOC's accreditation is based in a situational analysis of the rhetorical
audience's response to the discourse which the commission provides.
The final factor is summed up in the question: "what is the proper authorizing
ground of expressions of truth and value and of judgments and actions in public rhetorical
address?" (Bitzer, "Public" 76). This question fuses the audiences on each campus and the
EEOC together in that the authorizing ground for providing sexual harassment codes is
based in the extent to which they mirror "the knowledge and interests of the public" (76).
As was already noted, the common knowledge of the campus public that must be
articulated is that sexual harassment is wrong. More so, it was explained that sexual
harassment is a historical fact, a public act, with consequences "for good and evil [that]
extend to others--perhaps many others" (77). The aerospace worker and the student, the74
legislator and the administrator, allare affected by sexual harassment. That the situations
differ solidifies the nature of sexual harassmentas an exigence manifest in differing
situations to differing degrees. That multiple audiences form publicspoints to the
existence of disagreements within the unity ofa given situation. Hence, the question of
authorization is grounded in the audiences' acceptance ofa speaker's discourse, in the
validation or rejection that occurs rhetorically between thetwo.
It is these complicated factors which lead to the designation ofthe administrators,
faculty, staff, and students on college and universitycampuses as a "plurality of publics."
These publics are similar to societal publics, hence theyare historically verifiable. But
they are also the same across campus boundaries, thus forminga "rhetorical audience"
capable of responding to the EEOC's codes within thecampus situation, within the
context that is the focus of this rhetorical analysis. These points of analysisseem to
confirm Bitzer's statement that "the testing of public knowledge... occursin the
successive and overlapping rhetorical situations which the publicencounters as it interacts
with its total environment" ("Public" 90). Sucha test is only possible through the process
of distinguishing differences and noting similarities of "environmental"situations, of
defining the nature of a given audience and themessages it is asked to respond to, and
clarifying who asks them to formulate sucha response and by what authority. The test is,
in sum, a rhetorical one.
Conclusion
The analysis of the audiences that has occurred in this chapter hasbeen complex,
alternating between matters of fact and issues of philosophical, indeedtheoretical,
orientation. But the result is that we do not merely know that audiencesexists, we
understand why they exist. We have placed the audiences incontext by moving beyond
lists and into examination of the factors that determine their makeup andwarrant their75
designation as a public on each campus. These individual publics were then shown to
operate as a "plurality of publics" connected to each other. Finally, as a collective
"rhetorical audience," these publics were shown to be authorized and capable of mediating
the exigence as articulated in the rhetoric of the EEOC and manifest in college and
university sexual harassment codes. This process may seem at first glance needlessly
complicated. But it is essential that the complexities of the situation are treated to an
equally extensive analysis if critical gains are to be the result.
Some of the matters discussed herein are also demonstrative of why a situational
analysis such as this is necessary. An issue as complicated as sexual harassment will
necessarily obscure certain material as it illuminates other information. In regards to the
composition of the audiences-as-public, scholars and critics still have to contend with the
problematic ways in which male and female perspectives are collected and analyzed. An
audience is not an androgynous mass of gender-neutral similarities; it is a collection of
persons influenced and empowered by issues of sex, gender and socialization. Just as
situations are modified, so too should the means of explaining and analyzing them. As
such, the next chapter will explore how the problems noted in the initial section of this
chapter work to constrain the operations of the rhetorical discourse within the situation.76
Chapter VI: Constraints
Bitzer argues that constraints are those "persons, events, objects, and relations
which are parts of the situation because they have the power to constrain decision"
("Situation" 21). These constraints are further divided into inartistic and artistic
categories, the former being operative within the situation and the latter being the result of
the speaker's discourse. But arriving at a sufficient understanding of these constraints is
difficult. The reason being, they often overlap and sometimes contradict each other,
folding into other areas of the rhetorical situation. Given these complexities, this chapter
will develop in three parts. First we will analyze the inartistic constraints which are
operative in the campus situation. Specifically, we will analyze the current research into
the influence of sex and gender on perceptions of sexual harassment. Next suggestions
will be provided as to why the research is divided on the topic and how these divergent
results operate as constraints. Finally, we will look at the artistic proofs that the EEOC
brings to the campus situation; we will look at those features which the rhetor uses in an
attempt to secure the favor of their audience.
Much of this chapter relies on the references that can be made to previous
discussions within this thesis. The preceding chapter on the rhetorical audience is essential
in that it clearly sets out those persons who are part of the discussion of the inartistic
constraints above. Additionally, the relations and events detailed in Chapter Four help to
clarify the nature of the exigence as a factual and perceptual reality which constrains
persons as much as persons react to the same. In essence, the perceptions of the audience
and the artistic tools of the speaker provide the objects which previous information helps
to clarify and the subsequent chapter will analyze. The reader is well-served to keep these
factors in mind while examining the following information.77
Inartistic Proofs
At present there is a split in thought regarding the influence of gender and sex on
perception(s) of sexual harassment. Although both groups embrace similar terms, they are
by no means similar in orientation. Those proponents of the gender perspective hold that
people are more likely to label behaviors as sexual harassment dependent on how they are
influenced by factors such as age, marital status, feminist ideology, and frequency of
behaviors (Brooks and Perot 31). This group holds that the definitions of behaviors are
related in large part to how one is socialized. The second group focuses on the concept of
sex as the determining factor in most cases of sexual harassment. The distinction is thus a
matter of biological or sociological perspective. So as to untangle these complicated
orientations we will: 1) look to two studies that reach two different conclusions, 2) offer a
more holistic analysis which would posit that the more substantive answer to perceptions
of sexual harassment is an "attributional" blend of the two perspectives, and finally 3)
provide both a possible explanation for the discrepant conclusions that are reached and
examine how these conclusions texture our understanding of the operative constraints
within the campus sexual harassment situation.
The research done by Linda Brooks & Annette R. Perot and John Ryan & Sylvia
Kenig provide distinct theoretical orientations to sexual harassment. Although both
studies are dealing with slightly different variations on the subject, they are in essence
studying the same overall phenomena. The former looks at the "perceived offensiveness"
of behaviors that come to be labeled sexual harassment; the latter seeks to explain the
factors that give rise to certain definitions of the same (31; 231). What is interesting for
the purposes of this section are the different conclusions that the authors reach. Brooks
and Perot come to the conclusion that "feminist ideology and frequency of behavior
showed direct effects on perceived offensiveness" of sexual harassment behaviors (45). In
contrast, Ryan and Kenig found "no significant relationship ...between reported78
harassment and gender role ideology" (241). The italics, which are mine, serve to clarify
the differences in the conclusions reached by the two respective studies. While the first
sees the influence of ideology as a determinant of sexual harassment, the second dismisses
ideological orientation as insignificant. And while feminist and gender role ideologies are
indeed different, they nonetheless serve to demonstrate that ideology in general is placed
in conflict by the two studies. The question that must be posed at this point is whether
these findings are the result of different methodological orientations?
To a degree they are. Brooks and Perot spend a great deal of time providing
evidence that ideology is a major factor in the labeling of sexual harassment, while
including the previously mentioned factors such as marital status and age into the overall
schematic set up for deciding if a behavior is harassment and if the behavior will be
reported as such (34-35). Kenig and Ryan, on the other hand, are quite explicit in their
dismissal of the above types of claims. They believe that the ideology argument can be
used "by perpetrators to suggest that reports of sexual harassment are overreactions on
the part of the victim" (232). So the question now becomes a matter of how these
divergent orientations are funnelled through the research base of each study.
The Brooks and Perot study sampled 306 "full-time, tenure-track women faculty
members" and 500 women graduate students (35-36). These participants then engaged in
an experiment that included the independent variables of a five-point inventory of sexual
harassment behaviors. These variables were based on the dependent criterion of
"perceived offensiveness" and "reporting." The Ryan and Kenig study used a population
sample of 359 women of varying academic status--faculty, graduate, and undergraduate--
and 300 men of a similar academic makeup (232). The independent variables of
organizational position, age, and gender role ideology were then tested against seven types
of dependent variable behaviors: unwanted sexual jokes or remarks; suggestive looks or
gestures; deliberate touching, cornering, or pinching; pressure for sexual activity; actual or
attempted rape or sexual assault (234).79
At this point, some comments must be made about two differences in the
respective studies: sample groups and variable use. The people surveyed in the first group
are exclusively female, whereas the second group includes a cross-section of both male
and female subjects. In addition, the first study's independent factors more closely
resemble the dependent factors within the second study. I believe that these differences
are important. Not only do they point out significant differences between the sample
populations of each study, they also demonstrate different frameworks for attempting to
test similar questions regarding the reporting of sexual harassment--differences that will be
expanded upon in the end of this section.
The results are also intriguing in how they diverge. It is interesting that the same-
sex study supports an ideological and gender bias in sexual harassment, while the mixed-
sex study finds sex to be "the most profound influence" in predicting sexual harassment
(Ryan and Kenig 240). In essence, the former provides a socialized explanation for
harassment whereas the latter sees a biological explanation as the most plausible. These
conclusions seem to suggest that the sample group plays a large part in determining the
nature of the result. The use of behaviors as independent variables in the first study also
seems to shade the results: does the reversal of very similar behaviors to dependent
variable status in the second study in any way influence the results of the study? The
answer to that question cannot be reached within the scope of this thesis. But we can note
at this point that other research into sexual harassment subsumes these studies in the focus
on both sex and gender. This balance is, in many ways, more practical as well. The
biological person is constantly interacting with the social world. As such, who we are as a
genetic fact is shaped by how we are treated and how we treat others socially.
Additional research seems to support the above hypothesis. Following the increase
in research on the perceptions of sexual harassment in the early 1980s, Paula Barr
conducted studies that looked to Gender Role Socialization Theory as a possible80
explanation." The studies involved 195 and 219 students, respectively. The subjects
were looking at employee/employer scenarios that portrayed varying degrees of severity
culled from sexual harassment claims. The hypothesis driving these studies was that
"more severe behaviors would be more easily identified as sexual harassment than less
severe behaviors" (465). Although information differed in each study area, Barr notes a
finding in the second survey that is supported by the first survey which points to gender-
role socialization as the predominant influence on perception:
In the scenario in which the target indicates unwelcomeness
but is sexually provocative, a majority of both male and
female respondents did not perceive the behavior as sexual
harassment. The behavior was deliberate, repeated, and
unwelcome. However, the victim, by engaging in sexually
related conversations with her co-workers, was not acting
as the guardian of proper sexual behavior. (467)
Thus, the study purports that the socialized way in which we act is linked to how we
perceive a behavior. If the behavior is sexual and unwelcome, yet occurs within the
confines of a socialized sex role, the study suggests that we are far less likely to conclude
that it is sexual harassment even when it fits the definition.
Studies such as this one help to remedy the sex and gender dichotomy in that our
sex operates as a filter through which others perceive and respond to our gender role.
This complicated blend is furthered in the work of others who have studied socialized
patterns of behavioral acceptance. According to A. Bandura, "sex-role differentiation
usually commences immediately after birth...indoctrination into masculinity and
femininity is diligently promulgated by adoring children...and through non-permissive
parental reaction" (qtd. in Stewart et al. 22).
18 The reader must be reminded that the use of the term "gender," as in the case of Gender Role
Socialization, is more accurately to be regarded as biological "sex." As was noted in the Titus research,
such blending of terms is often as dangerous as it is confusing.81
This link of Barr to Bandura suggests that the behaviors we deem acceptable or
unacceptable may be "taught" at a very young age, that the constraints that are operative
in the campus situation are the result of a long, historical pattern of socialization shaping
our biological selves. The research that was presented on foundation textbooks,
teacher/student interactions, and social organizations seems to support this contention as
well. But our attention must now turn to how such behaviors are complicated when
persons attribute socialized actions to the sex of the person, which is in itself an
assumption that is in large part the result of socialization.
Attribution theory is based in the hypothesis that there is "a pervasive tendency for
the actors to attribute their actions to situational requirements, whereas observers tend to
attribute the same actions to stable personal dispositions" (Jones and Nisbett 90). As has
been noted, we lack data not only on male's perspectives but also in regards to harasser's
perceptions of the actions in which they engage. These facts complicate the
observer/actor relationship but, more so, they operate as constraints: the majority of
material surveyed provide a male/harasser and female/harassed perspective. If such
material is the rule, then perceptions about harassment and decisions based on those
perceptions are constantly channelled through a filter which in not always accurate. And,
while the use of the word "stable" implies a constancy in actions, there is actually some
divergence in how stable the behaviors are that an observer attributes to an actor when
looking at sexual harassment. A grope in one instance can be radically altered if the
context is shifted to another instance. The attribution model can thus be seen as a
constraint-based theory in the sense that it looks at the behaviors that fall outside of the
normal, stable actions of the actor within a given environment.
John Pryor begins his attributional discussion of lay persons' perceptions of sexual
harassment with the comment that "policy definitions of behaviors that constitute sexual
harassment literally abound" (273). This statement directly relates to the issue of
constraints in that it will complicate the speaker's ability to provide the audience with a82
"fitting" discourse; that is, if members of a public are privy to differing definitions they are
less likely to share a uniform understanding of the exigence of sexual harassment. Pryor
then goes on to discuss three explanations for sexual harassment: power imbalance,
repetitive historical patterns, and individual interpretation (274-276). These issues once
again add to our understanding of the constraint-infused domain of campus sexual
harassment. Not only do multiple definitions exists, but also explanations for the creation
of the exigence or the perception thereof.
Pryor suggests an explanation for these constraints by arguing that "a general
context of social-sexual behaviors" is the basis for the discrepancy in what actions people
label as sexually harassing, in what they attribute to a sender as a harassing behavior (276).
For males, the attribution of harassment occurs when they exhibit behaviors that fall
outside of their perceived social role. Pryor argues that, for those with "profeminist
attitudes," the range of behaviors that can be labeled as sexual harassment widens as a
consequence of being generally more informed on behaviors that could be labeled as such
(278).
These assumptions were then tested using a conceptual, methodological approach.
The test group consisted of eighteen males and females from a university that were
randomly placed into one of three conditional experiment groupings with twenty-four
individual scenarios representing fluctuations in consensus, distinctiveness, and
consistency. Additionally, the actors in these scenarios were varied into three types: a
professor, teaching assistant, and a student (279-280). The results of this experiment gave
support to "an attributional model of the lay person's understanding of sexual harassment"
in that behaviors outside of a person's normal social role were deemed more harassing
(284). In addition, behavior that was "independent" of the social role of the actor was not
construed as harassing because the context was removed from the attributional analysis.
In other words, with no basis for judgment of a person's overall social role, there was no
basis to judge a behavior as a deviance from that norm.83
An interesting difference, though, was reported in the subjects' "inferred
perceptions" of the female target and the male actor (284). The male subjects in the
experiment seemed to determine that the male actor behavior could be construed in a
different fashion by the actor than the female target. On the other hand, the female
subjects did not generally make a distinction between actor and target perception (285).
Another difference emerged in how subjects viewed the behaviors when the actor role was
differentiated. The professor actor was seen to be exploiting their "normal" social role
when engaging in harassing behaviors, while the student was seen to be acting in a manner
relatively consistent with their normal behavior.19 These results have import when looking
at the constraints that exist in the campus sexual harassment situation. If a social role
accents a judgment of a behavior, then the previous chapter's discussion of the campus
publics indicates that each audience is held to a differing standard based on their role
within the situation. In much the same way, the sex of the person seems to also accent a
judgment of harassment -- recalling Strine, Taylor, and Conrad's discussion of the
discrepancies in male and female recollections of sexual harassment.
Other studies further the connection of socialized behaviors being attributed to the
sex of the person. In 1989, Luis Garcia, Laureen Milano, and Annette Quijano looked at
people's perceptions by undertaking a study that uses vignettes representing various stages
of coercion. Although the specific activity mentioned is date rape, the findings support the
attributional explanation of perceptions related to sexual harassment. The subjects that
the authors gathered were evenly divided by sex and were students at a university. The
responses of the subjects were tabulated using the sex of the subject, the sex of the victim,
and the level of coercion as variables.
19 These differences were expanded upon in a 1988 study Pryor conducted with Jeanne Day. Following
the same line of attributional analysis, Pryor and Day posit that the discrepancy in male and female
labeling of harassing behavior is perspective based in that it is seen by the male sender as "accepted" if no
direct actions to the contrary are taken by the female. But the female receiver, faced and presented with
the exact same behavior, sees the progression as "more and more harassing" (417).84
The researchers noticed a reoccurring tendency of the subjects: "male subjects
perceived these sexual advances as slightly more coercive when the victim was female,
whereas females perceived the advances as slightly more coercive when the victim was a
male" (569). In other responses, low coercion advances were deemed more coercive if the
victim was male. Overall, the study showed a strong correlation between the amount of
negative feelings displayed towards the victim and the higher the level of perceived
coercion. These findings offer an explanation for the existence of the stereotype that a
person who is sexually harassed in some way "deserved it." If we negate another person
based on sex or gender, we are more likely to engage in behaviors which mirror that
negation. In other words, the reason that they "deserve it" is because of the "way they
are." The researchers conclude by noting that more study is needed if an additional level is
to be examined: attribution theory as a determinant of acceptance/non-acceptance of
coercive sexual advances.
In 1992, Paula Popovich, et al., studied the forms and consequences of behavior
as indicators of perceptions related to sexual harassment. Their research shows that
"males rated statements less negatively than did females, especially when the statement
described 'physical' behavior with 'hostile environment' consequences" as opposed to
verbal behavior with only economic consequences (609). We can theorize that, in much
the same way as with subtle coercion, as physical threats increase the amount of negativity
attributed to the harassed increases as well. But what is even more revealing about this
study is that the male subjects show a generally higher level of acceptance of physical
behavior. Males assigned the harassed woman negative attributions, whereas the
harassing male would not be judged on their overall physical behavior by the same
subjects. That persons will differentiate the behaviors they judge based on the sex of the
person supports a socialized view of others. But that view is directed towards a person of
a different sex; again, a compelling reason to see sex and gender as inclusive factors in the
creation of perceptual constraints.85
Two additional perspectives are helpful at this juncture in that they expand the
previous discussion. They were not integrated into the text discussion above because,
although they support the attributional model, they add to that research by examining two
additional factors: the issue of power and the problem of revising codes.
Hierarchical Level Theory. This framework focuses on the discrepancies in the
perceptions of high-power and low-power persons. And, it is important to note,
hierarchical power use against low-power people is the most common of the sexual
harassment dimensions; be it employer to employee, teacher to student, each scenario is
directly related (as the EEOC definition is) to the use of sexual harassment by a harasser
on a person in a position of less power. With that in mind, the research into hierarchical
placement as a perceptual determinant, as a constraint, is important. When we attribute
certain characteristics to high-power and low-power persons, we endorse a socialized
view of the workplace or the campus that is in many instances necessary. Low-power
persons look to high-powered persons for support, advice, and mentoring. But sexual
harassment is an exploitation of those differentials.20
Jasmine Tata looks at the impact of sexually harassing behaviors, gender, and
hierarchical level on subjects' perceptions of sexual harassment (199). Working from the
hypothesis that sexual harassment is multidimensional (consisting, in this view, of gender
harassment, seductive behavior, and sexual bribery, coercion, and assault), Tata gathered
a sample group of 50 male and 70 female undergraduate student volunteers. They were
presented with 15 sociosexual behaviors and asked to rank them using a seven point
system (202). The results demonstrate that hierarchical level, as well as gender, influenced
the subjects' perception of harassment and seductive behavior, but did not affect their
perceptions of other sexually-related activities (207).
20 Indeed, incidents of sexual harassment can occur but be in conflict with those standard differentials.
When hierarchy is seem as the predominant catalyst for sexual harassment, it is not surprising that peer-
to-peer harassment in not sanctioned against legally .86
These findings provide a good starting point for examining hierarchy as a cause of
sexual harassment perception. Specifically, these results are important to the study of
sexual harassment in education because the subjects are representative of one of the larger
audiences on campuses. The interaction of gender and hierarchy is also worth
commenting about. In many instances, we can conclude that gender is a determinant of
real or perceived hierarchical status. With more women being sexually harassed by men
and more men historically in positions of power, perception and hierarchy become
important components in an understanding of constraints.
Asynchronous Model. Mark Hickson, R.D. Grierson, and Barbara Linder provide
suggestions for reforming the way in which the academic community deals with sexual
harassment. These revisions are based in the argument that sexual harassment is the result
of the sender having feelings for the receiver that are "non-mutual" with the resulting
behavior being sexual harassment (112). These non-reciprocal actions develop, according
to the authors, in stages that range from: aesthetic appreciation (cautious compliments);
active mental groping (visualizations of a sexual nature); social touching (intentional
interaction); foreplay harassment (more private encounters); sexual abuse (verbal
comments and physical touching of an unwanted nature); and ultimate threat (if you don't,
I will...). The authors argue that these stages ultimately result in psychological,
emotional, and economic harms to the receiver (112-115).21
If we recall the findings of the previous studies, we can note how these non-
reciprocal actions and their subsequent results are attributional. The sender feels that the
recipient--based on their socialized power position, their perceived sex role, or both--
should see these actions as a natural result of their relationship. If the receiver refuses the
advances, the receiver is either seen as "saying no when they mean yes" or as "deserving"
21 While the issues raised in this section are beneficial, it is best to reference the discussion of fraudulent
psychological injury cases in Chapter Four.87
the subsequent increase in action. The authors, then, see the need to adopt plans that will
make prevention of sexual harassment easier, to adopt policies that will make a
preventative response by the receiver easier. Their three-tier plan addresses the
institutional, faculty, and student responses that should be taken, distinctions that provide
an easy companion to the last chapter's delineation of the campus audiences (116). They
argue that the institutional response is to make the policy explicit and accessible and to
educate the workers on the policy through workshops. The procedures to be followed in
a given case should also be equally clear and known to all. If a person is found innocent
of charges, files pertaining to the case should be destroyed. And, in all cases, the identities
of the people involved should be kept strictly confidential.
The faculty should be open in acknowledging both the existence of harassment and
the fact that it is not a matter of academic freedom. But faculty should also not seek out
people in a witch hunt fashion. Students, when faced with harassment, should tell a
person so as to gain advice on whether to file a formal complaint. They should make the
harasser aware that they are willing and ready to file charges against them. The activity
should be documented and one-on-one activity with the harasser should be avoided. The
harassment should be dealt with in a timely fashion, with the harassed fully aware of the
procedures open to them.
Hickson, Grierson, and Linder conclude by acknowledging that these actions "may
be argumentative," but are necessary given the "serious nature" of the problem (116).
More so, these types of actions help to ward off the destructive use of grapevine gossip
that could impede the process of filing, following through, and winning a case of sexual
harassment. The authors' suggestions point to a problem noted in Pryor's article,
discrepancy in labeling, and their suggestions extend beyond that analysis to offer general
ways in which the constraints could be modified so as to change the nature of responding
to the exigence. Additionally, they downplay the role of a problematic part of the codes- -
the informal response - -in favor of highlighting the use of formal sanctions. This article88
displays materials that "constrain decisions" in that it provides information suggesting that
perceptual differences lead to actual conditions; it solidifies the dual nature of the exigence
noted in Chapter Four while positing that exigence is best attacked prior to occurrence,
rather than after the fact.
Discussion of Divergence
The power of communication is often a question of what we decide to see rather
than what simply is. That is, each person brings to the communicative table a set of
notions that influence the work they do. The study of sexual harassment is no different.
In the previous analysis, we saw the above dispositions played out: different researchers
reaching different conclusions about the same issue. That we started with two readily
divergent perspectives and worked towards a more holistic attributional understanding is a
choice. And while that choice was based in a review of the literature available, it does not
do away with the disagreements that exist. As such, dueling results operate as constraints
in much the same way as the previous perspectives discussed; that is, they are decisions
about decisions and actions within the campus situation. They complicate the codes'
ability to solicit an audience response to modify the exigence of sexual harassment. So as
to understand the nature of these inartistic constraints, this section of the chapter will
examine how such constraints are perpetuated and the effect that such divergence has on
the campus situation.
The studies that we have looked at support the contention of Dair Gillespie and
Ann Leffler that research "provides the documentation that legitimates (or 'delegitimates')
particular definitional claims about social problems" (491). In simplified terms, research
will support certain definitions while it discounts others. In the two research-based studies
on the social problem of sexual harassment that we first looked at, two competing claims
rose to the surface: that ideology is/is not the major influence in predicting sexual89
harassment. But the legitimacy of those studies and the ones that followed is influenced
by the ways in which they went about reaching those conclusions. So as to clarify the
nature of this divergence, we will focus on the two initial studies.
The first area that may provide insight into the underlying reasons supporting the
different conclusions has already been mentioned: sample group makeup. While some
might argue that the subjects used in the two studies were generally representative of the
situation in which they were found (academia), they are more accurately "nonprobability
sample[es] involving nonrandom selection of individuals that happen to be readily available
and willing to participate" (491). College populations provide a vast resource for
research. If the studies had stayed focused on the campus public, the problems related to
sample group would be reduced. But both studies attempt to extend the conclusions to
the larger societal situation based on these sample groups.
Even when Ryan and Kenig note that "women faculty were included in the study
because of their low numbers within the university" we cannot assign their sample group a
probability label (232). The reason being, low numbers of women on a campus would
have to be represented by a proportionately low number of women in the sample group to
even be considered "representative." The bolstering of a sample population to include
under-represented groups must be combined with a larger sample of other groups in the
study. The question of "random sampling" must also be addressed. Both studies are,
beyond the nonprobable label, using subject groups that were specific to the educational
locale. This emphasis tends to skew the conclusions to the degree that they are
"generalized to the population of individuals from which the cases were randomly
selected" (Gillespie and Leffler 495). In the context of this thesis, that is not a problem.
The populations used in the studies were academic and the focus of my analysis is the
same. But when Brooks and Perot make the argument that their results could support
"what appears to be a widespread lack of information" on the issue of sexual harassment,
we must be careful not to extend that claim too far beyond the scope of the study they90
have carried out (45). As with the problem of sample groups, the nature of how they are
sampled frames the conclusions drawn. In short, academic populations will yield results
that have the most direct bearing to the academic environment. Although this may seem
self-evident, it is ignored in the conclusion of each study.
The final area that must be entertained is the way in which the data was arranged.
As has already been mentioned, there was an inverse use of similar variables in each study.
But, even more importantly, those variables were tested using different definitions of the
same exigence. The Brooks and Perot study, which found no significant gender (meaning:
sex) effect on reporting sexual harassment, nonetheless tied all references to a female
noun. Thus, when they comment that a person "will not report an experience unless she
first labels the incident as sexual harassment," we are left to question whether or not the
female-emphasis is just a matter of stylistic license (33). This argument relates to the
problems found in looking at the campus audiences: there is a general lack of data related
to male perceptions of sexual harassment. Given that absence, such terminology may be
the result not merely of persons being overlooked, but of them not being researched at all.
The Ryan and Kenig study also has a female emphasis, but is more inclusive in detailing
the "differing definitions of putative sexual actions on the part of men and women" (232).
These definitional bases provide the foundation from which the remainder of each
study is conducted.22 The biggest problem with each base of study is the way in which the
authors lead the readers and, one could argue, the subjects towards a decidedly narrow
view of sexual harassment. As an example, the term "feminist ideology" is problematic in
that it explains little. But the extensions that are drawn from this vague phrase have more
apparent ramifications: said ideology becomes a female mind-set, the fear of retaliation is a
female response to harassment, and the issue of gender becomes not a question of how
22 Note the use of "definitional" rather than definition. Both studies are rather broad in the ways in which
they define sexual harassment. Thus, I am emphasizing the ways in which they use those broad bases as a
means to conduct the respective research.91
men and women respond to and perpetuate sexual harassment, but how one of the two has
been victimized. In short, "the result has been a failure to comprehend the organizational
scope and functions of sexual harassment" (Gillespie and Leffler 498). To be clear, these
objections are not raised as a means of disparaging the results of either study. But these
complexities lead me to reference other materials so as to gather a more holistic
understanding of perceptions than either of these two studies could present. And these
issues are pointed out because, in both instances, they demonstrate "the pragmatic choices
that [researchers] must make given that it is not possible to address all questions, to use all
possible definitions, or employ every research strategy" (498).
Such choices may be necessary, but they also constrain the decisions rendered in
the academic situation. The perpetuation of false distinctions, the extension of a situation-
based conclusion to a larger situation, both affect the ways in which persons think about
sexual harassment. On the perceptual level, decisions about the exigence are as practical
as the materials available. As we have seen, these pragmatic choices in research may lead
to less practical perspectives on who does what to whom in a given situation. On the
actual level, the misleadingly rigid dichotomy between males and females throws biological
fact into a socialized mix and blends out distinctions: we start to ignore the fact that the
"he" who harasses "she" isn't always a male and the receiver of the harassment is not
always female; we, in essence, marginalize occurrences of harassment that fall outside of
the research objectives and theoretical definitions thereof
Taken a step farther, Bitzer argues that constraints can operate as either
"opportunities or limitations" ("Functional" 24). We can conclude that the constraints
noted in the analysis above operate more as the latter and less as former in that the chance
for change is thrust up again a rather inflexible perceptual wall. More so, a campus
audience that is treated to a stereotypical view of sexual harassment is likely view the act
itself in equally stereotypical ways. This stereotypical lens is, it must be admitted, based in
a well-established fact: male to female harassment is the most recognized, documented,92
and talked about form currently. But a fact cannot become the totality of information
available, or sought, in this or any instance. The "opportunity" to view sexual harassment
in a balanced way is "limited" when the research-based constraints blend out deviations
from the established pattern. As has already been discussed, this creates problems in
perspective. We become socialized agents accepting of equally socialized studies. But, as
has also been noted, factual examples of harassment--peer-to-peer, gay/lesbian, woman-
to-man--suffer as well. Valuable changes in the reality of sexual harassment are
complicated when examples that don't fit are cast aside in favor of more palatable
scenarios.
Artistic Proofs
Even a cursory glance at basic texts in rhetoric will uncover the three word
summary for artistic proofs: ethos, pathos, and logos. A speaker must demonstrate
themselves as worthy of being listened to, doing so will translate into the audience
responding positively to the discourse, and this is accomplished via a logical synthesis of
content and organization; together these proofs create the foundation from which
persuasive discourse stems. But we must defer a discussion of one of these components
until the next chapter, for pathos is a judgment that can only be rendered after an analysis
of the codes has been undertaken. The pathetic appeal is, in the case of sexual harassment
and in light of the situational framework, an appeal determined via the rhetorical
audience's response. At this point, we must instead focus on the credibility of the speaker
and the means by which they attempt to secure it.
It has been noted that the codes are enthymematic in nature in that they are based
on a major premise (sexual harassment is illegal and threatens the campus environment),
and further divided into component parts ("hostile environment" and quid pro quo). In the
case of basic codes, the examples are implicit in the description and definition of sexual93
harassment; in extended codes, the examples of sexual harassment are explicit. These
structural items all center around the logical topic of "Future Fact." That is to say, the
EEOC guidelines base their persuasive power in the argument that codes respond to
sexual harassment if they are followed or, as Aristotle states generally, "a thing will be
done if there is both the power and the wish to do it" (132). That power is federal
enforcement and informal college sanction and the wish, as has been previously
demonstrated, resides in the judgment of the campus publics. Again, we note the parallel
constitution of both code and exigence: a response is both educational and sanctioning in
connection to an exigence which is both actual and potential. But certain factors
complicate the legal constraints presented by the speaker in this instance. Most notably,
the problem relates to the terms used in creating the codes, both in their relation to other
supplemental materials that exist in the campus situation and their connection to legal
interpretations of key phrases.
A casual glance at the materials related to sexual harassment on college and
university campuses leads to a rather obvious observation: there has been the creation of
too many definitions with too many ways of interpreting them. Sharon Howard
"acknowledges the difficulties in arriving at a definition of sexual harassment" and then
goes on to list different types of definitions "before employing a definition that has become
commonplace"--the EEOC definition (507). But these "other" definitions operate as
constraints in that they restrict the ability of the EEOC definition to function as the
primary explanation. This definitional ambiguity is further hi. hlighted in the University of
Maryland College Park's 1990 sexual harassment policy. In the definition section they list
six different ways of labeling sexual harassment. These vary from defining it as offensive, a
"breach of a trusting relationship," coercive, and simply "a violation of professional ethics"
(4). Dr. Gladys Brown, the person who compiled the data for the manual, readily admits
this multiplicity of definitions by granting that "the definition of sexual harassment may
differ slightly among educational institutions" (4).94
These discrepancies have been noted previously when discussing the differences
between basic and extended codes, but they are compounded by the problems of
interpreting legal definitions. Some terms have been accepted but have never been defined
specifically. The ideas of "reasonable person" and "hostile environment" are therefore
important to discuss. The discussion of the first is framed in the context of its biases, the
second in regards to the recent shift in the way the courts define it.
Courts often rely on using the "reasonable person standard" in judging a case; that
is, in a given situation, what would a reasonable person judge to be right or wrong? At
first glance, this sounds like a fair way to look at sexual harassment. But, as Kathryn
Abrams points out, this "standard only complicates the controversy" (48). First, she
argues that the term itself is wrought with a male-bias that renders a female perspective
marginal. Historically, and in an ironic complement to my arguments about research
choices earlier, the decision of what was "reasonable" and the "person" who made such
decisions has been male. Secondly, how can there be only one reasonable standard of
truth? The first argument is valid in that the emphasis is on a masculine-derived
terminology. The second point she raises ties directly into the problematic existence of
differing "actual" standards for "potential" actions.
Her conclusion, however, is only a further clouding of the issue. She argues that
the term should be replaced with reasonable woman so as to "characterize the evaluation
of harassment, like the experience of harassment itself; as a phenomenon strongly
differentiated on the basis of gender" (50). But this new definition then shifts to being sex
exclusive in a female sense even if it is a shift that is legally supported by the cases that
were reviewed in Chapter Four. If the goal of using this phrasing is truly to "create a less
oppressive workplace," one wonders the extent to which such a change accomplishes that
end goal. But, as Nancy Alderman and Caroline Kennedy point out, interpretation of the
"reasonable person" standard is a continuing, not a finite, process. As is the case with the
majority of legal terms, "such standards can take on meaning only over time, case by case"95
(156-157). The implication of this legal flexibility is that what is construed as a reasonable
person should change as the information about sexual harassment changes.
The "hostile environment" standard is directly related to the questions raised in
regards to the former term. As Deborah Wells and Beverly Kracher argue, the decisions
of what constitutes a hostile environment should be shifted from the perspective of a
reasonable to that of a reasonable victim (423). Keeping in mind the arguments raised by
Abrams, we need to look at what the two authors offer. The crux of their argument
revolves around the idea of using Rawls' "Theory of Justice" to construct a definition of a
hostile environment on the basis of the victim's perspective. As rational beings, they
argue, we would view that perspective as just in the Original Position: the concept of
knowing only information pertinent to the issue to be resolved (424-426). Thus, their
reconstruction of the standard would use respect for persons as a basis for treatment of
others in a work (and education, we can add) environment. There are some questions that
must be raised though. Is a theory such as Rawls' applicable to sexual harassment? Can
this type of theory be applied to all cases in all situations? As Abrams pointed out, if the
truth is fluctuating it is hard to use the absolute standard of the reasonable victim or, for
that matter, reasonable woman.
These questions as to the definitions of key terms, though related to logos, are also
connected to the ethos that the creators of the codes demonstrate. If doubt exists as to
the nature of the codes' premise(s), then the credibility of the creator is also clouded.
These problems are, however, decreased by the fact that the EEOC references a
historically-generated basis for authority: the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As such, the
speaker is connected to a larger body of work which demonstrates the ethical nature of the
EEOC via an established past fact of decreasing discrimination and then, in 1980, sexual
harassment. This credibility-through-reference argument is not mere conjecture on my
part; as Aristotle notes, "the way to make ourselves thought to be sensible and morally
good must be gathered from the analysis of goodness already given" (91). Indeed, such a96
reference decreases the problems of character created by the codes' definitions and the
contradictory definitions found in supplemental materials.
Conclusion
The discussion of constraints in this chapter signals the completion of the
background analysis necessary prior to an analysis of the codes themselves. But this
discussion of constraints serves a more important function as well: it introduces us to
those materials--be they operative and independent or creations of the speaker--within the
situation which present themselves as rhetorical factors that influence how the speaker and
the rhetorical audience responds to the exigence (Bitzer, "Functional" 23). As such, the
cloudy nature of ingrained discrimination demonstrated within texts, classes, and campus
organizations serves to "orientate" both the audience and the speaker to the specific
situation we are studying, serves to constrain the manner in which they approach a subject
so intimately connected to notions of gender and sex. That the discussion of perceptions
of sexual harassment showed both disagreement and similarity only furthers the
complicated orientation of members of the campus publics to the situation. What is
learned and endorsed in a larger societal context, or even a broader academic
environment, filters into how we study, define, and explain a specific exigence. These
perceptions shade both the sender and receiver's understandings of the same problem; they
constrain our evaluations and place value judgments on the nature of the problem.
Hence the speaker is faced with the daunting task of presenting facts constrained
by value implications, of arousing an audience of "diversity within unity" to respond, of
presenting themselves as competent to call for such a response and present such materials.
That such a task is only now being touched upon is as purposeful as it is logical. Without
our established understanding of the theory, codes, situation, audiences, and constraints to
which the speaker is responding, we would be doing little more than suggesting that97
sexual harassment codes deserve analysis. But, given that these facts are in order and their
significance is explained, we can now turn to the last of the artistic proofs, pathos. More
so, we can analyze the success or failure of the rhetor to meet that artistic constraint's
requirements as demonstrated in the crafting of a response. Whether it is "fitting"or not is
the matter that determines such judgments.98
Chapter VII: The "Fitting" Response
As was noted, fitting responses can be of two types: complementary or corrective.
Whereas the former simply fits "because the situation enables it to be well received," the
latter is produced so as to change the nature of the situation (Bitzer, "Functional" 36-37).
Sexual harassment codes are of the corrective variety in that they respond to the exigence
of sexual harassment within the campus situation. By setting up codes which constrain
and sanction against activities, this type of response attempts to "correct" the
imperfections created by the exigence. These corrective responses can be of two types.
On the one hand, the response can be created simply in an attempt to keep the situation
going. In contrast, sexual harassment codes are direct responses to an exigence within the
situation that needs to be modified or removed.
It has also been noted that the structure of the codes and the nature of the exigence
contain parallel components. The codes have the dual function of education and sanction,
of explaining the exigence while also acting in response to cases of sexual harassment.
The exigence, in turn, is a combination of the potential for the act and the act as actual.
Hence, a "fitting response" would be a merging of the both exigence and response: the
educational mediating the potential occurrences of harassment and the sanction responding
to the actual violations of conduct.
Given these observations, we must analyze the basic and extended code types so as
to determine the degree to which the above blending occurs. The first section will be a
historical review of the development of the Oregon State University [basic] and Rice
University [extended] sexual harassment codes. This review will look not only at the
current forms of the codes, but also at the forms that they took at different stages in their
development. Following from this analysis, a judgment as to the responses will be
provided based on the six situational factors which determine speaker and audience
responsiveness to the exigence. The sum goal in each case is a judgment as to whether or99
not both corrective codes stand as fitting responses to the situation given the highly
structured and complex organization of the campus situation.
Basic Codes
As an extension of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Oregon State University's sexual
harassment policy dates back to the late 1970s. At the time, no set policy was in place
aside from those that dealt with cases of sexual discrimination as filed under The
Education Amendments of 1972, Title IX. But there existed complaints about sexual
harassment. As a result, then president Robert MacVicar sent a letter dated November 15,
1979 to all members of the campus public (save for the students). The second paragraph
of the letter contains a summary of the recommendations of Oregon State System
Chancellor of Higher Education R.E. Lieuallen. These recommendations were based on
the definition of sexual harassment provided by "the American Association of Colleges
Project on the Status and Education of Women [AACPSEW]" (1). The conceptualization
of sexual harassment at this time blended the ideas of "hostile environment" and quid pro
quo together, while clearly noting that acts of harassment involved the use of power
against a person for sexual reasons.
The third paragraph of the letter is also interesting in the distinctions that it makes
related to cases of sexual harassment. To wit, the discussion focuses on the effects of
charges on both the victim and the accused. But the wording is rather ambiguous and
tentative: "Unless harassment is blatant, the victim may doubt his or her perceptions and
be unwilling to discuss it with others. The victim may fear, justly or not, retaliatory
measures such as low grades or poor letters of recommendation" (1). While the
perceptual problems seem to be a matter of pragmatic importance given that retaliatory
measures might be taken, the comment that a victim's fears may be unfounded seems an
odd inclusion.100
The letter also includes several direct references to the changes that were
occurring to Title VII. Mac Vicar notes that court precedent was moving towards the
"inclusion of sexual harassment as a form of sexual discrimination" (1). However, he also
makes it clear that there was no ability to petition for damages from an employer who did
not know, but should have known, that sexual harassment was occurring in their place of
business. As previous discussion has made clear, once the EEOC guidelines were in place,
employers could be found liable even if they were not aware that harassment was
occurring. The conclusion of the letter establishes the manner in which cases at the time
should be dealt with given the above explanation: make it clear to the campus community
that sexual harassment is punishable under existing administrative rules, make sure persons
are made aware of these rules, provide for confidentiality and publicize such provisions,
take prompt action to investigate complaints, and inform the Office of the President
should such complaints be filed (2).
Such procedures took on a more definitive nature in November of 1983 when
Policies and Procedures Prohibiting Sexual Harassment at Oregon State University was
released.23 This policy is the prototype for the current codes in place at OSU and follows
the same basic structure, albeit in a slightly less extensive format and in a slightly different
order. As an example, the initial bibliography of laws and policies related to sexual
harassment is slightly longer in the 1983 code, whereas the abbreviated version is included
in the appendix in the 1994 version. There are, however, three areas in which the
differences between the 1983 and 1994 policies are more than a matter of order and
extension: sanctions, harassment-free environment guidelines, and consensual
relationships.
23 This policy was reiterated on November 4, 1985, in a letter to all vice presidents and department heads
by Acting Vice President for Academic Affairs and Provost Bill Wilkins. The content of this letter
follows the same basic structure of MacVicar's 1979 letter, highlighting once again that persons within
the academic community should be made aware of sexual harassment procedures available to them.101
The sanction section follows the same format as the 1983 code, but differs in an
important way: although "more severe sanctions" are threatened for persons found guilty
of sexual harassment, no contextual examples are given save for a referral to rules already
in place (2). In contrast, the 1994 code makes an explicit reference to these sanctions.
For students, there is the possibility of a "warning, required educational activities,
restrictions, disciplinary probation, suspension and/or expulsion"; for academic employees,
"removal from an assigned post and reassignment, suspension or termination"; for
employees, "written reprimand, suspension, reduction of pay, demotion, and finally,
termination of service" (10). These inclusions are of importance rhetorically in that they
give explicit examples of the constraints that are operative in the situation should a person
choose to engage in sexually harassing behavior; that is, reference to sanctions are not
twice-removed from review by a person reading the newer versions of the code.
The five-point "harassment-free environment" section of the 1983 code also differs
from the newer versions of the code. The reference to supplemental educational materials
is different and certain phrases have been altered in the 1994 version. But the most
important change is the addition of a sixth point: "information regarding sexual harassment
specifically for students is contained within the student code of conduct" ("1994" 3). This
addition is of rhetorical importance in that it references the materials to which the student
audience is held accountable, further solidifying the nature of sanctions operative within
the situation.
Finally, the 1983 policy makes no reference to consensual relationships. As has
previously been noted, the 1994 version contains a full page of information related to the
subject. That this topic was not included in the former version is understandable. The
EEOC guidelines were barely two years old and educational institutions were moving to
implement revisions that radically altered how the issue of sexual harassment was dealt
with. No longer was sexual harassment a serious concern in context of sexual
discrimination, it was a serious concern in and of itself, backed by federal law and102
punishable by a wide range of sanctions. But its inclusion in the latter version isonce
again an infusion of more constraints into the perceptual and structural field of the
situational audience. There is now a concern about "abuse of power" ora "conflict of
interest," a concern that a "third party" may construe such relationshipsas symptomatic of
a hostile environment (2). These changes all point to the evolving evaluations on the part
of the campus public, assessments that were altered to include intimate teacher-student
relationships as possible components of the exigence.
There is a singular difference between the 1994 and 1995 versions of the sexual
harassment codes.24 Under the formal procedures section that deals with "applicants for
academic staff positions" a complaint must now be filed within 180 days, whereas the
1994 version allowed for 365 days. This time-related revision operates as anarrow
expansion of constraints within the situation in that it deals with only two audiences: the
prospective academic staff member and the administrative audience that handles such
complaints. But the term "prospective" requires further analysis in that thesepersons were
not included within our previous discussion of audiences-as-public.
It was noted that a rhetorical audience has a membership within the given
situation, that they must possess the ability to authorize and mediate change (Bitzer,
"Public" 73). To a certain degree these "prospective" persons have thesepowers: their
complaints can affect the status of members within the rhetorical audience. But the nature
of the formal complaint relegates them to the status of a non-situational publicor, more
accurately, a member of the larger societal public; that is to say, their complaintmay result
in the removal of a member of a campus public, but their membership is not within the
plurality of publics that create the rhetorical audience. More so, a formal complaint
includes the "right to file with state and/or federal agencies" ("1995" 6). At the point that
such a right is invoked, the exigence being dealt with is not campus-specific. These types
24 As a matter of composition, an error can be noted in both the 1994 and 1995 versions of the OSU code:
subsection (a) in each version mistakenly references the nonexistent "Title VIII."103
of historical overlap have already been discussed and it has also been noted that they
complicate our analysis. What is sufficient to note at this point is that "prospective"
operates as a designation which will exclude certain persons from consideration as
authorizing and mediating components within the campus sexual harassment situation.
The path that has been tracked in the development of Oregon State University's
sexual harassment code is remarkable to the extent that there are few changes to the
fundamental structure of the code. Those changes that are of import have resulted in the
clarification of sanctions within the code: the explicit articulation of constraints that are
operative where before they were merely implied or relegated to matters of reference.
Such revisions signal, at least at this juncture, that the responses within this basic code
artifact are to some degree adaptive to the fluctuation and infusion of materials into the
situation. The other changes that have been noted are less problematic or engaging
rhetorically. They are only notable in so far as they compliment the above revisions:
phrases have been varied, materials that are referenced have been adapted or expanded
upon, new materials have been added so as to modify the response as the situation
changed, a matter of filing deadlines has been cut in half and the nature of who files such
complaints has lent to a clarification of membership within the rhetorical audience. But
our attention must now turn to an analysis of the similarities and differences within the
extended code artifact from Rice University.
Extended Codes
The Rice University sexual harassment code has followed a similar path
developmentally. The May 10, 1982 staff newsletter from Pearl S. Gray, then Rice
University's director of the Affirmative Action Office, begins with an almost identical
discussion of sexual harassment as is found in Robert MacVicar's 1979 letter. This
document relies on the very same American Association of Colleges Project on the Status104
and Education of Women [AACPSEW] definition. The letter also sets out the
development of legal precedents that show sexual harassment to be a crime punishable
under the sexual discrimination laws of 1972, while noting that the EEOC guidelines had
recently been implemented.
A problem that develops is the way in which these two issues--the AACPSEW
definition and the EEOC guidelines--are addressed in connection to each other. Gray
references the definition as is, then frames the EEOC guidelines as an explanation of
"violation[s]...with respect to employment" (1). But the information that follows these
comments contains the EEOC definition as well. The resulting duality of terms is
compounded by the fact that the former definition contains extensions not explicitly noted
in the EEOC guidelines, extensions such as "subtle pressure for sexual activity," "sexist
remarks," and "implied or overt threats" (1). Herein we see the germ of the extended
code type: the movement beyond the legally recognized guidelines towards a
categorization of behaviors that would be considered sexual harassment given an outside
source.
The final part of the same letter also recalls the OSU letter (and the follow-up one
sent out by Bill Wilkins in 1985) in the information distribution measures adopted: the
academic community needs to be made aware that sexual harassment is prohibited,
persons who feel they have been harassed should take their complaints to the Affirmative
Action Office, supplemental materials need to be visibly displayed, and the above
information needs to be disseminated throughout each individual department. These
measures are followed in the final paragraph by additional comments which note that
complaints must be filed in writing and that "every attempt" will be made to maintain the
confidentiality of the harassed (1-2).
In a letter dated a day later and sent out for publication in the student handbook,
the material is altered slightly. Gone is a direct reference to the AACPSEW, although
their definition is included in its entirety. The information distribution measures are also105
contained in this letter. But they have been adapted so as to inform students of actions
taken by the administration which are directed to "all faculty, staff and management
service employees" (1). These comments are then followed by what is the first
documented sexual harassment code at Rice University.25 As in the case of basic codes,
the procedures are first laid out: students are directed to contact the Affirmative Action
Office if they have been sexually harassed, then informal and formal measures are
expanded upon (2-3). In this version, it must be pointed out, references to prohibited
behaviors are restricted to the ones listed in the AACPSEW definition. Another difference
between this version and the later ones is that the discussion of complaints related to
faculty, staff; and employees is not contained herein, but exists only in the staff
newsletter's discussion of employment-related cases of sexual harassment.
The differences between the two preceding versions of this code, Policy No. 830-
89 and 803-92, are noticeable in both the quantity of material and degree of information.
The 1989 version, for instance, removes any explicit mention of prohibited behaviors but
contains in the introductory statement the comment that "sexual harassment will vary with
the particular circumstances" (1). This phrasing is followed by the EEOC definition, but
they label that definition as merely a "description." In contrast to the previous version of
the code, the 1989 guidelines also revise the confidentiality clause to include "impartiality"
and the assurance that both "will be maintained." The rest of this version, which is only
two pages in total length, contains: informal procedures (which now include the mention
of counseling and advice), formal complaint procedures, and an explanation of the makeup
of the panel of inquiry that will hear sexual harassment complaints.
25 The designation of this as the first "documented" policy is based on interviews conducted by myself at
Rice University in the spring of 1996 and information gathered by the Affirmative Action Office's
Director Catherine Keneally and Department Secretary Carmen Irvin. Although the two preceding
versions (No. 803-89 and 803-92) reference the original document as being created in 1981, searches
turned up no such document in the university files. Irvin posits that the date is either incorrect or that the
original document was never actually "copied down" until Gray's messages in May of 1982.106
This latter section focuses primarily on the composition of the panel as determined
by the persons involved in the complaint procedure. For two students, a faculty chair and
two faculty and student members will makeup the panel; for faculty, faculty members; for
sta1T staff members; when the parties are from differing audiences, a faculty chair and two
representative members from each party will be included. In all instances, the chair will
"normally" be a non-voting member save in instances of a tie (2). The decisions rendered
in these panels will be forwarded to the "appropriate" administrator for "final resolution"
as determined by the nature of the parties involved. The document ends by stating that
sanctions imposed range from a warning to dismissal, and that persons found guilty of
sexual harassment "may be subject" to criminal charges.
There are several items that are of interest in this document, beyond the initial
description/definition distinctions made in relation to the EEOC guidelines. First, the
panel operates as a functionary of one audience, the administrator, in that they are
appointed by the President at the request of the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity
Programs, the larger designation for the department which includes the Affirmative Action
Office. Secondly, the panel's decisions are non-binding in that they are then sent to
different parties for final resolution. The result is a dispersal of responsibility for the
response to complaints that is not clearly explained. While the President of Rice
University determines the panel, other persons are in charge of determining the outcome:
the Vice President for Student Affairs, the Provost, the Vice President for Finance and
Administration, and the representative administrators in other complaints (2).
The 1992 policy--the current form of the code--is strikingly different. The text is
broken up into two separate sections: Policy and Procedures. In the first, a policy
statement similar to those contained in the OSU policies provides the premise for the
code: "it is the policy of Rice University to provide an environment that is free from sexual
harassment because such conduct seriously undermines the atmosphere of trust and
respect that is essential to a healthy work and academic environment" (1). Following from107
the policy explanation are the legal authority and definition sub-sections, both of which
reference the EEOC and Titles VII and IX. Within these two parts, the problems of
definition/description are removed in that the legal authority for the code (EEOC) is now
also the provider of the definition.
But it is subsection D which finally solidifies the nature of the extended code,
explicit in the initial versions and partially removed in the previous version. Under the title
of "examples of prohibited behavior" a grocery list of acts are provided. These scenarios
are tempered by the comments that these "may" be forms of sexual harassment while, at
the same time, other types of behavior not listed may also constitute the same. Such
behaviors are: "sexual propositions, invitations, solicitations, and flirtations"; "threats and
insinuations"; "unwelcome verbal expressions" which include "insulting sounds and
whistles"; "sexually suggestive objects" not related to"educational purposes "; physical acts
which are "unwelcome and inappropriate"; and finally "consensual relationships" resulting
in "favoritism" that "adversely" affects others (2). These behaviors are followed by the
call for prompt reporting, the promise of non-reprisal for "good faith" complaints, and
disciplinary actions against those who file "malicious [and] false accusations" (2).
The next section, procedures, is identical to the sections in the 1989 version, save
for changes and extensions in the wording of the informal and formal complaints
processes. Indeed, the makeup of panels and distribution of powers are the same. But
some of the changes are worth comment. There is now an introductory paragraph which
explains that the "initial course of action" for a person who is being sexually harassed is to
tell the harasser to stop. However, this action "may not be feasible, may be unsuccessful,
or the individual may feel uncomfortable" dealing with the problem in this way (2). The
informal sub-section now includes an explanation of the purposes of this procedure: "the
aim...is not to determine whether there was an intent to harass but to ensure that the
alleged offending behavior ceases and that the matter is resolved promptly at the lowest
possible level. No disciplinary action is taken in resolving informal complaints" (3).108
In the panel of inquiry sub-section, the confidentiality and impartiality section is
now included (in the previous version it was contained in the definition section), but the
latter term has been removed and in its place is the term "privacy." The wording has also
shifted from "will be maintained" to "will be protected to the extent possible" (4).
Additionally, this section now explains the basis of the panel's decision-making process
and, in doing so, more explicitly explains the nature of the non-binding results that are sent
to the proper administrative persons: "the panel's report will detail the allegations, the
evidence in the case, the persuasiveness of the evidence, the consistency of the testimony,
and the credibility of the witnesses" (4-5). The section ends, in this version, with a revised
statement of the actions that will be taken. There is no reference therein to criminal
charges; rather, there is a general statement that the administrator "will take whatever
disciplinary action is indicated" (5).
The historical development of Rice University's sexual harassment code is
rhetorically engaging to the extent that it differs developmentally from the Oregon State
University's code. Rather than demonstrating minor shifts towards the clarification of
sanctions within the code, the Rice University code provides an alternating frame of
reference related to prohibited behaviors. While the initial distinction between
descriptions and definitions of sexual harassment are downplayed in No. 803-89, they are
resolved to the extent that they are separated in the 1992 code into two separate concerns
within the policy section. Such revisions signal, at least at this juncture, that this version
of the extended code has grown more concrete over time, delineating what "is" the act and
what is an "example" of the act. In further contrast to the basic code artifact, the other
changes are also more substantiative in that they clarify the procedural framework of the
panel of inquiry and the nature of its function as a component of the response to sexual
harassment. At the same time, however, the extended artifact does not include such
minutiae as time limits for filing complaints, or separate divisions of procedure for the
differing academic audiences. But our attention must finally turn to an analysis of both the109
basic and extended codes, and a judgment as to their effectiveness in operatingas "fitting"
responses.
Analysis
With the examination of both code types completed,we now turn to an analysis of
them that seeks to determine the degree to which they "fit" the situation. Moreso, we
must analyze the extent to which the codes parallel the nature of the exigence within the
academic situation. The reasons being, the response operates within the situation and isa
response not to the situation in general, but to the imperfection that is seen as warranting a
change. As such, we will now turn to the six factors of responsiveness provided by Bitzer
and explained in Chapter Three. These factors of response, focusedon both speaker and
audience, will secure a determination as to the success of the codes' in responding to
sexual harassment. For, if either speaker or audience shows a deficit inresponse not
matched by the other, the indication is clear: the response of the former is not successful in
securing the latter to operate as mediators of change.
The first issue that must be addressed in analyzing the "fitting" nature of the basic
extended codes is the degree of interest that the speaker and audience have in relation to
the exigence ("Functional" 32). Given that the code is primary andan audience response
is a secondary reaction which determines if the speaker's response--the code--is "fitting,"
this method of judgment is warranted; that is to say, if there are problems in the formation
of the response these factors will have a bearing on the judgment of the code by the
audience. The first subcomponent of interest, factual conditions, is readily observable in
the formulation of the basic and extended codes; that is to say, sexual harassment isa fact
that is comprehended by both the audience and the creators of the code types. Hence the
degree of interest is high in regards to this component.110
The second component, possession of actual knowledge, is a bitmore
complicated. While we may agree that everyone in the campus situation knows about
sexual harassment, the codes-as-response are framed so as to apply to bothpersons who
have been or have alleged that they have been sexually harassed and alsopersons securing
a general, educational, knowledge about the exigence. The response is, as such, directed
to the actual and the potential exigence in that information about harassment and
information after the fact of harassment are both included. But actual knowledge is
complicated further by the different perceptual orientations and definitional explanations
operative within the situation. Whereas some may perceive sexual harassment to be
manifest in peer-to-peer relations, the basic code does not recognize suchtypes of sexual
harassment. Thus the educational function of the response, while providing information
about harassment, excludes certain information that is operative within the situation.
In the extended code, there are different problems in regards to actual knowledge.
By listing behaviors that "are" sexual harassment, certain acts that could be determined to
be sexual harassment are relegated to questionable status. While it is true that the Rice
University code makes it clear that the behaviors listed are not the only types of sexual
harassment, such distinctions lead to a question: are there contexts where the behaviors
listed are not sexual harassment? Alternately, the listcan be construed as being overly
broad, raising yet another contextual, and educational-based, question:are these behaviors
always sexual harassment? The list of behaviors is previewed with thecomment that
sexual harassment may "take a variety of forms," but those formscan either be seen as too
limited or too expansive dependent on how the list is viewed (Rice, "1992" 2).
The above problems are compounded by the fact that the interpretation of actions
by sender and receiver may differ greatly, hence the rather ambiguousnature of an
informal complaint: "to either establish a suspicion of sexual harassmentor to attempt to
resolve a disagreement"; and to aid a person who "is uncertainas to whether what they are
experiencing is sexual harassment" (OSU, "1995" 4; Rice, "1992" 3). That the exigence111
can be considered a matter of both suspicion and disagreement or, in the case of the
extended code, a matter of uncertainty, points to the following paradoxical conclusion:
degree of actual knowledge is low in so far as perceptual and definitional explanations of
sexual harassment differ, high to the extent that the sanctioning component does specify
procedures available should an act be harassment based on the educational explanation.
The third component, proximity in place and time, is a situationally high factor.
The campus situation, as was noted in Chapter Four, is literally cluttered with occurrences
(actual) of and perceptions (potential) about sexual harassment. Each audience is aware
of the exigence in so far as the materials, both code specific and supplemental, are
dispersed throughout the campus situation. The expansiveness of the exigence is also
related to the fourth component, magnitude of factual conditions, or the extent to which
"consequences are numerous and of great significance" ("Functional" 32). That the basic
code delineates the procedures available to each audience indicates the extent of the
possible effects. In the extended code, the procedures are not distinguished by audience,
but the composition of each panel of inquiry and the person who reviews the panel's report
are based in audience distinctions. In sum, the factual conditions are connected to the
perceptual conditions, creating a relatively high degree of interest.
Components three and four are offset to a degree by the fifth interest determinant,
personal involvement. That is to say, the proximity of the exigence may be high and it
may be located throughout the situation, as a perceptual and actual matter of observation,
but actual involvement--like actual knowledge--is reserved in most cases for those that
have dealt with some manner of sexual harassment personally. While it is true that wecan
extend personal involvement to include persons that have been privy to the educational
aspects of the code, their relationship is still perceptual to the extent that they are not
dealing with the exigence-as-actual. Given these problems, interest is medium to low in
this regard.112
As such, the sixth component, quality of interest, is difficult to assess. Both code
types are not set up to respond to the quality of an experience of sexual harassment,
except in the sense that the informal procedures deal with "suspicions" or "uncertainty"
whereas formal methods deal with "allegations." That is to say, the informal procedures
within both code types treat the issue of sexual harassment as only part of a larger
discussion with no real sanctioning power. Only when the matter is transferred to a formal
complaint are measures taken and panels set up to address sexual harassment. Indeed, in
this situation, the nature of the experience is irrelevant in so far as any actual case of
sexual harassment is judged not by the qualities experienced by the harassed or the
harasser, but by determinations made by the creators of the code or the respective panel of
inquiry set up in conjunction with the creators. The extended code tempers these
distinctions, however, by making mention of the penalties that can be incurred for
interfering with a person seeking counsel about sexual harassment or filing a false
accusation with "malicious intent" (Rice, "1992" 2). In these instances there is a "quality"
assessment on the part of the creators as to the process and the use thereof that is absent
in the basic code.
The second and third factors, modification capability and risk, deal with the
degrees of change possible in responding to the exigence and the dangers that the speaker
and audience feel by doing so. These factors deal exclusively with the sanctioning aspects
of the code in that the educational interest in the codes does not translate into modification
of the exigence; there is no risk in referencing the codes for the purposes of clarifying
what potential actions are sexual harassment. In other words, the response of the
audience is based largely on the degree to which the codes make such actions palatable.
As such, the codes operate from the basis that modifications are possible and that risk is
low. But the audience response should, if such were true, demonstrate a comparative
level of response to the codes themselves. As Bitzer points out, rhetoric is a form of
communication "which seeks to establish correct judgments, primarily in the areas of113
practical and humane affairs" ("Public" 68). Given that codes are a form of rhetoric meant
to shape actions (that is, respond to and modify the exigence of sexual harassment), there
should be at the very least some way of telling if the codes are able to do so. The basic
and the extended codes, however, do not operate so as to make such audienceresponses
verifiable in regards to the educational components. In regards to the sanctioning
components, verification is only possible through the reaction to an actual manifestation of
the exigence.
Demonstrative of these problems is the fact that sexual harassment claims are
collected with other types of campus offenses, such as hazing, or divided simply by the
type of harassment. Using statistics obtained on October 15, 1995 from Bill Oye, the
official in charge of conduct at Oregon State University, we can see the following
breakdown:
12 in person sexual harassment cases
1 phone case
2 instances of E-mail harassment
17 streakers (nudity in public) charged with "contributing to a hostile, offensive
environment."
This total presents us with 32 documented cases of sexual harassment or other
types of sexually offensive behavior. These types of statistics provide the school with
valuable information to be sure. But they do little to determine if OSU is closer toa
"harassment-free environment." And a comparison of these statistics to the previous
year's count of 14 sexual offenses gives little measure of comparative risks.These
problems are compounded once again by the nature of supplemental materials that detail
the existence of sexual harassment. Although one official at the Affirmative Action Office
sees these statistics as "indicative of a change," in the two years prior there were no
reports of sexual offenses listed in the OSU statistical handout. The Rice University
records related to sexual harassment complaints are equally ambiguous. In the five-year114
period beginning in 1991, a total of five complaints were reported, with none occurring in
1991-1992 nor during the 1995-1996 school year.26
The combined conclusion that can be drawn is that a lack of modification is
occurring and that risk cannot be assessed. It seems entirely implausible that in the former
instance no sexual harassment occurred for two years and then, suddenly, the numbers
jumped to such a degree; in the latter instance, it seems equally unlikely that such a low
number of complaints translate into actual occurrences. In both cases, it also helps to bear
in mind that complaints are based on the formal charges and not on the informal methods.
As such, an interesting disjunction can be noted in both codes: responsiveness on the part
of the codes' creators is high in so far as the statistics represent the number of formal
complaints they responded to, but the audiences' response to the exigence is low in so far
as the statistics compiled indicate a reaction to the codes.
These problems channel into the next factor, obligation and expectation, in that
there is an implied obligation for the school to respond to the exigence and a further
expectation by the audiences that they will do so. But, as Bitzer notes, the response must
be "fitting" and the previous two factors demonstrate some significant problems with the
reliability of the codes as both educational and sanctioning responses. Now it could be
argued that those previous problems are the result of the supplemental materials
misrepresenting the outcomes of the codes. However, it has been noted that such
supplemental materials function as constraints--much like the perceptions of the exigence--
and a "fitting" response needs to modify itself given those realities.In other words, the
obligation is being met to the extent that the codes provide a sanctioning mechanism. But
the nature of that response is in tension with the diversity of expectations operative within
the situation; it is in conflict with the those perceptual factors that the educational
component of the codes do not deal with.
26 These statistics were provided by Carmen Irvin, department secretary for the Office of Equal
Employment Opportunities Project, on March 22, 1996.115
The next factor, familiarity/confidence, offers explanations of these previous
problems. Given that the basic code is seventeen years old, it has been posited that it
should have undergone modification as the situation changes. Butwe have noted that
very little change has actually occurred save for the revision of certain sanctioning items:
time limits and the alteration of certain phrases and sections. Additionally, the educational
component of the code-as-response has not undergone significant changes since 1980. As
such, the familiarity with the exigence as a potentialor an actual condition operative
within the situation has not bred a confident modification of theresponse. The codes
seem stuck in time to the same extent that the EEOC guidelines upon which they are
based have not changed. The extended code, although undergoingmore apparent changes
in the move from implicit to explicit listing of prohibited behaviors and in the clarification
of definition/discription distinctions, has also remained relatively constant.
These facts are then channeled into the final factor of immediacy, the idea that the
speaker and audience are "more likely to respond if they believe their efforts mustoccur
now or never" (Bitzer, "Functional" 33). While it is admitted that the process of
responding to the exigence of sexual harassment is ongoing, the immediacy of sexual
harassment has not decreased. In fact, immediacy has increasedas situational constraints
have expanded the understanding of the exigence. But the codes stand ata historical
distance--in development and revision-- almost two decades old. As supplemental
materials have come to include ideas such as peer-to-peer harassment and sexual "hassle,"
the educational sections of the codes have not. In both codes, the only notable change in
relation to historical developments is the inclusion of consensual relationshipsas an
introductory matter of concern.
These consensual changes are problematic in that they relate back to the discussion
of actual knowledge and experience. In both codes the perceptual stress isput, not on the
interactants, but on third parties who may interpret the actions to demonstrate favoritism
or a hostile environment. While such perceptions cannot be discounted outright, they116
create a problem in responsiveness that relates to both speaker and audience: how doesa
speaker respond to a claim of sexual harassment that is filed bya person not involved in
the acts being described; do the audience members in question haveany say as to the
person's designation of their behavior as sexual harassment? The basic codewarns about
the negative consequences in the workplace and academicprograms and the extended
code cautions about the adverse effects. But a referral to both highlights the codes'
inability to properly explain how such a complaint would be resolved. In the basic code
there is no further mention of how such a third person dispute would be solved via either
informal or formal measures. In the extended code, the formal panel of inquiry isnot set
up--as explained--to deal with a "three person" sexual harassment complaint. The sum
result of this singular modification is troubling in that the educational revision that has
occurred in line with present problems (teacher-student relations) hasnot been matched by
a change in the sanctioning structure of the rest of the code.
Which brings us to the actual judgment of the basic and extended codesas
corrective responses to a situation which is complex in the organization of its rhetorical
elements and highly structured in the presentation of its elements. In regards to the
educational aspect of the codes, there is little doubt that theseresponses are not fitting in
so far as they have not adapted sufficiently to the continually evolving perceptions of
sexual harassment as a potential problem. In relation to the sanctioning section of the
codes, the response is fitting to the extent that thereare procedures in place to deal with
cases of harassment. But this corrective response is also flawed in that revisions in the
educational sections are not matched by changes in the sanctioning sections. Moreso,
sanctioning mechanisms (as directed to the actual incidents of harassment)are complicated
when the explanation of the potential harassment is problematic.
These judgments are based on the fact that, while the degrees of interest
demonstrated by both speaker and audience are relatively high, the other factors that
determine the nature of a response are questionably constructed. Inessence, the basic and117
extended codes operate within a situation wherepersons are aware of and responsive to
sexual harassment to varying degrees. But the codes donot compliment that interest with
a sufficiently corrective framework. Indeed, the complex organization of the situational
elements can be contrasted with the relatively rigidmeans of modification noted in the
basic code; the presentation of elements is offset by the datedresponse which ignores
general increases in familiarity and expectation within the situation.In the extended code,
the structure is equally rigid and the fundamental difference, prohibitedbehaviors, is
problematic in that it has no contextual basis to which itcan appeal. Paradoxically, the
behaviors listed are so expansive as to ignore instances when they mightnot be sexual
harassment, so limiting in that no indication is given to explain what otherbehaviors might
be sexual harassment.
While codes cannot do everything, they clearly donot do enough in this instance
to warrant the designation "fitting." When the educational mechanisms in both codes,
corresponding as they do to the perceptual part of the exigence, ignorea component of
sexual harassment mentioned in inter-situational material (suchas peer-to-peer
harassment) they create a damaging gap between what the audience knowsand what the
speaker says. When the sanctioning devices, correspondingto the actual manifestations of
harassment, contain ambiguous procedures--which in at leastone instance do not deal
with an educational component therein--what is known by speaker andaudience is thrown
into conflict by what they can do about it. Thesum result are stopgaps at the fundamental
levels of the basic and extend codes; the educational materials donot mesh with the
situational perceptions and the sanctioning methods do notcompensate for educational
revisions.
But the indication that these code types are predominantly not "fitting"responses
cannot be the sole result of this thesis. The goal of rhetoric, ofa criticism that analyzes
the persuasive nature of rhetorical situations, is to "effect valuable changes in reality"
(Bitzer, "Situation" 24). As such, our attention must finallyturn to suggestions which118
might help to pave the way for more constructive codes, suggestions whichtake the
analysis and channels it into a productivemeans for finding an alternative. Without such a
concluding step, the work to this point would beno longer be criticism, it would merely be
critical.119
Chapter VIII: Recommendations
The judgment that the response provided by thecodes is not fitting is, in many
ways, not surprising.Sexual harassment, as a historical reality and acampus-specific
exigence, transcends the rhetorical framework of a setspeech delivered to a stationary
audience in a concert hall. Yet sexual harassmentis an exigence that locates itself; as a
potential matter of perception and an actual matter ofaction, in different situations. As
such, sexual harassment can be studied in the contextof those environments. The task at
present is to provide a final discussionwhich offers the possibly for "fitting" future
revisions. This discussion is an opportunity to map out afuture path of progress in
regards to sexual harassment on college and university campuses.
Given the complexities thus set forth, this final chapterwill develop in two distinct
stages. First, we will survey suggestionsprovided by Bitzer and note how they, while
positing a means of achieving "fitting" responses,only muddle our discussion with the
antiquated notion of a universal public. Secondly, wewill turn our attention to the work
of John Dewey and note the ways in which apragmatic approach might yields the most
benefits in so far as providing radical, yet possibleand progressive, suggestions as to the
future of sexual harassment codes.
Situational Suggestions
A review of Bitzer's own suggestions as to how onewould craft a more fitting
response to complicated exigencesprovides some positive suggestions, but very few
practical answers. In his essay "Rhetoric and thePublic Knowledge," Bitzer moves
beyond the critical recommendations applied withinthis text and towards a questionable
notion of universalized truth. He notes thatcertain exigences are "global, and no less than
a universal public issufficient to authorize their modification" (91). Thatsexual120
harassment has global implications is not in dispute. Whilemy research focused on the
development of the exigence within the United States, the effects of such donot dissipate
the moment we leave this country's borders. Butwe are confronted with a serious
problem: do global exigences such as sexual harassment necessarily recommend universal
solutions/responses? I posit that can not be the case for, if suchwere held as true, then
the situation expands itself to be so encompassingas to be nothing less than the husk
within which we conduct all of our social activity.
No, situations exist in reference to other situations. Their natureas distinct entities
capable of scrutiny is based in the constraints which modify andencompass the activities
therein. As was the case with sexual harassment in context of thecampus situation, we
noted both inartistic and artistic constraints which distinguished it from the larger social
environment. We saw that legal precedents rendered actions related to and decisions
about sexual harassment, for lack of a better word, "academic." Finally,we noted that
both code types were, by definition, campus-related and comparable in the educational and
sanctioning functions they included. An employer andan employee are subject to
comparable constraints when dealing with sexual harassment within the workforce. But
the audiences within the campus public are capable of sucha comparison in that they are
not exactly the same.
The audiences that make up the "campus public," the publics that create the
"rhetorical audience," serve as the possible mediators within the distinctcampus situation.
That they intersect with and blend into other publics at different times is, like the global
implications of the exigence, a reality that cannot be disputed. The walls that surround the
academic situation are largely figurative, but their figurative quality takeson real shape
when we note that the terms that describe these audiences differ from those that reference
their comparative social counterparts. More so, the perceptions of the individuals withina
given situation are shaped, for good and ill, by that context. Moves have been madeto
study the perceptions of audience members within academia yet there still remainsa deficit121
in our understanding of the perspectives of both males and harassers. And when the
critical task is to analyze how the rhetorical audience works to providea determination of
the speaker's fitting response, we would no sooner consult the doctor down the street than
we would expect the doctor to solicit the advice of a teaching assistant.
In general discussions, such distinctions lose their shape. When we speak of sexual
harassment on the whole, all persons are capable of giving a response. But whenwe move
into specific situations, shaped by specific constraints, and effecting certain audiences,
such broad responses become less effective. These generalities become frames of
reference, not methods for progress. Such are the reasons why we need to be suspicious
of Bitzer's claim:
Rhetoric's task in this new and dangerous age is to assist the
formulation and creation of that knowledge and method
constitutive of wisdom characterizing a universal public.
This universal public will serve as the authoritative agency
of decision and action needed to reduce contemporary
anxieties and to provide conditions of universal culture.
The central goal of rhetorical practice, therefore, is the
Isocratic goal--to fashion means and provide impetus
towards civilization, with regard to all humanity (91)27
The irony in the above claim is that the presumption of persuasion is gone shouldwe
concede to the lofty ideals it proposes. Should such an authoritative body exist, rhetoric
would lapse into Platonic decree, and the suggestions of the critic would calcify into
platitudes rendered on high. There is a secondary problem with the above pursuit: the
Isocratian promotion of pan-Hellenic culture becomes a universal culture and the notion of
a situation as a framework disappears under the stress of the extension.
27 The universal decision-making body is not new to discussions of rhetoric, nor is it primarilya
manifestation of Neo-Aristotelian theory and criticism. Chaim Perleman, in The Realm of Rhetoric,
appeals to a similarly nebulous body of rhetorical judgment when he explains that a "universal public" is
comprised of "at least all of those who are competent and reasonable...of an infinite variety of particular
audiences" (14).122
But the expansiveness of Bitzer's goal does provide an insight into the problems
already noted in looking at the two code types: both assume that the codification of a
response can extend to provide a fitting response for a variety of interests; the codes
attempt to match the potential and the actual exigence with an educational and sanctioning
response. Such attempts are undercut by at least two factors: 1) situations change over
time, and 2) the recognition of a readily observable fact is subject to the context in which
it is viewed. In regards to the first factor, it was noted that the codes' inability to provide
a fitting response was based, in large part, in their failure to adequately reflect the
perceptual diversity within the situation. These changes within the situation relate to the
second factor. The depth of knowledge related to sexual harassment has changed within
the last two decades.
The observation can thus be put forth that a code, if unreflective of situational
changes, will fail to be fitting in so far as it ignores or misinterprets the current perceptions
of the exigence. Thus our final task is to put forth concluding comments related to the
future of sexual harassment codes on college and university campuses. Such comments
should be viewed as a "rough sketch" rather than a definite call for action; they are made
in the interest of extending and complementing the criticism that has transpired. These
suggestions, given the problems inherent in the "universal" implications of Bitzer's
endorsements, will necessarily move beyond the situational method. By doing so, we
temper the possibility of endorsing changes which are either too absolute or so generalized
as to fail in addressing the specific campus situation which we have examined.
Pragmatic Suggestions
There is a point in the previous discussion of Bitzer that serves to orient us to the
direction of the recommendations that will be made: "we seem unable or unwilling to
acknowledge that some truths are not to be found in [the present], but rather become,123
over time, and perhaps pass in and out of existence" ("Public" 92). Such a stance seems,
to my mind and given the preceding analysis, to be the case with the exigence of sexual
harassment. Only a few decades previous, and in certain individuals currently, the
prevailing notion was largely that sexual harassment was "boys being boys." But
increased awareness spawned by the legal and social examination of the exigence has lead
to its observation as a fact that runs contrary to ethical conduct. Now, these observations
are complicated by often competing determinations as to the nature and scope of sexual
harassment. But it suffices to say that the fact remains, no matter how shadowed and
textured by perceptual distinctions, that sexual harassment is a negative act imposedupon
others. Thus, the truth of sexual harassment is twofold: it is an act thatcan be described
as unethical but it is also a truth which is modified as our value judgments and knowledge
of it changes. As the situational context changes so do our determinations of how thatact
affects us, as a potential for harm and as an actual instance of unethical conduct.
But the codes surveyed seem ill-suited to such a recognition of truth; theyseem
stuck in the contextual value judgments expressed in the EEOC definition. In thecase of
the basic code, the educational and sanctioning adaptations that have been madeare
minute in relation to the data that has been collected since 1980. Indeed, the current
version of the OSU code only changes a time limit. When looking at the extended code,
more fluctuations have occurred, but the prohibited behaviors now listed in the Rice
University code trace their existence back to 1979 and are coupled with procedural
problems similar to those found in the basic code. Metaphorically speaking, the walls that
surround the campus situation have grown, and they have grownaway from the responses
to them.
What possibilities exist to remedy these problems of figurative distance and literal
complication? My answer is tied to an understanding of how we determine what
constitutes progress. Simply put, progress is moving forward, it is a "present
reconstruction adding fullness and distinctness to meaning" (Dewey 281). The124
reconstruction is necessary due to the inadequacies that we have found in the present
response. These inadequacies are based in the continuation of past methods of responding
to sexual harassment. The distinctions are also evident in light of the inadequacies that
have been noted. The two codes blend too many factors together to adequately
complement the depth of perceptual divergence inherent within the situation. The
sanctioning component cannot stand alone; it is connected to the educational component
and creates the overall response. Hence, my belief is that any future formulation of sexual
harassment codes needs to overcome the problems of the past and, in doingso, provides a
framework suited to the realities of the present. What follows isa brief discussion of three
factors that need to be kept in mind should code revisions be undertaken thatare reflective
of the analysis found within this work of criticism.
The codes must be progressive in composition. The basic and extended codes
need to be modified so as to create a flexible and adaptive means of combating sexual
harassment. By "flexible" it is meant that they must provide the framework for decisions
as to cases in general; by "adaptive" it is meant that they must be relative enough to allow
for the distinctions within each, individual case. But, I can hear the question, where is the
code in these suggestions? Given the current formulations of codes itseems fairly safe to
respond: nowhere. But the present situation demands a relativemeasure of judgment
should we hope to give serious consideration to the complicated and often contradictory
claims of sexual harassment.
This relative measure must be distinguished from mere "relativism." The revisions
that are being suggested do not call for random decisions rendered off the cuff but, in line
with the situational method of criticism, responses that fit. The previous analysis
demonstrates that a response that fits the campus situation can not be too fixed in either its
attachment to past methods of determination or in concrete descriptions of an exigenceas
textured as sexual harassment. The fitting response must be as flexible and adaptiveas the
situation in which it resides, as open to interpretation as the audiences are to perceptions125
of the exigence. In both codes, the miscue comes not in the direction that is taken--the
education about and sanction of acts of sexual harassment--but in how rigidly and
absolutely that line is drawn.
As such, progressive sexual harassment codes can be thought of in terms of
regulating principles which operate as:
Not...fixed rules for deciding doubtful cases, but
instrumentalities for their investigation, methods by which
the net value of past experience is rendered available for
present scrutiny of new perplexities. Then it will follow that
they are hypotheses to be tested and revised by their further
working. (Dewey 241)
The codes should use situationally reflective language. A primary problem with
the codes was that the explanatory material did not mesh with the perceptual
understanding of sexual harassment within the situation. Suggestions can be provided at
this juncture which might help to overcome this divide. The "harassment free
environment" statements that are currently in place contain patently false comments in
their initial phrasing: "maintenance of an environment free from sexual harassment is
important"; "it is the policy of Rice University to provide an environment that is free from
sexual harassment" ("1995" 3; "1992" 1). These must be amended to assumea future
tense if the statements are to hold any rhetorical integrity in so far as ethos is concerned.
Even if the questionable statistics related to both artifacts are to be takenas accurate,
neither school can claim to have either maintained or provided an "environment" free of
harassment. Perhaps the statements are meant to reflect an optimistic wishon the part of
the creators. But the point to be stressed is that regulating principles, to embrace
progress, need to promote as accurate a picture of the current state of things as possible.
The codes should rely on audience participation in their articulation and
implementation. Following from the suggestions for a progressive and situationally
reflective code, the scope and nature of the statement should be the responsibility of the126
public designated to formulate it. The statement should, in other words, contain a method
for regular revision and involve all audiences in its regulation. The revision component
anchors the modification to current speculation and value judgment; it keeps the statement
from becoming an absolute and continues its perpetuation as a constantly adaptive means
of regulation. Such continual complication is as essential as it is initially frustrating. But
these disturbances of acceptance and codification operate to assure progress in so far as
"every genuine accomplishment instead of winding up an affair and enclosing it as a jewel
in a casket for future contemplation, complicates the practical situation" (Dewey 285). In
the current forms of the codes, acceptance on the part of the campus public is largely a
matter of indifference save for those with actual experience. Very often that which is
potential is deferred until it becomes an actual; that which is educational only becomes
important when it transforms into a matter of sanction. That we are compelled by this
revision to respond, and respond often, only signals that we are to now take seriously the
changing nature of the exigence. An answer to the implementation aspect can possibly be
found in reflection on the extended artifact's "panel of inquiry." While it was criticized in
the analysis for being problematic in the division of labor and the manner of addressing
third-party complaints, it could be modified to reflect this progress-oriented approach by
expanding the panel's composition to include a more representative sample of the
audiences involved in the campus situation.
Where would we stand should we take these suggestions to heart? Nearer to
progress and farther away from absolute measures severed from evolving situations and
continually changing exigences. The educational nature of the response could be
transformed into a flexible means of explanation and could be coupled with an equally
malleable method of sanctioning. All audiences would now know what was happening to
whom by virtue of their role in creating, revising, and using the codes to which they are
subject. By using this more pluralistic approach, the outlook as to the exigence would
also be more progressive. That is, the potential and the actual nature of sexual harassment127
would be represented and revised, not by a single creator, but by the diversity of
situational participants that experience and perceive sexual harassment, often in different
ways. And these revisions would lead to the admittance that sexual harassment codes, as
currently framed, stand in the way of progress. That is to say, they are not "fitting" inso
far as they adhere to a framework which has been proven to be minimally adaptive,
perceptually unreflective in key areas, and divisive in their inclusion of all audiences. As
John Dewey notes in comments that are applicable to the previous discussion:
Rigid moral codes that attempt to lay down definite
injunctions and prohibitions for every occasion in life turn
out in fact to be loose and slack. Stretch the ten
commandments or any other number as far as you will by
ingenious exegesis, yet acts unprovided for by them will
occur. No elaboration of statute law can forestall variant
cases and the need of interpretation ad hoc. Moral and legal
schemes that attempt the impossible in the way of definite
formulation compensate for explicit strictness in some lines
by implicit looseness in others. The only truly severe code
is the one that forgoes codification, throwing responsibility
for judging each case upon the agents concerned, imposing
upon them the burden of discovery and adaptation. (Dewey
103)
Such revisions may not sit well with persons who prefer the hard and fast rule to
the adaptive and progressive. There is always something alluring in referencing the past.
But the degree to which these suggestions will be heeded cannot be ascertained within the
final passages of this thesis. This act of criticism has shown that the attempts made to
modify the exigence of sexual harassment on college and university campuses have not
been rhetorically successful. As such, this analysis is offered up in the hope that a new
response might be found, in the hopes that we do not surrender ourselves to the fallacy
that what was translates into what is. Sexual harassment, as an unethical reduction of
others, demands forward thinking. Best that those steps are taken in the here and now, so
that the future responses to sexual harassment have the best chances of being productive.128
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APPENDICESOffice of the President
To:
From:
Oregon
State.
UniversityCorvallis, Oregon 97331 (503/ 754-4,4
November 15, 1979
Deans; Directors, Academic and Service Units;Members of the
Faculty and Staff
Robert MacVicar, President
Subject:Sexual Harassment
The topic of sexual harassment has been receivingmuch press coverage recently.
A memorandum has been received from ChancellorR. E. Lieuallen, Oregon State
System of Higher Education, regarding sexualharassment in education and the
impact a sexual harassment charge and litigationwould have on Oregon insti-
tutions of higher education.Following is an abstract of his memorandum:
Sexual harassment has been defined in severalways by the American Asso-
ciation of Colleges Project on the Status andEducation of Women to
include actions such as verbal harassmentor abuse; subtle pressure for
sexual activity; sexist remarks abouta person's clothing, body or sexual
activities; unnecessary physical contact; andsoliciting sexual favors
accompanied by implied or overt threats.Any individual who uses his or
her power or position to extort sexualgratification or to verbally
degrade a person in a subordinate positionand, but for that person's
sex would not have done so, has sexually harassed thesubordinate.
Sexual harassment is a very serious chargeand a very difficult one to
adjudicate discreetly and fairly.It may create untenable positions
both for the victim and for the accusedeven after the validity of a
charge is established.Unless harassment is blatant, the victimmay
doubt his or her perceptions and be unwillingto discuss it with others.
The victim may fear, justly or not, retaliatorymeasures such as low
grades or poor letters of recommendation.
Case law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964has upheld at
the Federal Circuit Court level the inclusion of sexualharassment as a
form of sex discrimination.It appears courts are moving more clearly
to hold the employer responsible for the acteven without the employer's
acquiescence or ratification when explanation of the employer'slack of
awareness is unreasonable.In addition to suit or complaint under
Title VII, victims may also use state tort law.Proving a case under
tort law is likely to be much more difficult than underTitle VII.How-
ever, if a plaintiff can prove the employer was unwillingto prevent the
harassment or to respond once aware of it, the employermay become sub-
ject to damages.
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To establish an environment in which sexual harassment is not considered
acceptable behavior,I am requesting that all administrators and supervisors
implement the following:
1.Make sure that faculty, staff, and students understand that sexual
harassment is prohibited behavior under the Board's Administrative
Rules both in educational programs and employment.
2.Make sure employees and students know that grievances relating to
sexual harassment may be brought under any of several existing
grievance procedures (Faculty Handbook, pp. 40-41, Student Handbook,
p.57, and OSEA contract).
3.Provide for confidentiality of both victim and alleged respondent
to extent possible and publicize the intent to do so.
4.Take prompt action to investigate and, if upheld, provide remedial
action.
Because of the sensitive nature of the subject, if complaints of this nature
occur at Oregon State University, the Office of the President, AdS 622,
should be advised that a complaint has been initiated.
RM:is_L(
Vice President for
Academic Affairs
and Provost
Ole on
t
Univee rsityCorvallis,Oregon97331-2128MOM
-g4
NOV123 -,-
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November 4,1985
MEMORANDUM
TO: Vice Presidents, Deans, Directors, Department Heads
FROM: Bill Wilkins
Acting Vice P es dent for Academic Affairs and Provost
RE: Sexual Harassment
To help assure that Oregon State University is free from sexual
harassment, I am requesting all administrators and supervisoYs to
do the following:
1.Discuss the attached guidelines with faculty, staff,
and students.Stress to each supervisor and employee
that sexual harassment is prohibited behavior under the
Board's Administrative Rules, both in educational programs
and employment.Accomplish this as soon as possible.
2.Notify OSU's Affirmative Action Office (x3556) immediately
if you have questions, concerns, and/or a possible complaint.
Report promptly.
3.Make certain that employees and students know that grievances
relating to sexual harassment may be brought under any of
several existing grievance procedures (Faculty Handbook, pp.
40-41; Student Handbook, p. 57; and OSEA contract).
4.Provide for confidentiality of both victim and alleged
respondent to the extent possible and publicize the intent to
do so.
BHW/nrh
ArrAchment
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f)Prevention is the best tool for the elimination of sexual harassment.
An employer should take all steps necessary to prevent sexual harassmentfrom
occurring, such as affirmatively raising the subject, expressingstrong dis-
approval, developing appropriate sanctions, informing employees oftheir right
to raise and how to raise the issue of sexual harassment underTitle VII, and
developing methods to sensitize all concerned.
g)Other related practices.When employment opportunities or benefits are
granted because of an individual's submission to the employer'ssexual advances
or requests for sexual favors, the employer may be held liable for unlawfulsex
discrimination against other persons who were qualified forbut denied the
employment opportunity or benefit.
Case law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964has upheld at the
Federal Circuit Court level the inclusion of sexualharassment as a form of sex
discrimination.Courts are moving more clearly to hold the employerrespon-
sible for the act even without the employer's acquiescenceor ratification when
explanation of the employer's lack of awareness isunreasonable.In addition
to suit or complaint under Title VII, victimsmay also use state tort law.If
a plaintiff can prove the employer was unwilling to prevent the harassmentor
to respond once aware of it, the employer is subject todamages.(The employer
is responsible for notifying all employees of sexually prohibitivebehavior.
If it can be shown this was not done, OSU becomes liable).
Director
Affirmative Action141
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment is prohibited.Any individual who uses his or her power or
position to extort sexual gratification or to verbally degradea person in a
subordinate position and, but for that person's sex would not have doneso,
has sexually harassed the subordinate.
Sexual harassment as defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commissionis
as follows:
Section 1604.11Sexual Harassment
a)Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbalor
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) sub-
mission to such conduct is either explicitly or implicitly madea term or
condition of any individual's employment, (2) submission toor rejection of
such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual, or (3) such conduct has thepurpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performanceor creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
b)In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment,
the commission will look at the records as a whole and the totality of the
circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in
which the alleged incidents occurred.The determination of the legality of a
particular action will be made from the facts on a case bycase basis.
c)Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employmentagency,
joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and those of its agents
and supervisory employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of
whether the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden by
the employer and regardless of whether the employer knowsor should have known
of their occurrence.The commission will examine the circumstances of the
particular employment relationship and the job functions performed by the
individual in determining whether an individual acts in eithera supervisory
or agency capacity.
d)With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is
responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer,
its agents or supervisory employees, knows or should have known of the conduct,
unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.
e)An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees, with
respect to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where the employer,
its agents or supervisory employees, knows or should have known of theconduct
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.In reviewing
these cases, the commission will consider the extent of the employer's control
and other legal responsibility which the employer may have with respect tothe
rondlirt of cuch nnn-nmnlnynoc142
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
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LEGISLATION AND POLICIES
PERTAINING TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Section 703
Title IX of the EducationAmendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681, et seq.)
Department of Education (34 C.F.R. Part 106)
Department of Energy (10 C.F.R. Part 1040)
Department of Agriculture (7 C.F.R. Part 15a)
Executive Order EO-81-7State of Oregon, 1981
OAR 580-21-310 to 580-21-470
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex (29 C.F.R. Part 1604.11 (a) November 10, 1980)
Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Education, Memorandum:
"Title IX and Sexual Harassment Complaints," August, 1982
Oregon State University Personnel Divison Policy 8.1.1.2
Oregon State University Student Conduct Code, OAR 576
Memorandum to University Executive Officers, Deans and Directors,
Re: Sexual Harassment.From: President Robert MacVicar,
November 22, 1983144
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SANCTIONS
FACULTY
Faculty found to have engaged in sexual harassment may be subject to a
written reprimand to be included in personnel files under the provisions
of OAR 580-21-320 and 580-21-385 and/or to evaluations of less than fully
satisfactory service and/or even more severe sanctions.If a proven
incident of sexual harassment has occurred and after the delivery ofa
written reprimand arising out of such conduct, more severe sanctions for
cause may be instituted under OAR 580-21-325 through 580-21-470 and 580-
22 -045.Such conduct may be handled under OAR 580-21-310 to 470 at the
discretion of the President.
CLASSIFIED STAFF AND MANAGEMENT SERVICE EMPLOYEES
Classified staff found to have engaged in sexual harassmentmay be sub-
ject to disciplinary action in accordance with current collective bar-
gaining agreements.If a proven incident of sexual harassment occurs,
sanctions in accord with the progressive discipline concept shall be in-
stituted, including written reprimand, suspension, reduction of pay, de-
motion, and finally, termination of service.
Management service employees found to have engaged in sexual harassment
may be subject to disciplinary action in accordance with provisions of
Personnel Division Policy 8.1.1.2, including possible written reprimand,
suspension, reduction of pay, demotion or dismissal.
STUDENTS
Students found to have engaged in sexual harassment may be subject to
sanctions under the Student Conduct Code, OAR 576.145
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HARASSMENT-FREE ENVIRONMENT
Maintenance of an environment free from sexual harassment isvery impor-
tant.To provide this environment, the following procedures must be
implemented:
1. All Deans, Directors, Department Heads and Supervisors
must inform all employees that sexual harassment is
prohibited.
2.These Policies and Procedures should be emphasized by
the Deans in School meetings and explained by Depart-
mental Chairs to faculty, classified staff andmanage-
ment service employees.Directors should discuss the
issue in staff meetings.Those who have questions,
concerns, or feel victimized by sexual harassment
should be referred to the Affirmative Action Office
immediately.
3. The posters, "It's Against the Law," and "Sexual
Harassment is Unacceptable Behavior at Oregon State
University," and any other such material for display
provided by the Affirmative Action Office must be
widely disseminated and displayed in every Department
and School or College office.Also, a copy of the
posters and memorandum from the President dated
November 22, 1983, plus other materials provided by
the Affirmative Action Office and marked for display
must be posted in every Dean's office, in the office
of every Department Chair, and in every Director's
Office.
4. All Head Residents and Resident Advisors must display
both posters, distribute copies of a pamphlet,
and discuss the rules with residents in their living
groups.
5. Deans, Department Chairs, Directors, Head Residents
and Resident Advisors are encouraged to invite the
Director of Affirmative Action to talk to their
staffs concerning this very important issue.146
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PROCEDURES FOR FILING SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS
FACULTY
Faculty grievance procedures prohibiting sexual harassment are the same
as for any other discrimination complaint.These procedures are outlined
in detail in the 1980 Affirmative Action Plan.The grievance procedures,
briefly, are as follows:
Informal Complaints
Any faculty member who considers herself/himself a victim of sexual harass-
ment should contact the Affirmative Action Office immediately.The Direc-
tor of Affirmative Action will request a written report (on an OSU form)
from the faculty member setting forth the allegations of sexual harass-
ment.The Affirmative Action Director, after consultation with the
aggrieved party, will investigate the matter thoroughly, maintaining con-
fidentiality if at all possible.A sincere effort will be made to settle
the allegation informally by talking to the people directly involved,
talking with the Department Heads of the people involved, the pertinent
Dean, and any others who may have knowledge of the incident(s).Follow-
ing this intensive investigation, the Affirmative Action Director will
make a decision regarding whether or not sexual harassment has occurred
and suggest or implement a settlement of the allegation.The Affirma-
tive Action Director will consult the President and the Legal Counsel for
the President.
Formal Complaints
If satisfactory resolution to the grievance cannot be reached through the
above informal procedures, the aggrieved party may file a formal complaint
with the Equal Employment Board of the University.
Equal Employment Opportunity Board.The Board is appointed by the
President and makes recommendations to him.The Board has authority
to hear any complaint properly presented to it which alleges the practice
of employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, age,
national origin, handicap or Viet Nam era veteran status within Oregon
State University, or the existence of a policy, practice, or procedure
within the University which results in discrimination either by itself or
by its method of application.The Board is designed to provide a readily
available forum for complaints alleging discrimination within the Univer-
sityand is not intended to be used to review complaints which have al-
ready been adjucated or are being processed in other formal due-process
procedures.147
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Who May File a Complaint?
1.Any University employee, former employee, applicant for employ-
ment or any organization.
2.If complaint alleges general discriminatory practiceas opposed
to discrimination against the complainant personally, thecom-
plainant, upon request of Board, shall furnishnames of indivi-
duals alleged to be adverselyaffected.
Procedures:
1.Complaints must be in writing, signed by complainant, andmust
state basis of claim including summary of facts or policies
which are alleged to be discriminatory.
2.Complaints to the Board shall be filed with the Director of Af-
firmative Action who shall make a preliminary review of themat-
ter, gather relevant data and within a reasonable time, makea
preliminary decision as to whether or not the complainant has
been discriminated against.
3.The decision made by the Director shall be supplied to the Board.
All data gathered by the Director shall be made availableto the
Board for use in subsequent hearings.
4.No complaint will be heard unless received by the Board within
90 days after the date on which the discriminatory practiceor
act is alleged to have occurred.The Board may waive time limit-
ations and may grant extension of the filing dateupon receipt
of a letter giving reasons for extension request.
5.Complainant may be represented at all stages of the proceedings
by legal counsel.
6.Hearing shall be set expeditiously and shall be conductedat such
time and place as the Board shall determine.A quorum consists
of at least five members.
7.Complainant shall be permitted full opportunity to present wit-
nesses or documents and to cross-examine any witness produced in
opposition.Opposition party has the same opportunity.
8.Chairperson of the Board shall preside and make all rulings for
orderly conduct of the hearing.Decision by the Board regarding
objections to rulings of the chairman shall be by majorityvote
of members of the Board.
9.Record of the hearing shall be transcribed stenographicallyor
be recorded by tape or other appropriatemeans and shall be a148
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10.At the conclusion of the hearing the Board shall consider all evi-
dence received and render a decision by majority vote of the mem-
bers present.The decision shall be in the form of a written report
to the President (copy to complainant and to the responding depart-
ment or school) which shall include findings of fact, conclusion,
and recommendations for action by the President.Minority views of
members may be included at the option of said minority members.The
complainant and the school or department involved may submit comments
directly to the President pointing out any errors or disagreement
with the report which they wish to be considered by the President.
11.President will review file and shall promptly remand the record and
file to the Board for further action as appears to be required;
accept or reject the Board decision; announce the decision; or
otherwise dispose of the complaint.The President shall notify the
complainant, School or Department, and the Affirmative Action Office
in writing of the action or decision.
If the aggrieved faculty member feels that his/her concerns have not
been satisfactorily conciliated at Oregon State University, he or she may
seek assistance outside the State System of Higher Education.149
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PROCEDURES FOR FILING SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS
CLASSIFIED AND MANAGEMENT SERVICE EMPLOYEES
Informal Complaints
Classified and management service employees withconcerns, problems, and
complaints concerning sexual harassment must contact theDirector of
Affirmative Action immediatelY.The Affirmative Action Director will
request a written report (on an OSU form) from the employee settingforth
the allegations of sexual harassment.The Affirmative Action Director,
after consultation with the aggrieved employee, willinvestigate the mat-
ter thoroughly, maintaining confidentiality if at all possible.A sin-
cere effort will be made to settle the allegation informally by talking
to the people directly involved, talking with the supervisors/employers/
Deans or Department Heads of the people involved, andany others who may
have knowledge of the incident(s).Following this intensive investiga-
tion, the Affirmative Action Director will makea decision regarding
whether or not sexual harassment has occurred andsuggest or implement
a settlement of the allegation.The Affirmative Action Director will
consult the President and the Legal Counsel to thePresident.
Formal Complaints
Formal grievance procedures for classified personnel incollective bar-
gaining units are included in the State Executive Department'sagree-
ments with the exclusive bargaining representatives.University classi-
fied employees who are members of the Oregon PublicEmployees Union
bargaining unit are to file sexual harassment grievancesunder provisions
of Article 22 of the State of Oregon/OPEU agreement, whichprovides that
such grievances will be submitted directly to the Presidentor his designee,
and that unresolved grievances may be later submitted forresolution either
to the Bureau of Labor and Industries or to binding arbitration. Employ-
ees represented by the Graphic Arts International unionare to file
sexual harassment grievances under Article 6 of the State ofOregon /GAIU
agreement, which provides that such grievances will be submittedto the
President, and that unresolved grievances may be submitted forresolu-
tion to the Bureau of Labor and Industries.For employees represented
by both OPEU and GAIU, the President has designatedthe Affirmative
Action Director to receive and investigate sexualharassment grievances.
The University has adopted a grievance procedure formanagement service
employees which may be used in pursuing sexual harassmentgrievances
through successive consideration at different administrativelevels, ul-
timately to the President, and eventually to the CivilRights Division
of the State Bureau of Labor and Industries.Management service person-
nel are encouraged to begin their processing of suchgrievances by con-
tacting the Affirmative Action Director for help.150
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Discrimination Complaints
In addition to rights and privileges for review undergrievance systems
and under pertinent State and Federal laws, the Universityhas established
the Equal Employment Opportunity Boardas a review procedure for com-
plaints involving discrimination or other violationsof the University's
Equal Employment Opportunity Policy.Resolution at the University level
is encouraged prior to the use of external appealsprocedures.
Informal review through administrative channelsto the President is the
first phase of such complaints.
Formal Complaint Procedures Involve:
1.A written complaint investigated and consideredin
accordance with a prescribed timetable by successive-
ly higher departmental and administrativelevels up
to, and including, the President.
2.Formal hearings by the University's Equal Employment
Opportunity Board.
Collective Bargaining
All classified employees are members of officiallyrecognized collective
bargaining units.Members of the units are covered by provisionsof
labor contracts agreed to by the State of Oregon andthe elected employee
organizations. Employees are entitled to representation by theseorgan-
izations in matters pertaining to their employmentat the University.
Currently, Oregon Public Employes Union Local 503,SEIU, AFL-CIO,'CLC is
the approved collective bargaining representativefor most classified
employees at Oregon State University.A small number of Printing Depart-
ment employees are represented by the Graphic ArtsInternational Union.
Current agreements have been signed by the State ExecutiveDepartment and
these unions for statewide application.151
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PROCEDURES FOR FILING SEXUAL HARASSMENT COMPLAINTS
STUDENTS
Student grievance procedures for sexual harassmentare the same as for
any other segment of the University.These are outlined in detail in
the 1980 Affirmative Action Plan.Student victims also have three avenues
of legal recourse under Title IX:
1. Institutional grievance procedures;
2. Appeal to Federal enforcementagencies; and
3. Lawsuit alleging prohibited discrimination.
Students are not limited to these three optionsunless they elect to pur-
sue their claims under Title IX.Further, students may elect to simul-
taneously pursue multiple avenues of recourse.1
The grievance procedures, briefly,are as follows:
Informal Complaints
Any student who considers herself/himselfa victim of sexual harassment
should contact the Affirmative Action Officerimmediately (AdS A600,
phone 754-3556.)The Affirmative Action Officer willrequest a written
report (on an OSU form) from the student settingforth the allegations of
sexual harassment.The Affirmative Action Officer, afterconsultation
with the student, will investigate thematter thoroughly, maintaining con-
fidentiality if at all possible.A sincere effort will be made to settle
the allegation informally by talking to the peopledirectly involved and
any others who may have knowledge of the incident(s).Following this
intensive investigation, the Affirmative ActionOfficer will make a de-
cision regarding whether or not sexual harassmenthas occurred and sug-
gest or implement a settlement of the allegation.The Affirmative Action
Officer will consult with the President and theLegal Counsel to the
President
Formal Complaints
If a satisfactory resolution to the grievancecannot be reached through
the above informal procedures, a formal complaintshould be filed with
the University Hearing Officer, Dr. Forrest Gathercoal,Education Hall
419A, telephone 754-3648.The Affirmative Action Officer will aid the
student in filing the formal complaint.Copies of the complaint will be
sent to the President of the University, the Chancellorof the State
System of Higher Education, the individuals involved,and the department
head.
'Material re Title IX taken fromMiranda Associates, Inc., Participants'
Notebook for Workshop entitled "SexualHarassment: It's Not Academic,"
page 63.152
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An investigation of the complaint will be completed within 30 days.As a
result of the investigation, the Hearing Officer will make findings of
fact and a recommendation for the resolution of the grievanceto the af-
fected parties and to the President.The President will make a decision.
If satisfaction is not received from this investigation and decision,the
aggrieved student may appeal the decision to the Chancellor ofthe State
System of Higher Education.The Chancellor may choose to hold an open
hearing to resolve the complaint or may choose to not holda hearing and
resolve the complaint in some other manner.153
HOW TO FILE A COMPLAINT
Visit the Affirmative Action Office immediately.As soon as you believe
there is an incident of sexual harassment you should inform the Director
of Affirmative Action.
The Oregon State University Complaint Form must be used.The following
information must be included:
1. Name of Complainant
2. Addresses--campus and home
3. Telephone number(s)
4. Succinct statement of the facts with appropriate
dates and times
5. Names of any witnesses
6. Statement of your actions154
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Reporting Office:
Affirmative Action
Academic Department
Student Services
Women's Center
Other
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
REPORT OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Date
Name of Person Reporting Incident
Address:Campus Phone
Home Phone
faculty; staff; student; Other (specify)
Name of Complainant
Address:Campus
Home
Phone
Phone
faculty; staff; student; Other (specify)
Location of Incident:
Classroom Office Living Group Dining Halls/Commons Campus
Grounds Other
Nature of Incident (e.g., what happened, what did the person say, how
often did this happen, effect of incident upon person, reactions and
responses.)Use other side or additional pages as needed.155
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EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
GUIDELINES ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1604.11Sexual Harassment.
a.)Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of
Title VII.*Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual
harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly
or implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, (2) sub-
mission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3) such
conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or of-
fensive working environment.
b.)In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harass-
ment, the Commission will look at the records as a whole and the totality
of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the
context in which the alleged incidents occurred.The determination of the
legality of a particular action will be made from the facts on a case by
case basis.
c.)Applying general Title VII principles, an employer, employment
agency, joint apprenticeship committee or labor organization (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "employer") is responsible for its acts and
those of its agents and supervisory employees with respect to sexual
harassment regardless of whether the specific acts complained of were
authorized or even forbidden by the employer and regardless of whether
the employer knew or should have known of their occurrence.The Commission
will examine the circumstances of the particular employment relationship
and the job functions performed by the individual in determining whether
an individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity.
d.)With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer
is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where the
employer, its agents or supervisory employees, knows or should have known
of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and appropriate
corrective action.
e.)An employer may also be responsible for the acts of non-employees,
with respectto sexual harassment of employees in the workplace, where
the employer, its agents or supervisory employees, knows or should have
known ofthe conduct and fails to take immediate and appropriate correc-
tive action.In reviewing these cases the Commission will consider the ex-
tent of the employer's control and other legal responsibility which the em-
ployer may have with respect to the conduct of such non-employees.
The principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion
or national origin.156
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f.)Prevention is the best tool for theelimination of sexual harass- ment.An employer should take allsteps necessary to prevent sexualharass- ment from occurring, such as affirmativelyraising the subject, expressing
strong disapproval, developingappropriate sanctions, informingemployees of their right to raise andhow to raise the issue of harassmentunder Title VII, and developing methodsto sensitize all concerned.
g.)Other related practices.Where employment opportunitiesor bene- fits are granted because ofan individual's submission to the employer's
sexual advances or requests forsexual favors, the employermay be held liable for unlawful sexdiscrimination against otherpersons who were qual- ified for but denied theemployment opportunity or benefit.
These sexual harassment guidelinesare one section of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's SexDiscrimination Guidelines, whichare codified as 29 CFR 1604.157
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COPY
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE OF OREGON SEAL
EXECUTIVE ORDER EO 81 7
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The State of Oregon through its public policy is dedicated toa
work environment free from discrimination based onrace, religion,
national origin, age, sex, marital status ora physical or mental
handicap.
Personnel policy, practices, and law requires working conditions to
be conducive to the performance of duties in an atmosphere free from dis-
crimination, intimidation or coercion in any form.
Sexual harassment, a form of sex discrimination, is an unacceptable
and unlawful practice for which legal remedies are available under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and ORS 659.030.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, sexual harassment is de-
fined as any sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
1.Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or impli-
citly a term or condition of an individual's employment;
2.Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is
used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individuals;
Or
3.Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantially inter-
fering. with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or offensive working environment.
IT IS ORDERED AND DIRECTED THAT:
1.The Executive Department develop and disseminate personnel policy
prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace;
2.State agencies disseminate such policy to all state employees;
3.The Executive Department develop training and educational
programs for the purpose of assisting agencies to eliminate any sexual
harassment in state government service;
4.State agencies inform their employees of the internal complaint
process.-16-
EC/ -81 -7
158
5.State agencies inform their employees that sexual harassment
complaints will be received by the Governor's Affirmative Action Office,
Bureau of Labor-Civil Rights Division or EEOC.
6.The Governor's Affirmative Action Office be available to counsel
complainants on their more appropriate procedures and remedies (160 State
Capitol, Salem, telephone 378-6868); and
7.This order takes effect immediately.
Done at Salem, Oregon, this 23rd day of September, 1981.
IS/ V. Atiyeh
Governor
SEAL ATTEST:
/S/ Norma Paulus159
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OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY
PURPOSE:The purpose of this policy is toset forth Oregon State
University's commitment to maintaininga University
environment free from sexual harassment.The University
realizes its moral and legal obligationsto ensure that
all employees and studentsare provided a discrimination
free environment to realize theirgoals and to function
effectively at the University.
POLICY: In accordance with federal and statelaws
University prohibits discriminationon the
color,national origin,religion,sex,
status, disability, or veteran status.In
University prohibits discriminationon
sexual orientation.
Sexual harassment is
is prohibited.
,Oregon State
basis of race,
age,marital
addition, the
the basis of
one form of sex discrimination that
Any person who believes that heor she has been sexually
harassed at the Universitymay file either a formal or
informal complaint in the AffirmativeAction Office.
Confidentiality will be maintained tothe fullest extent
permitted.
DEFINITION:
1.
2.
Sexual harassment is definedas:Unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors,and other
verbal or physical conduct ofa sexual nature when:
Submissiontosuchconductismadeeither
explicitly or implicitly a termor condition of an
individual's employment or education;
Submission to or rejection of suchconduct by
individual is used as the basisfor employment
education-relateddecisionsaffectingsuch
individual, or;
an
or
an
3. Suchconducthasthepurposeoreffectof
unreasonably interfering withan individual's work or academic performance or creating an
intimidating,hostile,oroffensive workingor
learning environment.161
CONSENSUAL RELATIONSHIPS
OregonStateUniversitypolicyrequiresthatall
employees conduct themselves ina professional manner. Withregardtoconsensualsexualorromantic relationships, it should benoted that when they occur betweenteacherandstudent,orsupervisorand supervisee, there is aconcern that they may involve an
abuse of power.Even when negativeconsequences to the participantsdo notresult,such romanticliaisons potentially can createa conflict of interest oruse of academic or supervisory leverageto maintain or promote the relationship.Another area of potential troubleor liability involves perceptionsof a "third-party" whomay feel that the only way tosucceed is to engage ina
sexual liaison because they feelthey have lost equality
in terms of assignments,promotions, etc.
All employees should recognizethe possible negative
consequences of sexualor romantic liaisonsin the workplace and academicprogram.162
HARASSMENT-FREE ENVIRONMENT
To maintain an environment free fromsexual harassment is very
important.To provide this environment, thefollowing actions should be taken:
1. Deans, directors, department heads andsupervisors
should inform all employees thatsexual harassment
is prohibited.
2. The Sexual Harassment Policy shouldbe emphasized
by the deans in school meetingsand explained by
departmental chairstoacademicstaff,and
classifiedandmanagementserviceemployees. Directorsshoulddiscusstheissueinstaff
meetings.Those who have questions,concerns, or
feel victimized by sexual harassmentshould be
referredtotheAffirmativeActionoffice
immediately.
3.The pamphlets, Sticks and StonesCan Break My Bones
but Words Can Never Hurt Me,and Understanding
Sexual Harassment,as wellasany other such
materials for display provided bythe Affirmative
Action office, should be widelydisseminated and
displayed in every department, schooland college
office.
4.All head residents and residentadvisors should
display the posters, distributethe pamphlets, and
discuss the rules with residents intheir living
groups.
5. Deans, department chairs, directors, headresidents andresident advisors should beencouragedto
invite the director of AffirmativeAction to talk
to their staffs concerning thisvery important
issue.
6. Information regarding sexual harassmentspecifically
for students is contained within thestudent code of
conduct (Fall Schedule of Classes).163
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION OFFICE
COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
BASIS: Sexual Harassment
INFORMAL
DEFINITION: The process of gathering information to either
establish a suspicion of sexual harassment or
to attempt to resolve a disagreement
without following a formal complaint procedure.
WHO MAY FILE:Students, employees, applicants for employment, and
others, where appropriate.
PROCEDURE:1. Thecomplainantcompletesthe"Complaintof
Discrimination or Harassment" form; the AAO advises
the complainant of her/his rights to file with
state and/or federal agencies.
2. The AAO may notify the appropriate administrator,
dean, or director that an informal complaint has
been initiated.
3. The AAO contacts the individual/entity (respondent)
accused of sexual harassment to discuss the alleged
harmful act.
4. TheAAOdevelopsaproposedresolution,if
appropriate within fifteen (15)calendar days of
acceptance oftheinformalcomplaint. If
appropriate, the complainant is advised that she/he
may file a formal complaint.
5.The AAO may notify the appropriate administrator,
dean,or directorof thefinalstatusof the
complaint.
FORMAL
DEFINITION: The process of investigating a case of alleged
sexual harassment and making a determination as to
whether or not sexual harassment occurred and,
where appropriate, providing a resolution to the
complaint.164
WHO MAY FILE:Students and Student employees
(undergraduate and graduate)
APPLICABLE BOARD RULE,Division 15Students may appeal a
decision to the Chancellor's Office in a written
format within two weeks of the determination.
PROCEDURES:1.Thecomplainantcompletesthe"Complaintof
Discrimination or Harassment" form.The complaint
must be filed within365 days of the alleged
harmful act.
2.The AAO acknowledges in writing the receipt of the
formal complaint; the letter includes information
on the complainant's right to file with state
and/or federal agencies.Copies of the letter are
sent to the respondent, the appropriate
administrator, dean, or director, the University
legal advisor, and the Chancellor of the Oregon
State System of Higher Education.
3.AAO shall conduct a thorough investigation of the
complaint.
4.Within thirty (30) calendar days of the receipt of
theformalcomplaint,AAOshallinformthe
complainant and all persons who were copied in #2
above, of the final status and a resolution, where
appropriate.The 30-day period may be extended for
an additional 30 days with the approval of the
Chancellor.The letter of determination identifies
theavailableappealprocedures for the
complainant.
WHO MAY FILE:Classified and management service employees, and
applicants for employment.
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT,
Article 22 (NOT RELEVANT FOR APPLICANTS)
PROCEDURES:1.Thecomplainantcompletesthe"Complaintof
Discrimination or Harassment" form.The complaint
must befiled within180days ofthe alleged
harmful act.
2.The AAO acknowledges in writing the receipt of the
formal complaint; the letter includes information
on the complainant's right to file with the Union
(forclassifiedemployees),and/orstateand
federal agencies.Copies of the letter are sent to165
respondent, the appropriate administrator, dean, or
director, the University legal advisor,and the
director of the Department of Human Resources.
3.AAOconductsathoroughinvestigationofthe
complaint.
4.Within fifteen (15) calendar days of the receipt of
the formal complaint, AAO informs the complainant
and all persons copied in #2 above of the final
status and a resolution, where appropriate.If an
extension of the 15-day time period is required,
AAO shall notify the complainant of the anticipated
date ofcompletion of the investigation. The
letterofdeterminationidentifiestheappeal
procedures available to the complainant.
5.A classified employee has the right to file a
grievancethroughtheUnionallegingsexual
harassment without filing a Report of
Discrimination/Harassment with AAO. Such a grievance
will be submitted within 30 days of the date the
grievant or the Union knows,or by reasonable
diligence,shouldhaveknownofthealleged
grievance,directlytothePresidentorhis
designee. The President or his designee will respond
within 15 calendar days after the receipt of the
grievance. Assistance in the investigation of
the alleged grievance may be provided by AAO and the
Department of Human Resources.
WHO MAY FILE:Applicants for Academic Staff Positions
APPLICABLE BOARD RULE, Division 21
PROCEDURE: 1.Thecomplainantcompletesthe"Complaintof
Discrimination or Harassment" form.The complaint
must be filed within 180daysofthe alleged
harmful act.
2.The AAO acknowledges in writing the receipt of the
formal complaint; the letter includes information
on the complainant's right tofile with state
and/or federal agencies.Copies of the letter are
sent to the respondent, the appropriate
administrator, dean, ordirector, andthe
University legal advisor.
3.AAOconductsathoroughinvestigationofthe
complaint.
4.Within twenty (20) calendar days of the receipt of166
theformalcomplaint,theAAOinformsthe
complainant,and all persons copied in #2 above,
ofthefinalstatusandaresolution,where
appropriate.If an extension of the 20-day time
periodisrequired,the AAO willnotify the
complainant in writing of the anticipated date of
completion. The letter of determination states the
appeal procedure available to the complainant.
WHO MAY FILE:Faculty employees (instructor, senior instructor,
faculty research assistant, research associate,
assistant professor, associate professor, professor,
no rank).
Initiation of Formal Procedures, 576-50-025
1. If a grievance is not resolved to the satisfaction
of the grievant at the informal stage, or if the
grievant chooses to bypass the informal stage, the
grievant may file a formal written grievance.A
grievance shall be filed with the dean, director,
or the appropriate administrator in charge of the
administrative unit, except a) where the grievant
is a department chair in which case the grievance
shall be filed with the Provost and Executive Vice
President, or b) where the grievant alleges sexual
harassment against the person in charge of the
administrative unit, in which case the grievance
shall be filed with the next higher administrator.
The grievant shall file a copy of the written
grievance with the Legal Advisor in the Office of
the President.The formal grievance must be filed
within sixty(60)days of the time the faculty
member knew or by reasonable diligence should have
known,oftheactswhichgaverisetothe
grievance.Therefore, discussion or mediation at
the informal stage should be initiated as soon as
possible.The University shall extend the sixty-
day filing requirement if the grievant is pursuing
thecomplaint at the informal level and it appears
that additionaltime would bebeneficialin
resolvingthegrievance. Extensionbythe
UniversityshallbeinwritingbytheLegal
Advisor.
2.The written grievance must contain the grievant's
name and address, the date and nature of the act or
omission which gave rise to the grievance,any
rule, policy or procedures alleged to have been
violated or misapplied, and the remedy requested by
the grievant.167
3. Thedean,director,administrator, orthe
respective designee shall send a written decision
to the grievant within twenty (20) days of receipt
of the grievance.
Appeal to the Faculty Grievance Committee, 576-50-030
1. Ifthedecisionofthedean,director,or
administrator is not satisfactory to the grievant,
the grievant may file a written appeal with the
Faculty Grievance Committee within ten (10) days of
receipt of the written decision, stating why the
response at the previous level is deficient.This
step is optional with the grievant.The grievant
may bypass thecommittee andfiletheappeal
directly with the President.
2. (a)The committee shall send to the grievant a
written notice of the time and place of the hearing
at least seven (7) days prior to the hearing.
(b) At the committee hearing, the faculty member
shall present his or her case first, followed by
the person or persons who are the object of the
grievance.Thereafter, the faculty member shall
have an opportunity to respond.
(c)Each party shall have a right to call and
examine witnesses, to introduce exhibits or other
documents.Themembersofthecommitteemay
questionany witnessand maycalladditional
witnesses.
(d)If the grievant so chooses, he or she may be
accompanied or represented at the hearing by any
other person.
(e) Either party may provide for and obtain a sound
recording of the hearing.
(f) The hearing shall be open to the public at the
option of the grievant to the extent allowed by
law.However,deliberationsoftheHearing
Committee shall not be open to the public or the
parties.
Decision by the Committee and Appeal to the President, 576-50-035
(1)The committee's decision shall be made in the form
of a written recommendation to the President.It
shall be based upon evidence presented at the
hearing. Therecommendationshallincludea
description of the complaint,the evidence the
committeecollected,anditsconclusionsand
recommendations for disposition of the case.The
recommendations shall be sent to the grievant, to168
the President,andtothedean,director,or
administrator in charge of the unit out of which
the grievance arose within sixty(60)days of
receipt of the appeal to the committee.
(2)The President or his or her designee shall review
the decision of the committee and the President
shall deliver a written decision to the grievant,
tothe GrievanceCommittee,and tothedean,
director, or administrator in charge of the unit
out of which the grievance arose within thirty (30)
days of receipt of the committee recommendation.
Prior to issuing a decision,the President or
designee may interview any person concerning the
grievance to supplement the record whether or not
the person testified at the hearing, provided that
the decision shall list each person so interviewed.
In addition, the President or designee may review
any document,provided that the decision shall
identifyanysuchdocumentsthatwerenot
introduced at the committee hearing.The grievant
shall be informed of any additional information
obtained by the President and given seven (7) days
to respond.If the President rejects or modifies
the recommendations of the committee, the reasons
shall be stated in the decision.
(3)If the grievant chooses to appeal the decision of
the dean, director, or administrator directly to
the President,the Presidentshall proceed to
review the matter and reach a decision as set out
in576-50-035(2)providedthatallpersons
interviewed and all documents reviewed must be
identified in the decision.The President shall
issue a decision within thirty (30) days of receipt
of the grievant's appeal.
Appeal to the State Board, 576-50-040
If the decision of the President is not satisfac-
tory to the grievant, the grievant may appeal to
the State Board of Higher Education within ten (10)
days of receipt of the President's decision in
accordance with OAR 580-21-050.
Effects of Time Limits, 576-50-045
If the University fails to respond within the time
limits at any step in this grievance process, the
grievant may appeal to the next step.169
Non-Retaliation, 576-50-050
An individual filing a grievance in good faithor
otherwise participating inanyof theactions
authorized under these grievance rules shall notbe
subject to retaliatory action ofany kind by any
employee of the University, the Oregon State System
of Higher Education, or the State Board of Higher
Education.
Two-Year Review, 576-50-055
Not later than two years from the adoption of these
rules, the Provost and Faculty Senate Executive
Committee shall jointly appoint a faculty committee
to review the effectivenessofthis grievance
procedure and to recommend any changes.
APPLICABLE BOARD RULE, DIVISION 21
SANCTIONS
ACADEMIC EMPLOYEES
Academic employees found to have engaged in sexualharassment may
be subject to an oral or written warning or reprimand inaccordance
with OAR 580-21-320. Sanctions more severe thanan oral or written
warning or reprimand, such as removal froman assigned post and
reassignment,suspension or termination shall be imposedin
accordance with OAR 580-21-325 through 580-21-385.
CLASSIFIED AND MANAGEMENT SERVICE EMPLOYEES
Classified employees found to have engaged in sexualharassment may
be subject to disciplinary action in accordance withcurrent
collective bargaining agreements.If a proven incident of sexual
harassment occurs,sanctionsinaccord with the progressive
disciplineconceptshallbeinstituted,includingwritten
reprimand, suspension, reductions of pay, demotion, andfinally,
termination of service.
Management service employees found to have engaged in sexual
harassment may be subject to disciplinary action in accordance with
provisionsoftheUniversityPolicyAgainstDiscriminatory
Harassment,including possible written reprimand,suspension,
reduction of pay, demotion or dismissal.
STUDENTS
Students found to have engaged in sexual harassmentmay be subject
to sanctions under the Student Conduct Code, OAR 576-15-030.These
sanctions may include a warning, required educational activities,
restrictions, disciplinary probation, suspension and/or expulsion.170
COMPLAINT OF DISCRIMINATION OR HARASSMENT
Affirmative Action Office
Oregon State University
Adm. Serv. A526 phone 737-3556
Date:
Name: Signature
Dept.or Address Phone
Faculty ; Staff ; Student ; Other(Specify)
I.NAME OF PERSON OR GROUP THE COMPLAINT IS AGAINST:
2.Dept. or Address Phone
3.Faculty _; Staff ;Student ;Other (Specify)
4.DATE AND TIME:
5.PLACE:
6.WITNESSES:
7.WHAT HAPPENED:
NOTE:Please use back of form if additional space is needed.
8.Basis of Complaint: Race ; Color ; Religion ; Sex ; Age ;
Sexual Orientation ; National Origin ; Marital Status ;
Disability _; Veteran Status ; Retaliation _; Sexual Harassment ;
Other
9.Type of Complaint:Informal Formal
10.What would you like to see happen (for you, for others) with respect to the
alleged incident(s) of harassment or discrimination?
Person Accepting Report: Date:171
LEGISLATION AND POLICIES PERTAINING TO SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Sec 703
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681,
et seq.)
Department of Education (34 C.F.R. Part 106)
Department of Energy (10 C.F.R. Part 1040)
Department of Agriculture (7 C.F.R. Part 15a)
Executive Order EO - 81 7 State of Oregon, 1981
OAR 58021 - 310 to 580 - 21 - 470
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex (29 C.F.R. Part 1604.11 (a)
November 10, 1980)
Oregon State University Policy Against Discriminatory Harassment
September 1992
Oregon State University Student Conduct Code, OAR 576172
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1604.11 Sexual Harassment.
a.)Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703
of Title VIII.Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature
constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission to such conduct is
made either explicitly or implicitly a term or conditions ofan
individual's employment,(2)submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment
decisions affecting such individual, or (3) suchconduct has the
purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
b.)In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual
harassment, the Commission will look at the records as a whole and
the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual
advances and the context in which the alleged incidents occurred.
The determination of the legality of a particular action will be
made from the facts on a case by case basis.
c.)Applying general Title VII principles,an employer,
employmentagency,jointapprenticeshipcommitteeorlabor
organization (hereinafter collectively referred to as "employer")
is responsible for its acts and those of its agents and supervisory
employees with respect to sexual harassment regardless of whether
the specific acts complained of were authorized or even forbidden
by the employer and regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known of their occurrence.The Commission will examine
the circumstances of the particular employment relationship and the
job functions performed by the individual in determining whetheran
individual acts in either a supervisory or agency capacity.
d.)With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an
employer is responsible for acts of sexual harassment in the work
place where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees).
knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can be shown
that it took immediate and appropriate corrective action.173
e.)An employer may also beresponsible for the actsof non- employees, with respect tosexual harassment of employeesin the workplace,where the employer(orits agentsor supervisory employees) knows or should haveknown of the conduct and failsto take immediate and appropriatecorrective action.In reviewing,' these cases,the Commission will considerthe extent of the employer's control andany other legal responsibilitywhich the employer may have withrespect to the conduct ofsuch non- employees.
f.)Prevention is the best toolfor the elimination ofsexual harassment. An employer should takeall steps necessary toprevent sexual harassment from occurring,such as affirmatively raisingthe subject,expressing strong disapproval,developing appropriate sanctions, informing employeesof their right to raiseand how to raise the issue of harassmentunder Title VII, and developing methods to sensitize allconcerned.
g.)Other Related Principles:Where employment opportunities or benefits are granted becauseof an individual's submissionto the employer's sexualadvances or requests forsexual favors, the employer may be held liablefor unlawful sex discriminationagainst other persons who were qualifiedfor but denied thatemployment opportunity or benefit.
These sexual harassmentguidelines are one sectionof the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission'sSex Discrimination Guidelines, which are codifiedas 29 C.F.R. 1604
'The principles involvedhere continue to applyto race, color, religion or national origin.174
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
STATE OF OREGON
EXECUTIVE ORDER EO81- 7
SEXUAL HARASSMENT
The State of Oregon through its public policy is dedicated to
aworkenvironmentfreefrom discrimination basedonrace,
religion, national origin, age, sex, marital status or a physical
or mental handicap.
Personnelpolicies,practices,andlawsrequire working
conditions to be conducive to the performance of duties inan
atmosphere free from discrimination, intimidation or coercion in
any form.
Sexual harassment,aform of sex discrimination,is an
unacceptable and unlawful practice for which legal remedies are
available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and ORS
659.030.
For the purpose of this Executive Order, sexual harassment is
defined as any sexual advances, requests for sexual favors and
other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature when:
1.Submission to such conduct is made, either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition
of an individual's employment;
2. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by
anindividualisusedasthebasisfor
employment decisions affecting such
individuals; or
3.Such conduct has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with an individual's
work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.
IT IS ORDERED AND DIRECTED THAT;
I. The Executive Department develop and
disseminatepersonnelpolicyprohibiting
sexual harassment in the workplace;
2. State agencies disseminate such policy to all
state employees;175
3. The Executive Department develop training and
educationalprogramsforthepurposeof
assisting agencies to eliminate any sexual
harassment in state government service;
4.State agencies inform their employees of the
internal complaint process;
5.State agencies inform their employees that
sexual harassment complaints will be received
by the Governor's Affirmative Action Office,
Bureau of Labor-Civil Rights Division,or
EEOC.
6.The Governor's Affirmative Action Office be
available tocounselcomplainants on more
appropriate procedures and remedies (160 State
Capitol, Salem, telephone 378-5336); and
7. This order takes effect immediately.
Done at Salem, Oregon, this 23rd day of September,1981
/S/ V. Atiyeh
Governor
ATTEST:
/S/ Norma Paulus176
STAFF NEWSLETTER
Pearl S. Gray
Affirmative Action
may 10, 1982
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IS ILLEGAL, UNACCEPTABLE CONDUCT AND IS PROHIBITED AT
OREGON STATE UNIVERSITY.ALL COMPLAINTS WILL BE THOROUGHLY INVESTIGATED.
Sexual harassment has been defined in several ways by the American
Association of Colleges Project on the Status and Education of Women to
include actions such as verbal harassment or abuse; subtle pressure for
sexual activity; sexist remarks about a person'sclothing, body or sexual
activities; unnecessary physical contact; and soliciting sexual favors
accompanied by implied or overt threats.Any individual who uses his or
her power or position to extort sexual gratification or to verbally degrade
a person in a subordinate position and, but for that person's sex would
not have done so, has sexually harassed the subordinate.
With respect to employment, sexual harassment has been deemed a
violation of Section 703 of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.Unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a requirement of
an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct
by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such
individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile or offensive working environment.
In matters relating to non-employment such as academic and student
affairs activities, the same principle on non-coercion and not using status
or authority to exact sexual favors is equally prohibited.
Maintenance of an environment free from sexual harassment isvery
important.To provide this environment, the following proceduresare advised:
1. All Deans, Directors, Department Heads and supervisorsmust
inform all employees that sexual harassment is prohibited behavior.
2. It should be emphasized by the Deans and explainedto the faculty
and students that those who feel victimized by sexual harassment
should be referred to the Affirmative Action Office.
3. The poster "It's Against the Law" must be widely disseminated
and displayed in every Departmental and Schoolor College office.
Also, a copy of the poster and the official memorandum ofthe177
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President must be posted in every Dean's office, in the office of
every Department and in every Director's office.
4. The Dean is to discuss this memorandum and the poster withevery
Department Head, who is to discuss it with faculty.
Any individual, whether faculty, staff or student, who feels that he/she
is the victim of sexual harassment should report the situation to the Univer-
sity Affirmative Action Officer immediately.All allegations are to be made
in writing and will be investigated.Every attempt will be made to maintain
confidentiality.
Sexual harassment is much more prevalent than most people realize.It is
a serious offense in that it violates the basic civil rights of the victim
and robs that person of dignity.178
COPY FOR STUDENT HANDBOOK
PEARL S. GRAY
May 11, 1982
X.STATEMENT ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Sexual harassment is illegal, unacceptable conduct and isprohibited
at Oregon State University.All complaints will be thoroughly investigated.
Any student who perceives she/he has been subjectedto sexual harassment
should contact the Director of Affirmative Action immediately,Administrative
Services Building A600, telephone 754-3556.
Sexual harassment includes such actionsas verbal harassment or abuse;
subtle pressure for sexual activity; sexual remarks abouta person's clothing,
body or sexual activities; unnecessary physicalcontact; and soliciting sexual
favors accompanied by implied or overt threats.Any person who uses his or
her power or position to extort sexual gratificationor to verbally degrade
a person in a subordinate position and, but for that person'ssex would not
have done so, has sexually harassed the subordinate.
To establish an environment free of sexual harassment, theUniversity has
implemented the following procedures and policies:
1.All faculty, staff, and management service employees havebeen
advised that sexual harassment is prohibited behavior underState Board
of Higher Education Administrative Rules and under OregonState University
policies and procedures.This applies to both educational programs and to
student employment.
2.Confidentiality for victims and alleged respondents is provided
to the extent possible.
3.Prompt action is taken by the Director of Affirmative Actionon
initiating an investigation, and, if pertinent, remedial actionwhen a complaint
is made.
4.Grievance procedures relating to sexual harassmentare published179
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and available in the AffirmativeAction Office or in the officeof any Dean
or Director on campus.Briefly, proceduresare as follows:
Procedures for Complaints of SexualHarassment
1.A student who perceives he/shehas been subjected to sexualharass-
ment should contact the AffirmativeAction Office immediately,Administrative
Services Building A600, telephone754-3556.
2.Informal Complaint.The student will be requiredto complete a
written report on an OSU formsetting forth the allegationsof sexual
harassment.The Affirmative Action Officer,after consulting with thestudent,
will investigate thematter thoroughly, maintainingconfidentiality if at all
possible.A sincere effort will be madeto settle the allegation informally
by talking to the peopledirectly involved,supervisors/employers/Deansor
Department Heads of the peopleinvolved and any others whomay have knowledge
of the incident(s).Following this intensiveinvestigation, the Affirmative
Action Officer will makea decision regarding whetheror not sexual harassment
has occurred and suggestor implement a settlement of theallegation.The
President and the Legal Counselof the University will beconsulted.
3.Formal Complaint.A formal complaint/grievanceis filed with the
University Hearings Officer, Dr.Forrest Gathercoal, EducationHall 419A,
telephone 754-3648.
Copies of your complaint/grievancewill be sent to the Presidentof the
University, the Chancellor of theState System of Higher Education,the in-
dividuals involved, andany appropriate agency or departmenthead.
An investigation of your complaintwill be completed within 30days.
As a result of the investigation,the Hearings Officer willmake findings
of fact and a recommendationfor the resolution of thegrievance to the affected
parties and to the President.The President will make thedecision.180
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If the President's decision is not acceptable, the complaintmay be
appealed to the Chancellor of the State System of Higher Education.
The Chancellor may choose to hold an open hearing to resolve the complaint
or not hold a hearing and resolve the complaint in some other manner.
Remember
No individual filing a complaint or otherwise participating inany
of the actions will be subject to reprimand or retaliatory action.181
POLICY NO. 830-89
RICE UNIVERSITY
SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICY
Rice University is committedto providing an environment that is free from sexualharass- ment.
The determination of what constitutessexual harassment will vary with theparticular cir- cumstances, but it may be describedas unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexualfavors, and other verbal or physical behaviorof a sexual nature where:
(1) Submission to such conduct is madeeither explicitly or implicitlya
term or condition of the individual's educationor employment;
(2) Submission to or rejection of suchconduct by an individual is used
as the basis for academic or employment decisionsaffecting the individual; or
(3) Such conduct has thepurpose or effect of substantially interfering
with an individual's academicor work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or demeaning educationalor working environment.
Any person at Rice University whobelieves that he or she has been the victimof sexual harassment is strongly encouragedto bring the matter to the attention ofa designated official, with assurance that confidentiality and impartiality willbe maintained.
COUNSELLING, ADVICE ANDINFORMAL RESOLUTION
Problems, questions and grievances shouldnormally be brought to the attention ofthe Di- rector of Equal Employment OpportunityPrograms (EEOP). Studentsmay, however, if they wish, consult with their CollegeMaster or the Director of Student Advisingand Activities or the Director of Graduate Programs.Throughout this advising process, informationwill be held in confidence unless and until the initiatingindividual agrees that additional peoplemust be informed to facilitate a solution_ Noperson will be reprimanded or discriminated against inany way for ini- tiating an inquiry or complaint in goodfaith. It is also the policy toprotect the rights of any person against whom a complaint is lodgedand, when appropriate, thisperson shall be notified_ Prompt
reporting is strongly urged, as it is oftendifficult to verify the facts ofan incident long after it has occurred.
FORMAL COMPLAINT PROCEDURES
Those wishing to bring a formal complaintof sexual harassment shouldso inform the Di- rector of E.E.O.P. who will inform the respondent,conduct an inquiry and preparea report sum- marizing the relevant evidence. A draftof the report will be providedto the complainant and to the2
respondent to enable themto respond before a final report ismade to the appropriateadministrative official(s). At any time aftera complaint is made, but prior to formaldisposition, the complainant or the respondent may request that theDirector of E.E.O.P. referthe matter to a Panel which will be appointed by the Presidentas follows:
Panel of Inquiry
At the beginning of each academicyear a pool of faculty, staff and studentswill be created on the basis of nominations from theStudent Association, the GraduateStudent Association, the Person- nel Office and the Faculty Council.Each panel will comprisea chair plus four members, two male and two female, to be drawnfrom the pool as follows:
1.When both parties inan alleged incident are students, thepanel will comprise a faculty chair plustwo faculty and two student members.
2.When both parties are membersof the faculty, the panel willbe made up of faculty members.
3.When both partiesare members of staff, the panel will bemade up of members of staff.
4.When the parties are fromdifferent constituencies, the panelwill have a faculty chair plus two membersfrom each of thesetwo constituencies.
The chair will normally benon-voting but will cast the tie-breaking vote when necessary.
The reports from the Directorof E.E.O.P. and from thePanel will be submittedto the ap- propriate administrator for finalresolution. Specifically incase (1) above they will be forwardedto the Vice President for StudentAffairs, in case (2) to theProvost, and in case (3) to theVice Presi- dent for Finance and Administration.In all other cases, thereports will be forwarded to thetwo appropriate administrators.
Any disciplinary actionsubsequently taken will be consistentwith University policies, and may range from a warning to dismissaldepending upon the circumstances.Furthermore, persons who engage in sexual harassmentmay be subject to prosecution and criminalor civil liability.
Georgi..i{President
1981
Revised:February 17, 1989
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POLICY NO. 830-92
RICE UNIVERSITY SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICYAND PROCEDURES
I. POLICY
A. Policy Statement
It is the policy of Rice Universityto provide an environment that is free from sexual
harassment because such conduct seriously underminesthe atmosphere of trust and respect that is essential to a healthy work and academicenvironment.
This policy applies to all members of theuniversity community, who are
encouraged to report promptly complaints aboutsexual harassment. Persons found to be in violation of this sexual harassment policy shallbe subject to disciplinary action whichmay include, but is not limited to, written warning,demotion, transfer, suspension or dismissal.
B . Legal Authority
Sexual harassment is a form of sex discriminationwhich is prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by Title IX ofthe Education Amendments of 1972, and by
the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. RiceUniversity's Equal Opportunity/
Affirmative Action Policy also prohibitssex discrimination.
C. Definition
Sexual harassment may involve the behaviorof a person of either sex against a
person of the opposite or same sex, and occurs when such behaviorconstitutes unwelcome
sexual advances, unwelcome requests for sexual favors,and other unwelcome verbal or
physical behavior of a sexual nature where:
1. Submission to such conduct is made eitherexplicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's educationor employment;
2. Submission to or rejection of such conductby an individual is used as the
basis for academic or employment decisionsaffecting the individual's
welfare; or
3. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of substantiallyinterfering with an
individual's welfare, academic or work performance,or creates an
intimidating, hostile, offensive,or demeaning education or work
environment.
A third party may also file a complaint under thispolicy if the sexual conduct of
others in the education or work environmenthas the purpose or effect of substantially
interfering with the third party's welfare,academic or work performance.184
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D. Examples of Prohibited Behavior
Prohibited acts that constitute sexual harassment may takea variety of forms.
Examples of the kinds of conduct that may constitute sexual harassment include, butare not
limited to:
1. Unwelcome sexual propositions, invitations, solicitations, and flirtations.
2. Threats or insinuations that a person's employment, wages, academic
grade, promotional opportunities, classroom or work assignmentsor other
conditions of employment or academic life may be adversely affected bynot
submitting to sexual advances.
3. Unwelcome verbal expressions of a sexual nature, including graphic sexual
commentaries about a person's body, dress, appearance,or sexual
activities; the unwelcome use of sexually degrading language, jokesor
innuendoes; unwelcome suggestive or insulting soundsor whistles;
obscene phone calls.
4. Sexually suggestive objects, pictures, videotapes, audio recordingsor
literature, placed in the work or study area, thatmay embarrass or offend
individuals. Such material if used in an educational setting should be related
to educational purposes.
5. Unwelcome and inappropriate touching, patting,or pinching; obscene
gestures.
6. Consensual sexual relationships where such relationships leadto favoritism
of a student or subordinate employee with whom the teacheror superior is
sexually involved and where such favoritism adversely affects other
students and/or employees.
E. Responsibility
Individuals who are aware of or have experiencedan incident of sexual harassment
should promptly report the matter to one of the officials designatedto receive informal or
formal complaints. These officials are listed in Section II. Procedures.
F. Non-Reprisal
No faculty, administrator or staff, applicant for employment,student, or member of
the public may be subject to restraint, interference, coercionor reprisal for action taken in
good faith to seek advice concerning a sexual harassmentmatter, to file a sexual harassment
complaint, or to serve as a witness or a panel member in the investigationof a sexual
harassment complaint_
G Malicious, False Accusations
A complainant whose allegations are found to be both falseand brought with
malicious intent will be subject to disciplinary action whichmay include, but is not limited
to, written warning, demotion, transfer, suspension,or dismissal.185
3
IL PROCEDURES
An initial course of action for any faculty, staff, or student who feels that he or she
is being sexually harassed is for that person to tell or otherwise inform the harasser that the
conduct is unwelcome and must stop. However, in some circumstances this course of
action may not be feasible, may be unsuccessful, or the individual may be uncomfortable
dealing with the matter in this manner. To encourage persons experiencing alleged sexual
harassment to come forward, the University provides several channels of communication
and both informal and formal complaint resolution procedures.
A. Information, Counseling, and Informal Resolution
Anyone may seek advice, information or counseling on matters relatedto sexual
harassment without having to lodge a formal complaint Persons who feel theyare being
harassed, or are uncertain as to whether what they arc experiencing is sexual harassment,
are encouraged to talk with whomever they feel comfortable. Such informal discussions
can be handled departmentally by deans, department chairs, heads of administrative
departments, or by the Co-Directors of-Equal Employment Opportunity Programs, Director
of Human Resources, College Masters, the Dean of Students; the Director ofMulticultural
Affairs, or the Director of International Services.
At this stage of the informal resolution process, theperson seeking information and
advice will be counseled as to the options for action available under this policy. To the
extent possible, information disclosed through this advising process will be held in
confidence, unless and until the initiating individualagrees that additional people must be
informed in order to facilitate a solution. The aim of informal complaintresolution is not to
determine whether there was intent to harass but toensure that the alleged offending
behavior ceases and that the matter is resolved promptly at the lowest possiblelevel. No
disciplinary action is taken in resolving informal complaints.
B . Formal Complaint Resolution
The filing of a written complaint is required for thematter to be formally
investigated and a determination made as to whethera violation of the University policy
prohibiting sexual harassment has occurred.
Formal complaints of sexual harassment against a member of the facultyor staff are
filed with the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity Programs (EEOP).Those wishing
to bring a formal complaint of sexual harassment against a student should inform theDean
of Students who will either refer the case to the University Courtor, with the concurrence
of the Chair of the University Review Board, willassume original jurisdiction. The Co-
Director of EEOP or the Dean of Students receiving the complaint willconduct a full,
impartial, and timely investigation.
The Co-Director of EEOP or the Dean of Students, if she/heassumes original
jurisdiction, will provide the respondent with a writtenstatement of the allegations, to
which that individual will be required to respond ina timely manner. During the course of
the investigation the Co-Director or the Dean of Students will hear thecomplainant, the
respondent, and witnesses identified by each party. To theextent possible, complaints will
be handled confidentially, with the facts made available onlyto those who have a
comnellin E need to know for onrnocrsof invectioatinn nr186
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At the conclusion of the investigation of a complaint against a faculty or staff
member, the Co-Director of EEOP will present to the appropriate administrative official(s) a
written report which will include the allegations, the investigatory process, the evidence in
the cast, the persuasiveness of the evidence, the consistency of the testimony, and the
credibility of the witnesses. The university administrator(s) will make a determination as to
whether there was a violation of policy, will take necessary action, and will inform the
complainant and the respondent of the final disposition of the complaint. In a case
involving a complaint against a student, the Dean of Students will prepare a written report
and will take appropriate administrative action.
At any time after filing a formal complaint, but before the Co-Director's report is
submitted, or the Dean of Students has taken action, either the complainant or respondent,
if either person is an employee or student of the University, may request that the Co-
Director of EEOP or the Dean of Students refer the matter to a panel of inquiry.
C. Panel of Inquiry
At the beginning of each academic year, a pool of faculty, staff, and students will
be created on the basis of nominations from the Student Association, the Graduate Student
Association, the Office of Human Resources, and the Faculty Council. The panels of
inquiry arc selected from this pool by the President of the University, each panel
comprising a chair and four members, two male and two female. The chair will normally
be non-voting, but will cast the tic-breaking vote when necessary. Panel membership will
be dependent on the status of the parties involved in the complaint as follows:
1. When both parties in an alleged incident are students, the panel will
comprise three faculty and two student members, undergraduate and/or
graduate as appropriate.
2. When both parties are members of the faculty, the panel will be made up of
faculty members.
3. When both parties are members of staff, the panel will be made up of
members of staff.
When the panics are from different constituencies, the panel will have a
faculty member plus two members from each of the two constituencies.
5. With respect to complaints brought by third parties, it is not the status of the
third party but rather the status of the subjects of the complaint that will
determine the composition of the panel.
The purpose of the panel of inquiry is to determine, to the best of its ability, the
facts regarding the alleged sexual harassment_ Prior to the hearing, the panel will meet to
determine procedures for the conduct of the hearing in consultation with the parties
involved. The panel will hear the complainant, the respondent, and witnesses identified by
each party, and will examine all evidence it deems necessary. The rights of both panics
will be observed and privacy and confidentiality will be protected to the extent possible.
At the conclusion of its investigation, the panel, will issue a written report to the
appropriate administrator(s). Specifically in case 1) above, the report will be forwarded to
the Dean of Students, in case 2) to the Provost, and in case 3) to the Vice President for
Finance and Administration. In all other cases the reports will be forwarded to thetwo
appropriate administrators. The panel's report will detail the allegations, the evidence in the5
case, the persuasiveness of the evidence, the consistency of the testimony, and the
credibility of the witnesses. The appropriate administrator(s) will determinewhether there
has been a violation of the University's policy prohibiting sexual harassment,and will take
whatever disciplinary action is indicated.
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